

PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS FOR AUTHENTIC DEMOCRACY:

A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF THE POLITICAL
PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION

by

M A R T I N M I C H A E L Z L O T N I K

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A B S T R A C T

The problem addressed is the evaluation of a school and the study conducts a philosophical analysis of the normative and political pre-suppositions of educational evaluation.

This involves the articulation of a comprehensive theory of education, integrating social and political philosophy and a vision of the good for man.

This integration is achieved through an examination of the related ideas of an existential perspective on the good of the individual, the grounding of normative judgments in the human existential predicament, the primacy of practice and the importance of "democratic" communications and power relations.

It is argued that educational evaluation should be grounded in a conception of man's good - in both individual and social terms, and Chapter I addresses the individual aspect.

Chapter II analyses the social perspective and articulates a democratic social principle based on equal consideration of the good of all individuals.

Chapter III argues that power relations and communications processes are crucial for individuals and groups realizing their good.

Chapter IV articulates principles for the shaping of power relations and communications by the basic structure of society; it addresses the reconciliation of popular political accountability, worker autonomy and cultural pluralism.

Chapter V uses the preceding analyses to articulate two basic aims for education, one existential, the other social. It is argued that these aims should be elaborated in terms of the power relations and communications processes of the participants before considering specific educational objectives, curriculum, pedagogy or evaluation procedures. The overarching importance of the system of political control over education is stressed.

Throughout, and especially in Chapter VI, the thesis addresses major policy issues in the political control of education, e.g., educational evaluation, curriculum control, teacher accountability, local versus central control. It also raises basic questions concerning the research programme of educational theorists and philosophers of education.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. FPSC - "the fundamental principle for social co-operation" (see p. 85)
2. PTE - "the principle of teaching excellence" (see p. 288)
3. SET - School evaluation team (see pp. 13-17)
4. TAG - "a transformative action group" (see p. 101)
5. TAG Network - "a network of transformative action groups"
 - (a) the principle of inter-related groups, each with internal democracy, and with democratic inter-relations (see p. 143)
 - (b) a structure incorporating a pyramidal approach to political representation along three tracks - citizenship, work and culture, which incorporates franchise/co-operative relations in the work-place and which grants all workers professional status (see Chapter IV)
 - (c) the mid-term goal for an authentically democratic society.
6. TPA - "the teachers' professional Association" (see pp. 250-251)

P R E F A C E

In its final form the thesis reports the analyses and findings of only a part of the educational and research activity. The writing of this thesis has been a deeply satisfying experience, as much for the opportunity to straighten out my own thinking on a number of important matters, as for the experience of creative work. Indeed the aspects of self-transformation and of scholarly research go very much together. Because this sort of intellectual activity is a co-operative venture it is fitting to acknowledge the contribution of others to the thesis and to the total educational experience associated with its writing.

I have had many excellent teachers spanning my elementary, secondary and university studies. Rather than try to recognize them all I will mention three from my graduating year at King Edward High School - Sadie Boyles, James Moore and Miss Robinson.

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without pay for a second; by providing me with inside experience regarding the politics of education over a ten-year period; by the intellectual stimulation of staff and teacher colleagues.

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NOTES ON USAGE

1. At this point I should make clear the plan followed regarding gender distinctions in the thesis. I am sensitive to the need to reduce sexism in literature and scholarly work. However, I find expressions such as "he/she", "his/her", etc. awkward. Accordingly I alternate between the feminine form in the odd numbered chapters and the masculine in the even.
2. Let me at this point explain my use of quotation marks and inverted commas.

In referring to a concept or a foreign or technical expression I use single quotes, e.g. 'justice'.

In expressing an odd expression or unusual usage, I use double quotation marks, e.g. "justice".

In reporting a direct quotation of a sentence fragment, sentence, paragraph, etc. I use double quotation marks (except for quotations within quotations).

Interestingly these are not exclusive categories and so I have sometimes to choose according to the greater emphasis I want to put on the expression.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

What is the problem with education today? It is striking that there is a variety of perspectives on this question, depending, in part, on whether one is a teacher, student, parent, taxpayer or politician, in part on one's geographic locality, cultural circumstances, gender, class position, own educational experiences and so on. The ways people describe, categorize and theorize about educational problems are also extremely divergent. Some see the problem as a matter of technique or concrete aids, some in terms of power relations, some in terms of conceptions of the good life or justice or other broad purposes. Hence the major problems in education are seen or not seen as due to poor teaching, poor administration, lack of accountability, powerful teacher unions, lack of resources, lack of professional status and too little autonomy for teachers, social relations in a class society, the decline of morality and social solidarity, the economic and social changes arising in advanced industrial society, the predominance of a technological - scientific orientation in our culture, ... depending on one's perspective.

How are we to establish public policies for education given this diversity in perspective? How are persons engaged in serious research and scholarship concerning education to justify their perspective or the focus of their study? How does one justify one's omissions? Clearly one cannot even mention all the concerns that might have been considered but this is different from not providing an ethical grounding for one's analysis, and not mentioning why. On the other hand how does one justify taking the time to go into ethical questions? How far does one go into

the ethical foundations of one's educational analysis? We can ask the same sorts of questions concerning pedagogy, social theory, justice, politics and other disciplines or fields that might illuminate our understanding of education.

Is it reasonable to expect scholars and policy makers to justify their perspectives or focus? Or does rationality only become relevant to educational research and policy once a perspective is chosen, arbitrarily, from among the many possibilities? This study brings to light some findings which are important not only for educational theory and policy but also for social and political theory; and these findings are reached through particular approaches and perspectives; but I face the issue of perspective and focus, attempt to justify the perspective taken and I argue that the choice of inquiry and perspective taken in the thesis is not arbitrary.

Indeed I am struck by the interconnections between the concerns and issues inherent in the various perspectives and will reveal a number of these connections during the study. I argue that we can make sense of many of these apparently arbitrary differences in perspective through the articulation of a sound foundation for educational policy and theory which involves a theorization of human agency, social co-operation, social justice, culture and politics. Hence I offer a theory of education involving a wide-ranging inquiry into the above-mentioned fields and I justify the perspectives taken in articulating this theory. I will develop findings and conclusions which are relevant to the everyday evaluation of educational processes and also to the governance of education. To do this the study provides a theorization of human agency to a greater extent than is the practice in political or educational philosophy, develops some original findings concerning democratic social life and

offers a general strategy for the transformation of both education and society towards a way of life which is good, just and feasible. This is both a philosophical analysis, a study in educational, social and political philosophy, and a practical study: it addresses issues of central significance to concerns as varied as the improvement of the quality of education for students or the working lives of teachers, of the basic structures of a just and democratic society, and of principles for educational research and philosophy of education. While a philosophical analysis it touches on the territory of other disciplines such as sociology, economics and organization theory without adopting their methods of inquiry.

Naturally this sort of study poses extremely difficult challenges: the scope is vast and the space little; the disciplines involved are many; it has to produce generalized findings and yet be practical. And so I will need some devices which allow an efficient development of the topic. But what is the topic? In all this talk about perspectives I have not said what our theme or topic is. It is better that I deal with the device first. I initiate this study with a device: the task is to conduct an evaluation of a school. How did this task get assigned? There are many possibilities: e.g. officials in a government educational bureaucracy assigned it; the local community demanded it; the local teachers' association initiated it; the teachers in the school decided to do it. While the nature of the assignment is important to the participants it will not matter to us, initially. What does matter is that a group of teachers in the school is conducting the evaluation of their own school. The only constraint on these teachers is that they are to submit a report in writing within eighteen months of the assignment being made. They may bring such advisers and consultants into their evaluation team as they

see fit, use whatever criteria of evaluation they choose and conduct their inquiry in any way that does not upset the current functioning of the school during the evaluation period. Moreover they have the resources they need in terms of books, journals, materials, time off through relieving teachers and expense money for consultants or advisers.

In fact the teachers enlist the participation of parents in the community, local academics and an officer of the teachers' union to join their evaluation team. The composition of the evaluation team will not be identified by occupation although it may be of interest that there is a variety of different experiences - union organization, political, academic and an assortment of industrial work experience in addition to teaching; there is a diversity of social, political, religious and philosophical perspectives within the group; the members are all well educated, articulate and experienced in group work.

My study is both an account of the work of this group and of their deliberations over about a fourteen-month period and a philosophical inquiry into social, political and educational theory. More accurately the account of the deliberation of this school evaluation team is a device which I use in the philosophical inquiry, a device which economically facilitates the articulation of a theory and a set of findings that are practical at a number of levels, e.g., the problems of everyday classroom practice, the policies for governing the educational system, general social theory, and the requirements for democracy.

In following through their task of school evaluation they come to appreciate that principles for good education can only be satisfactorily articulated with respect to a set of principles for a just and democratic society. Accordingly they pursue an inquiry into principles for the just

and democratic organization of social, cultural and political relations as the foundation for the subsequent formulation of educational aims and principles of evaluation.

So what is our topic? School evaluation? Educational governance? Educational theory? Democratic theory? Social justice? Social transformation? Professionalization? While all of these issues are addressed none of them is the topic. The topic is the social and political philosophy of education and the wide-ranging arguments in the thesis reflect the broad scope implied by this topic. Within this broad scope there is a focus on the political presuppositions of educational evaluation.

The school evaluation team is a fiction and the "characters", in the dialogic reports of their deliberations, are imaginary agents used to articulate various strands in the arguments through which the analysis of the topic is pursued. Generally the names of the characters indicate their general orientation or perspective although they are not intended to be radical stereotypes - they are each capable of flexible and logical thinking, and their views are modified during the deliberations. The orientations of Action-Man, Liberal, Precise, Scholar, Solidarity and Teleologist should be easy to discern. Heart has a special concern with the "lived experience" of individuals and with the quality of interpersonal relations.

These dialogues express a number of different considerations in the analysis of the issues and sometimes the analyses do not lead to a clear-cut resolution of a particular matter under discussion. This is right and proper because in certain instances the validity of the conclusion depends upon a number of diffuse factors which are difficult to specify. Nevertheless a natural question regarding the dialogues is, "Where does the thesis writer stand? What are the author's conclusions?" If any argument

is not challenged by any of the characters it expresses the author's position; if it is challenged but the challenger subsequently withdraws her objection, this also asserts the author's position. Whenever Facilitator, who has a special function of facilitating the agenda and identifying consensus, reports agreements or conclusions she expresses the author's position. Finally, all commentaries are in the voice of the thesis writer.

The speakers are ready. Let us begin.

C H A P T E R I

EVALUATION, AGENCY, AUTHENTICITY AND AUTONOMY

1. How do you evaluate a school?

The first problems facing our school evaluation team (SET) are those of method and agenda. How do you go about evaluating a school? In what order should you proceed? Are these merely technical questions or do they involve one in taking normative, ethical or political positions? These are difficult issues for the SET who take some time coming to closure on them. Several meetings of often frustrating and inconclusive discussions have already taken place when we join the SET with Facilitator summing up the earlier discussion and suggesting an approach to the agenda.

FACILITATOR: We are experiencing a lot of frustration trying to get

under way on our task but perhaps, initially, we were too impatient and unrealistic concerning the difficulties of and the time required for a school evaluation. With your permission I would like to review our discussions with a view to clarifying and improving our agenda and our methodology. An early suggestion was to set up a schedule of interviews with teachers, students and parents and of observations of lessons and school activities. However it was pointed out that we do not have any agreed principles to guide our collection, interpretation and evaluation of data. To this it was asked, "Why not simply report the facts and leave the interpretation and evaluation of those facts to those who read the report?" However Scholar argues that we do not have that option because the number of potential

"facts" is unlimited and practically speaking reporting facts involves taking positions on what is both important and true. In any case our task is to prepare an evaluation of the school and not simply an encyclopaedic report. We are forced to be selective in the facts we report; moreover we want our selection of facts to be justifiable and not simply an arbitrary choice. Therefore we require some justifiable principles and criteria to guide our inquiries, our data collection, our deliberations and the writing of our summary report.

As several of you have remarked, this is a pretty obvious conclusion, but it is important nevertheless. Having agreed on the need for justifiable principles and criteria for evaluation, we all immediately proceeded to advocate our own views about good education and our discussion, lacking consistent use of categories and terminology or any systematic approach, ranged all over the map and produced little closure. Some wanted to start by establishing aims for education, curriculum principles, pedagogical principles and the like; others argued for a social and political perspective in terms of democratic values; others called for a focus on interpersonal relations and decision processes. It seems that our frustration arises not so much from straightforward disagreements over the particular principles advocated, although there are such disagreements, as from the concern that we are not talking in the same terms because our categories do not mesh and because we have no sense of method or order in our agenda.

I recommend that we discontinue our attempts to persuade one another of the merits of our various principles or criteria or philosophies of education and try to put our discussion on a much more fundamental level, at least for a while, because if we can get clear on the basic categories for discussing our task and on the

appropriate methods for exploring it, then we will make better progress later in terms of both validity and speed. So I ask the members of the committee to focus on the kind of principles and criteria we are seeking, i.e. on their general nature, and to ignore, for now, their specific content.

TELEOLOGIST: I agree with Facilitator's proposal and have a suggestion in accordance with it. If we are going to evaluate the quality of education in our school we will be concerned with ideas about 'good education' or 'good schooling' (which is not necessarily the same thing); we will talk of the various respects in which education is good or bad, effective or ineffective, helpful or harmful, or something of this sort. So we will need some conception(s) of the good or of various "goods". Whatever else it may be a good school is good for human beings and so we should articulate principles for the good of human beings. This is still too vague. A good school is good for human beings but which ones? Students? Teachers? Parents? Everyone in the community? (Which community?) Everyone? Do these categories imply different conceptions of the good? Or do they all point to a single idea of the good for man? Do they refer to groups in a fundamental conflict of interests? Or, is there a good common to everyone? If so, what is it?

LIBERAL: While Teleologist has focused the discussion at a fundamental level, her approach alarms me. I take the position that the individual has the right to define her own good and to live freely and autonomously according to her own values within the constraints required for others to have the same rights. If, in accordance with Teleologist's programme, we try to define 'the good for man' and use this as a basis for educational evaluation we introduce an

authoritarian bias which may lead us into totalitarian commitments.

TELEOLOGIST: Like you I am opposed to authoritarianism and I appreciate your concern that a particular definition of man's good might have authoritarian implications but does not this depend on the definition? You justify your concerns in terms of autonomy and freedom, suggesting that you consider autonomy and freedom to be crucial features of man's good. If they are not, your rejection of authoritarianism is not justified, is it?

LIBERAL: No, but I thought you planned to be more specific and to elaborate on man's good beyond 'autonomy' and 'freedom'.

TELEOLOGIST: I do, although not to the point or in a way that represents authoritarian imposition. However my main concern at this point is to establish that, at the most fundamental level, the kind of principles we seek are concerned with the good of human beings. While liberals often argue against such a programme as authoritarian or totalitarian they are wrong. Any normative position, including the defence of liberal values, requires justification of its values as advancing the good of human beings. John Rawls, who argues as you do against grounding justice in terms of man's good is nevertheless led to articulate a "Thin Theory of the Good" because one cannot rationally defend an ethical or political theory except on a foundation of man's good.¹

LIBERAL: I am prepared to carry on the discussion in terms of principles for the good of human beings but I will oppose any authoritarian imposition of values or any attempt to pass off particular value commitments as representing "man's good" or "universal human needs".

PRECISE: With so much dispute among scholars about what is good for man, about human nature, or whether man has a nature I am not hopeful of

our reaching closure. However, as we seem to be stalemated, let us proceed on this agenda, unless someone has a better idea.

HEART: I agree with Teleologist's programme of pursuing an inquiry into man's good, and also that we need a great deal of knowledge about human beings but we should be more optimistic of success because all of us have a great deal of experience concerning the human predicament which we can draw on during our deliberations.

FACILITATOR: Do we agree to an inquiry into the good for human beings along the lines Teleologist suggests?

SET: Agreed.

2. Concepts of human agency

HEART: Let us take a few minutes to get clearer on what human beings are like. Some scholars have proceeded to discuss education, social principles or political theory without an explicit articulation of their position on human agency.² There are a number of reasons why we should take the time and care to provide an explicit conceptualization of human agency: if one does not there is a danger, as in certain types of utilitarianism, of entirely losing sight of the agency of the human being; there are many competing conceptions of the human agent suggested by terms such as 'person', 'individual', 'self', 'character', etc., which, although often loosely treated as synonymous, have distinguishable meanings;³ there are certain fundamental issues at stake concerning the subject/object separation, an appropriate appreciation of an existential perspective on the human predicament, and collective versus individual agency. Explicit conceptualization of human agency with respect to these fundamental issues reduces our chances of drifting into a serious error or

imbalance in our understanding of man; moreover, the errors we do make can be readily related to the conclusions we draw concerning social justice, educational evaluation and other matters.

ACTION-MAN: I barely understand you! What do you mean by "the subject/object separation", "an appropriate appreciation of an existential perspective" and "collective versus individual agency"?

HEART: The 'subject/object separation' refers to our understanding of consciousness in relation to the world and of the knowing, acting subject in so far as she knows, acts and is in the world. As Lucien Goldmann writes:

In an immediate way all reflection of consciousness upon itself and its status first of all affirms the separation of the subject and the object, the self and the world. I think about a world which, as an object of my thought, has another epistemological status than my own consciousness. Likewise, I act upon a world which, as the object of my action, has a practical status different from myself, being one of the poles of a global structure of which I am the complementary pole.

Yet, as soon as reflection advances even a little, one perceives that it is difficult to accept this duality as such. Already pre-dialectical discussions between rationalism and idealism, before any reflection upon development, have shown us the existence of two opposed, complementary, and on the static level, equally founded positions; one which, by reducing the object to the subject, made the external world a simple modification of consciousness, and the other which, by reducing the subject to the object, makes consciousness a simple intramundane object analogous to all those considered by reflection. ⁴

FACILITATOR: What about the existential perspective?

HEART: A crucial "fact" about man is that she exists and experiences her existence in an utterly different way from the existence of objects or things that are present to us or are "real". Existential philosophers have important insights into the human condition that we need to understand and appreciate. For example, Heidegger

distinguishes the study of man's being in this existential sense, which he calls 'ontological' inquiry from the study of objects and things which is 'ontical' (corresponding roughly to positivistic science).⁵ Ontical inquiry, which provides theoretical explanations involving causes, forces, trends, probabilities and the like, cannot reveal the existential features of our lives.⁶

On the other hand, the existential perspective is not sufficient because there is also a place for scientific/theoretical inquiries in understanding man's good. Hence by "an appropriate appreciation of an existential perspective" I mean recognizing and including both existential and scientific/theoretical methods of inquiry into man and her good.

ACTION-MAN: How do you propose to achieve an appropriate balance between these two types of analysis?

HEART: My suggestion is that we start with Heidegger's concept of Dasein (in Being and Time) because Heidegger is correct in maintaining an inseparable relation between subject and object and because it is a highly satisfactory and profound articulation of the existential perspective. Then we need to criticize Heidegger's account, supplement and "correct" it with certain non-existential perspectives. Based on these analyses we should be able to articulate our own position on the human agent which will facilitate our discussion of man's good.

3. Heidegger's Dasein

This section is a summary of a presentation by Heart.

'Dasein' or 'being-there' is Heidegger's term for the human agent or man. Dasein is the "entity" which each of us is.⁷ Dasein exists and so in some sense stands outside the world of things. Man, as Dasein, has a relation to herself, i.e. she is at once subject and object to herself. Dasein exists as possibility in the sense that her being is never complete at any given moment and therefore she has no essence as an object has.⁸

Dasein is in-the-world and exists in no other way. The subject, for Heidegger, is never detached from her world. This "world" consists of things for Dasein's use which Heidegger calls 'ready-to-hand'; other things that are just there or 'present-at-hand'; and co-agents, i.e. others who are also Dasein in-the-world.⁹ 'Being-in-the world' expresses both spatiality, i.e. a relationship of being alongside entities in the world, and also a caring or concernful relationship to those entities and to other persons.¹⁰ In being-in-the-world Dasein is not dependent on some privileged subject for meaning and significance but experiences them directly and immediately. She always finds herself already under way in a project or a continuous flow of actions. Hence she experiences temporality directly in that her project has a past and a future in addition to her present action. In her project Dasein engages in projection or purpose as implicitly present in the flow of actions and the projecting of meaning or significance onto things in the world, as 'pragmata' or instruments in her praxis. For example, hammers, telephones, books, scalpels and typewriters are meaningful in terms of the human activities and projects which they instrumentally serve. Through her praxis Dasein transforms her world, and instruments ready-to-hand are meaningful and significant in relation to this transformative action.¹¹

The concept of 'project' connects the ideas of 'self' and 'world'. For Heidegger the 'I' or the 'self' is, "...what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its Experiences and ways of behaviour, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing".¹² This illustrates that there is an historical sense embedded within the experience of being 'I' or 'self' expressed in the maintenance of identity through change. Selfhood is more than the differentiation of I/me from not I/me. Indeed we generally experience others as selves like us. In any case the central idea of selfhood is not the distinction between a single isolated individual and everything else but of an historically continuing sense of identity. On this view there is no scepticism concerning the multiplicity of selves.

There is a very important point concerning the self which I want to note in Heidegger's analysis and which I will apply in the subsequent analyses. The self is not primarily or fundamentally inward looking and is not to be seen as some essence of interiority.

...one's own Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally 'come across' only when it looks away from 'Experiences' and the 'centre of its actions', or does not as yet 'see' them at all. Dasein finds 'itself' proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids - in those things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned.

"I" does not refer to "a certain privileged point - that of an I-Thing - but is to be understood as Being-in in terms of the "yonder" of the world that is ready-to-hand - the "yonder" which is the dwelling-place of Dasein as concern".¹³ I want to stress that selfhood is concerned with the project, with Dasein's praxis and with her concerned thought and action toward her world.

In the 'here', the Dasein which is absorbed in its world speaks not towards itself but away from itself towards the 'yonder' of something circumspectively ready-to-hand; yet it still has itself in view in its existential spatiality.¹⁴

It follows from this perspective that an understanding of self and an understanding of one's world go together.

Thus Dasein's understanding of being pertains with equal primordially both to an understanding of something like a 'world', and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world.... Dasein also possesses - as constitutive for its understanding of existence - an understanding of the Being of all entities of a character other than its own.¹⁵

Dasein, as an inquiring being is able to conduct her inquiries in different modes and to conceive being in radically divergent ways. Heidegger says that we understand the self as a sort of substance, as present-at-hand like entities we encounter in the world: "Dasein is tacitly conceived in advance as something present-at-hand".¹⁶ Later we will want to consider the question, "Under what conditions does Dasein understand herself as a kind of thing or substance?" Now we want to note that the way in which Dasein conducts her various inquiries has a crucial bearing on the way she conceives and experiences her being. There are a number of ways in which Dasein can misperceive her circumstances: by seeing the ready-to-hand as present-at-hand, i.e. seeing instruments in her praxis as external, given "reality"; by seeing others as either ready-to-hand (instrumentally) or as present-at-hand (as things); by seeing oneself as present-at-hand. In any of these ways of misperceiving being there is a form of Dasein's existence that goes with it, which Heidegger calls 'inauthentic existence' or 'inauthenticity'.¹⁷ In other words the way Dasein understands her own existence and her world (which are not separate but a connected structure) is related to how she experiences her life. Initially then 'authenticity', i.e. 'authentic existence', goes with a way of understanding one's being-in-the-world which in some sense is "true". We have more to say on authenticity in section 6.

We have mentioned that being-in-the-world gets at the caring relationship that Dasein has to her world and its immediate meaning and significance to her. 'Care' is not to be identified with 'will', 'wish', 'addiction' or 'urge'. "Care cannot be derived from these, since they themselves are founded upon it."¹⁸ Concepts such as 'will', 'wish' and 'urge' seem to presuppose an ontical understanding of being. This is not to say that they have no place but to the extent that they are treated as forces, causes or links in causal chains or factors in probabilistic explanations of behaviour then they miss Dasein's sort of existence.

Heidegger writes of 'fallenness' - the tendency of Dasein to 'lose' herself in the world which I interpret as losing sight of her own existence in her fascination with things. 'Conscience' is a contrary feature which summons or calls Dasein toward authenticity. For Heidegger 'care' is a unity constituted by existentiality, facticity and fallenness. 'Facticity' refers to the fact that although Dasein has the possibility of choices and decisions she must be herself in her world, i.e. that Dasein is bounded or limited and as we will elaborate later her range of possibilities is determined.

The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world.¹⁹

Much is said about 'possibility' and 'potentiality'. Dasein has the possibility of existing in basically different ways and for Heidegger there is a crucial polarity between authentic and inauthentic existence. Methodologically, Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein is not an attempt to describe universal properties of Dasein, (such a study, were it attempted, would be ontical not ontological) which is impossible for a being that exists (as opposed to the being of entities) but to show

the horizons of possibility within which the concrete possibilities of every individual Dasein must fall.²⁰

I can only touch on Heidegger's account of 'knowing'.²¹ He criticizes a superficial manner of interpreting knowing the world by setting up a relation between subject and object. "But subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."²² How could they for Dasein, who is encountered by others in the world, is also "world"?²³

If knowing 'is' at all, it belongs solely to those entities which know. But even in those entities, human-Things, knowing is not present-at-hand as, let us say, bodily properties are. Now, inasmuch as knowing belongs to these entities and is not some external characteristic, it must be 'inside'.²⁴

How then is this "being inside" which knowing possesses grounded in the kind of being which belongs to the subject? Heidegger responds that "knowing is a Kind of Being which belongs to Being-in-the-world", and he anticipates the objection that this formulation nullifies the problem of knowledge; "for what is left to be asked if one presupposes that knowing is already 'alongside' its world, when it is not supposed to reach that world except in the transcending of the subject?" To this objection Heidegger points out that the "constructivist standpoint" underlying this objection has not been phenomenally demonstrated and he additionally asks, "what higher court is to decide whether and in what sense there is to be any problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing as such and the kind of Being which belongs to the knower?"²⁵

When our concerned encounter with the world holds us back from praxis, i.e. from producing, working with and manipulating things etc., the sole remaining way of being in the world is a type of "just tarrying alongside" in which we "encounter entities within-the-world purely in the

way they look". Hence knowing is taking a viewpoint in which Dasein refrains from manipulation or utilization to perceive the entities as present-at-hand.

Perception is consummated when one addresses oneself to something as something and discusses it as such. This amounts to interpretation in the broadest sense; and on the basis of such interpretation, perception becomes an act of making determinate. What is thus perceived and made determinate can be expressed in propositions, and can be retained and preserved as what has thus been asserted.²⁶

In this fashion Heidegger can show that formulations which portray knowledge as being concerned with propositional statements, their truth values and grounds are understandable as partial derivations from his more profound and correct interpretation.²⁷

Before leaving this discussion of Heidegger's concept of Dasein we should contrast it with the thoughts of Descartes and of Kant. With his "Cogito ergo sum" (I think therefore I am) Descartes claimed to put philosophy on a new and firm footing and to answer the sceptic's doubt but Heidegger argues that Descartes left the 'sum' (I am) completely undiscussed.²⁸ Moreover, because Descartes posits the human subject as a substance or created 'ens' his subject can be apprehended in isolation, i.e. without a world.²⁹

Kant is criticized for interpreting consciousness of my Dasein as consciousness of my being-present-at-hand in the same way as things are present-at-hand. Hence for Kant there is a 'Being-present-at-hand-together' of the physical and the psychical but this is completely different from Heidegger's idea of 'Being-in-the world'.³⁰

I want to stress that this inquiry, whilst drawing extensively on Heidegger's work, does not use it in any wholesale way as a foundation because there are differences in research interests and methodology, and

at times I have freely interpreted his expressions - I do not want attention diverted from the substantive points I make, which can stand independently of whatever authority Heidegger can give them, onto questions of the fidelity of my analyses with Heidegger's standpoint.³¹

4. Criticisms and methodology

In this session the SET agrees that an existential perspective, such as Heidegger's, is crucial for understanding aspects of human agency. Specifically they concur with Heidegger's articulation of being-in-the-world, the care structure and its connection to the projective understanding of world and self, and of the self as more than interiority and as inescapably connected to the world. Concerning Heidegger's definition of philosophy as 'universal phenomenological ontology', several members disagree that this is the definition of philosophy but see it rather as a particular way of doing philosophy.³² Also the SET has a somewhat different research interest from Heidegger.

TELEOLOGIST: We share an interest with Heidegger in ontologically clarifying some "who" and "what" questions: who is the agent who knows, thinks, speaks and acts? Ontologically what are 'existence', 'knowing' and 'caring'? However our task also directs us to pose some "why", "how" and "under what conditions" questions. Why, how and under what conditions do we: perceive ourselves as substance?; tend to live authentically or inauthentically? These sorts of questions are seeking conceptual clarity or empirical, causal or quasi-causal explanations.³³ Because they are formulated causally rather than ontologically an existentialist of a pure sort may object that they reflect inauthenticity by presupposing forces, causes and tendencies and thereby denying existential freedom. However our

concern must be as much directed to understanding man's factual determinations as his existential freedom.

This suggests that whereas Heidegger uses the method of phenomenology we should use both existential and non-existential perspectives and move back and forth between existential and causal analyses. This method is appropriate for a being who wants not only to understand being and to grasp the most authentic possibility of those available to her but who also insists on altering the range of possibilities available. Hence we should combine both types of analysis not as a random, unconsidered eclecticism but as an integration of two vital types of inquiry into a unified study of aspects of the human condition. Whether inquiry into laws, principles and tendencies is authentic or inauthentic turns on how they are conceived; whether as aids to praxis or as explanations for a given spectacle beyond human control and responsibility.

For Heidegger Dasein is always free to choose authentic existence: even when ensnared with things in the world and existing inauthentically Dasein can always choose authentic existence and hence inauthentic existence, despite being deficient always holds open the possibility of a future decision for authenticity.³⁴ However, I argue that whether and to what degree a human agent has the capacity to choose authenticity depends upon various social conditions. If I am right on this there are important implications for our agenda.

While existentially I do not quarrel with Heidegger's description of facticity as the experience of givenness - of having to be myself in my world - I want to look into the ways in which human social action reconstructs facticity, i.e. the determinations which men

and women encounter as fixing their possibilities. More specifically how and under what conditions can human beings consciously alter their own determinations? What principles should guide their praxis in this endeavour?

SOLIDARITY: I agree with Teleologist's points about methodology and I want to raise a different sort of criticism to the effect that Heidegger's articulation of 'authenticity' is too individualistic. Heidegger portrays authenticity as not only opposed to the "they" - the impersonal, collectivised, everyday, reified social relations of modern industrialized societies - but as opposed to social solidarity and fraternity as well and to society as such.³⁵

FACILITATOR: We appear to agree on these points and so we can address our own conception of human agency at our next session.

5. Agency and I-self

SCHOLAR: We have already implicitly suggested some features of human agency in discussing the structure of the project and praxis. Agents are beings who perform actions or do acts.³⁶

Action can be thought of as intervention in events in the world which produces definite outcomes or as the application of means to achieve ends. In acting the agent manifests power which is latently present whenever action is a possibility in the sense that the agent could have 'acted otherwise' and if he had then events in the world would have unfolded otherwise.³⁷

There are two matters we wish to discuss which each in a way presupposes a position with respect to the other: whether agency is to be conceived as individual or collective; what status purpose and intention have concerning action. For Heidegger, while Dasein

experiences 'being-with-others' and has a special relation of care toward them which Heidegger calls 'solicitude' the agent is always the individual Dasein.³⁸ However Marx, Lukács and Goldmann lay the stress on a plural, historical subject as the manifestation of human agency.³⁹ The agent who actually accomplishes social transformation and establishes many of the major possibilities of human existence is not an individual but a collective subject. For Marx and Lukács this collective, historical subject is a socio-economic class.^{40, 41} Therefore a commitment to some form of democratic control over the factual determination of existential possibilities suggests that our agenda should give substantial attention to collective agency.

LIBERAL: What do you mean by 'collective agency'? Is it a group of people coming to undertake some action through joint deliberation? Do you include a social class as an example of a collective agent? If the latter it seems that intentionality is absent.

SCHOLAR: Intention or purpose is relevant to the description of action although this requires elaboration and qualification. We describe actions by expressions such as 'firing a gun', 'shooting a man' or 'making a promise' in which intention or purpose is implicit in the description.⁴² At least actions have the possibility of having intentions associated with them, although the agent may not be conscious of having an intention or his action may produce consequences which he does not intend. While logically 'intention' presupposes actions the reverse is not true. As Giddens writes,

...reasons and intentions are not definite 'presences' which lurk behind human social activity, but are routinely and chronically (in the durée of day to day existence) instantiated in that activity.⁴³

Despite the fact that agents do not necessarily have conscious intentions or purposes with respect to any particular action I agree with Liberal that we should not use the term 'collective agent' to refer to collectivities that have no possibility of conscious purpose or intention.⁴⁴ Nevertheless actions can be more or less intentional or purposive and agents can vary greatly in their capacities to understand both their intentions and the consequences of their actions. By monitoring their own actions and reflecting upon their purposes, intentions and consequences actors can achieve a more or less transparent understanding. By 'transparency' we refer not only to an understanding of causal connections, i.e. the "penetration" of the consequences of action, but equally to a knowledge of self which the reflexive monitoring of purpose, intention and mood reveal.⁴⁵

HEART: So there are basically three distinctions we need to make among human agents: collective agency is distinguished from individual; among portrayals of individual agents we should be able to distinguish an existential perspective from among various other perspectives. Ordinary language is satisfactory for distinguishing collective from individual agency but I suggest we use the coined term 'I-self' to refer to the existential perspective on individual human agency.

I-self is a human individual who: experiences her existence as personal; in existing as being-in-the-world has a caring relationship to the world; understands the world and herself through the structure of the project; exists as possibility and hence lacks any essence of the sort possessed by things; experiences states of mind and moods; can deliberate, engage in discourse, work with tools or instruments and imagine.

'I-self' is a way of referring to the subjective pole in a subject/object polarization which is inseparable (just as the north and south poles of a magnet are inseparable). In other words I-self points to the existential experience of caring which underlies significance, action, interaction and knowing. When we wish to stress the ontological significance or an existential perspective we can use 'I-self' whereas when we wish to make an ontical, scientific, nomothetic, theoretical or common-sense reference we may use whatever term seems appropriate in the circumstances, e.g. 'man, human being, social agent, actor, person, individual....'

COMMENTARY: The SET agrees to this formulation as a provisional basis for continuing the inquiry into authenticity, autonomy and man's good.

6. Authenticity

HEART: Basic to our understanding of I-self is the idea of authenticity; an existential possibility characterized by her seeing self/world "truly" and acting in accordance with this true vision. When she is authentic I-self sees her project, a meaningful, sustained flow of action, as harmoniously connecting her future vision of self in-the-world to her present being-in-the-world. She is under way in a transformation of her self/world and she sees her praxis as efficacious and the end, direction or purpose of the project as true, right or good. Additionally she experiences self-esteem.

PRECISE: Under the single idea of authenticity Heart has included a number of apparently distinct criteria. What is the justification for this particular assortment? In what sense do they belong together? Is it not possible for I-self to see the purpose of her project as good but her action as ineffective or vice versa? Also should authenticity not be seen as a matter of degree?

HEART: While Heidegger tends to treat authenticity/inauthenticity as a dichotomy I agree with Precise that it is more satisfactorily portrayed as a matter of degree with respect to the several dimensions. On Precise's other point, the criteria which constitute authenticity are not arbitrarily thrown together but comprise a structured whole. I will not take the time to develop the connections which do exist except for one case which can illustrate the type of argument that could be elaborated with respect to various connections.

I have included both understanding one's project and acting in accordance with this understanding among the criteria for authenticity. While understanding and action are conceptually distinct they are existentially connected. If I-self misunderstands her agency and/or her world the logical possibility of stumbling upon authentic action is remote at best and more aptly considered paradoxical, for the criterion of acting in accordance with one's project presupposes an understanding of that project. Conversely if, for whatever reasons, I-self does not act in accordance with a true understanding of her project then she will tend to develop a distorted or false conception of her self/world. The idea that one needs a sound understanding to carry out appropriate action fits with common sense while the idea that one's understanding becomes distorted by false action does not, presumably because we have had experiences in which we fail to act as our understanding suggests. Hence it seems that concerning any particular act the act does not transform our understanding of our project. However if we focus on the major project(s) defining self/world as unfolding over an extended time we can explore the effects of action on understanding.

Let us now reflect on the hypothetical case of an I-self who understands self/world but acts contrary to, i.e. not in accordance with, her understanding. Indeed this is a bizarre possibility because we are to imagine an agent who understands herself and her circumstances, who has a vision of a possibility for self/world which is most true to her understanding, and yet who acts contrary to that understanding and understands she is doing this as she does it. While we cannot rule out the possibility of such an agent logically we would never expect to meet one. Nevertheless we cannot be satisfied with this merely formal demonstration and must push on to see if we can grasp how "inauthentic" action "produces" inauthentic understanding and further how such a relationship between action and understanding can be concealed from a "common-sense" view.

We can explore this "how" question through an analysis of reification resulting from inefficacious praxis and deficient modes of being-with-others. In reification I-self sees self or other selves as a thing or sees the consequences of her praxis as a merely external "reality" governed by laws emanating from a centre of significance and meaning independent of human agency. We can readily see how this leads to passivity concerning aspects of I-self's life that she would change if she perceived them as resulting from her own action. But the reverse is also true: to the extent that I-self becomes detached from praxis and acts as a mere observer of events and actions the world truly will appear as a spectacle.⁴⁶ However a particular I-self may become detached from praxis this mode of relating to the world has the unintended consequence of reifying her consciousness and so her mode of acting on the world brings about an unintentional self-deception.

However this "how" analysis raises a "why" question. Why does an I-self withdraw from praxis or take a detached attitude toward the world? In part we can answer, "Because she has a reified consciousness". To a degree the circularity in "Reified consciousness produces detachment" and "Detachment produces reified consciousness" describes the reciprocal reinforcement in the relationship between the two, but this cannot be the whole story. I-self, to the extent she understands (or misunderstands) self/world has reasons for her actions and dispositions whereas to the extent she lacks consciousness of self/world her action is subject to causes. In the next section we argue that power is a crucial factor in determining I-self's stance (whether active praxis or detached passivity) toward her project.

In addition to detachment from praxis deficient modes of being-with-others are a source of reification. Mention has been made of 'solicitude' as Heidegger's term for the caring encounter of Dasein with other Daseins. Heidegger writes of "deficient and indifferent modes" of being-with-others, e.g. being for, against or without one another, passing one another by, not "mattering" to one another.⁴⁷ He also refers to two positive modes but one of these is only positive in a certain sense and certainly leads us away from authenticity. He writes of Dasein "leaping in" for the other, taking away her 'care' and putting herself in her position of concern. This is paternalism and it results in the other becoming dominated and dependent - whether the domination is hidden or open.⁴⁸

On the other hand it is possible to "leap ahead" of the other rather than "leap in" for her, not to "take away her 'care' but rather to give it back to her authentically as such for the first time". This is an authentic relationship with another I-self which

"helps the Other to become transparent to herself in her care and to become free for it".⁴⁹ Of course interpersonal relations can take many intermediate forms between extreme paternalism and authentic and fraternal being-with-one-another.

For Heidegger Dasein has two fundamental possibilities for being-with others: in the authentic mode she helps another to her freedom to attain a true understanding of self/world but in an inauthentic mode she dominates the other, or depersonalizes her or treats her with indifference.⁵⁰

In brief I define 'authentic being-with-one-another' as an existential state in which I-selves see each other as jointly engaged in a mutual project as co-agents. In their authentic being-with-one-another the fraternal I-selves form a community.

PRECISE: What is the "mutual project" and how does it relate to a person's own project?

HEART: In I-self's grasp of her own project other I-selves are experienced in various possible ways, i.e. the world in which I-self dwells is a social world populated by others. But how are these social relationships experienced? In an authentic relationship with others, I-self finds that there is a good degree of mutuality. In terms of diagram 1 on p.44 two or more persons will find that their personal projects are linked to a substantial degree; they are under way from a common situation, along a shared path, toward a mutual vision. I have referred to 'mutual project' to capture this sense of a common and shared engagement in which interpersonal relations are neither of indifference nor of domination/dependence.

The foregoing arguments show that as in the case of praxis the way we understand social and interpersonal relations affects our

actions. Again we want to demonstrate that our social actions affect our understanding and this is very simple. If I trust you, acknowledge you, help you and love you this is one "reality"; if I lie to you, betray you, attack and hurt you that is another. Here the way we act toward one another is the social "reality" we are trying to understand. Not only do different patterns of actions represent different "realities" to be apprehended as true of the present time but they radically change our vision of the future possibilities of existence and hence our actions crucially determine the limits within which we may conceive our projects, our selves and our world.

PRECISE: While we have established that our actions with respect to both things and our relations with other people do affect our understanding we have not yet explained how or in what sense an action can be authentic or inauthentic or how one would know whether or not it was.

HEART: The test of whether a particular action is authentic or inauthentic depends upon the action being monitored or assessed by I-self with respect to rules, principles or criteria which are themselves grounded, explicitly or implicitly, in I-self's authentic project.

PRECISE: But how does one know if one's project is authentic? Does I-self have an immediate intuitive sense of authenticity?

HEART: Yes, a consideration of the criteria for authenticity confirms that if authenticity is experienced it is experienced directly and immediately by the I-self concerned. However not in such a way that the assessment of one's project and existence cannot be altered on reassessment. Suppose that at this moment my assessment shows that my project is authentic, i.e. that I am living authentically.

Then tomorrow as a result of some problem - a dilemma in my conception of my project, a discussion or confrontation with others, or a failure of praxis (in being unable to carry out aspects of my project), I radically reassess my project and conclude that I had it wrong. Either my vision of myself in-the-world as a caring structuration of ends and intentions is wrong in some way or the implementation of my project, i.e. my praxis, is off course and I have not really been under way on my project or not fully so. Whether in terms of ends or means or both I can come to see at one time as inauthentic a project that on another occasion I see as authentic.

Authenticity is a way of being but it makes no reference to any sort of essence or reified "true self" because we deny that the self has any essence.⁵¹ Because we do not acknowledge any privileged standpoint other than I-self for experiencing her existence and for ascertaining whether her project conforms to that collection of criteria which we have called 'authenticity' there is no problem in a reassessment of one's life and project resulting in a verdict of "authentic" yesterday but "inauthentic" today.

Indeed authenticity is an unstable existential state: we may simply drift into inauthenticity by not being aware of much of what we are about; we may through our interaction with others or through failures of praxis, etc. be provoked to a radical reassessment of our project. In the latter case we undergo a crisis of self-perception and self-esteem - a crisis which opens possibilities for an authentic transformation of our project directed to a worthy vision of self in the world or various inauthentic responses such as reification, escapism, depression or despair.⁵²

FACILITATOR: We have demonstrated that reification can result from inefficacious praxis and from deficient modes of being-with-others and have examined both the "how" and "why" of reification and the general grounds for claims to know whether a project is authentic.

HEART: However we must not leave the impression that inefficacious praxis and deficiencies in our ways of being-with-one-another are totally separate. One simply cannot gain an authentic understanding of one's praxis by oneself. In a system of social co-operation characterized by a complex division of labour and social activity I-self cannot know what she is about except through understanding the social projects of which she is a participating member and this requires that she understand the intentions, commitments, concerns and beliefs of others. As I shall argue in subsequent sections we cannot gain a "true" understanding of these matters except through an authentic being-with-one-another.

FACILITATOR: In our next session we can pursue a more profound analysis of reflexive monitoring.

7. Autonomy, responsibility and reflexive monitoring

HEART: In the previous session we asserted that I-self can assess the authenticity of any particular action by applying rules, principles or criteria which are grounded in her authentic project; but this requires that I-self be able to have an authentic understanding of her project and we argued that if authenticity is experienced it is experienced directly and immediately.⁵³

In arguing for a direct perception of practical, normative and evaluative matters I am not suggesting a mysterious intuition or arguing that we perceive without presuppositions, without theory

or independently of social influence; I am not saying that we perceive incorrigibly or that we can always "see" what is there. On the contrary: I cannot see the stars if my eyes are focused on the ground or if there is dense cloud cover; I cannot judge a gymnastics performance competently without training nor can I do it fairly if I am biased for or against a certain competitor. All of this is compatible with our assertion that if authenticity is experienced it is experienced directly and immediately by the I-self concerned. The fact that we may not be able to assess our circumstances or that we may do so incorrectly is also important because it suggests an inquiry into the conditions that support I-self in assessing her project and that increase the transparency of her understanding of it.

LIBERAL: What is the justification for asserting that the rules, principles or criteria for evaluating courses of action must be grounded in I-self's authentic project?

HEART: In a causal sense I-self is not bound by this principle but can base her reflexive monitoring on some other foundation. However if she does so she will go wrong in some way. Because I-self is in-the-world any principles to guide her thought and action must be grounded in-the-world, i.e. in her predicament, if she is to understand, discuss and justify them. If we can agree on this we can proceed to defend the grounding in terms of I-self's authentic project.⁵⁴

DIAGRAM 1

I-SELF'S PROJECT




Diagram 1 is a greatly oversimplified portrayal of an authentic project. I-self has a (relatively) true or correct understanding of her situation (S) and of her possibilities and she has chosen the most genuine of these as her "vision" (V) or aim. She is under way along a path (P) of actions and commitments which is bringing her situation into accord with her vision; she is transforming self/world to bring it more in line with her vision.


FACILITATOR: So 'vision' represents I-self's purposes, ends or goals while 'path' points to the means she uses to pursue them.

HEART: To a degree the project can be understood as a means/end relation but this is not completely accurate. The conception of my vision is constantly altered as I move along my path. Moreover I-self's path of actions and commitments is not merely instrumental to the vision but rather the vision gives meaning and significance to a path to which she already has an inarticulate commitment.


DIAGRAM 2 EXAMPLES OF INAUTHENTIC PROJECTS

Note: Dotted figures show incorrect or distorted perceptions whereas solid figures show what would be perceived under unreified and "honest" evaluation.


2.1



2.2



2.3



In 2.1 X thinks she is authentic; everything seems "O K" and she finds her perception of situation, path and vision to be congruent. The distortions in her perceptions conceal the fact that she is off course.

In 2.2 Y understands her project accurately but she is not authentic because her action is out of kilter with her vision.

She is off course and she knows it. This is a crisis in that her project is unstable - it cannot stay like this. The question is which way will a degree of equilibrium be achieved - by getting her path orientated to her vision or by distortion in her understanding.

Poor Z in 2.3 misunderstands situation, path and vision and yet she knows she is off course. In a way she is closer to the truth than X but until she can understand her own action she cannot get on course.

Now it is not possible for I-self to be without a project; having a project is part of being I-self. The authentic project contains within its structure a correct understanding of the situation and a worthy vision feasibly connected to it. To base one's evaluations on the authentic project is to combine correct understanding, worthy intentions, feasibility and the likelihood of a desirable outcome.

COMMENTARY: During the discussion Precise raises four objections to Heart's demonstration but after hearing Heart's reply the SET, including Precise, agree that the principles I-self uses in reflexive monitoring of action should be grounded in her authentic project. The discussion of these objections follows.

The four objections are:

- (a) that the account is circular;
- (b) that frequently or generally I-selves will not have access to any authentic project and therefore will have no basis for reflexive monitoring;
- (c) that it is not practical for any society to base its norms of conduct and its morality on a foundation of individual perception and circumstance;

- (d) that it is not desirable for society to base its norms of conduct and its morality on the limited foundation of individual circumstance.

Is there circularity in assessing our project according to principles derived from the project? By elaborating on the procedures of reflexive monitoring it is revealed that the charge of circularity does not hold. In determining what to do I-self has to make judgments about a great many actions, possible actions and commitments. A convenient and efficient way of doing this will be to use principles, rules or criteria as guidelines. These principles, rules or criteria require grounding themselves; sometimes they will not cover or apply to a situation; sometimes they need to be altered as conditions change; often they are unnecessary because we "see" immediately what to do. The most defensible approach to reflexive monitoring is to ground one's evaluations in an honest and resolute perception or "seeing" of our self in-the-world which is what the authentic project describes. There is a danger that we may use changing or special circumstances as excuses or rationalizations for failing to live by our principles but on the other hand there is a comparable danger of reifying the principles (i.e. forgetting or misunderstanding their origin and justification) and applying them when they do not suit the circumstances. One thinks of Gilbert and Sullivan's "Pirates of Penzance" parody of Victorian duty ethics in which characters act against both common sense and personal and common interests under the grip of a reified conception of duty. Rather than being circular, grounding in the authentic project, starts from an existential grasp of experience.

The second objection (b) I take very seriously. It is true that many persons do not have an authentic project accessible to their

understanding and that generally we all have some degree of inauthenticity in our projects but what are we to make of this? Do we take steps to create conditions under which people have progressively more authentic projects and develop more transparent understandings of their self/world? Or do we find an elite group to work out rules and principles to be used heteronomously by inauthentic agents? As we proceed through this and subsequent sections I develop arguments for a fundamental commitment to authenticity and show that there are concrete practical steps to bring about social transformations incorporating progressively greater authenticity.

Both (c) and (d) represent a misunderstanding of the position advocated and/or the status of the inquiry. I am not arguing that there is no need for social rules and laws - on the contrary I shall argue for positive laws. Ideally such laws reflect the authentic evaluations of the citizens who are bound by them but in any case they are part of the situation. We are not ready at this point, however, to discuss social norms, rules and laws because we have not yet analysed social co-operation. But I-self, as an agent, must have a basis for her own reflexive monitoring. In saying that this basis lies in her authentic project I am not suggesting some private world which is to be contrasted to a public, social existence - that would be an inauthentic project. Hence (c) and (d) miss the mark - they do not apply to this account.

FACILITATOR: Our concern is now with procedures and conditions for increasing the correctness, i.e. transparency, of I-self's understanding of her project.

HEART: The process which I-self uses to scrutinize her action and evaluate her project is called reflexive monitoring: it is always


conscious (which is not saying that I-self is always conscious of her action) and involves scrutiny not only of the situation, the action or path of actions and the vision of self/world but also of the intentions, moods and dispositions of I-self; hence it is 'reflexive' in "returning" to the subject as well as 'reflective' as in 'thought' or 'thinking'.

Because she cares I-self has a tendency to take responsibility for her self/world; in taking responsibility she must engage in reflexive monitoring. When reflexive monitoring is resolutely and honestly conducted it is called critical reflection; it is critical in at least two ways:

- (1) it subjects action and/or project to review and criticism;
- (2) it places I-self in a position of vulnerability not only in that she may find herself guilty regarding a particular action but also, and more critically, she may discover that her whole project is inauthentic and that she is faced with the choice of radical self-transformation versus some form of inauthentic response.

We say that I-self "has a tendency to take responsibility for her action" rather than "takes responsibility..." because there are contrary tendencies which we will discuss momentarily. To articulate the connections between 'responsibility' and 'reflexive monitoring' it will be helpful to consider the latter as a continuum stretching from minimal "ownership", caring and responsibility at one end to full autonomy at the other as depicted in diagram 3.

DIAGRAM 3 - DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY IN REFLEXIVE MONITORING



The responsible agent has principles, rules or criteria with which to monitor her actions, is prepared to have a conscience and agrees to be held accountable. She acknowledges her freedom to apply her principles in the evaluation of her actions and project. In being prepared to have a conscience she accepts the applicability of judgments concerning her agency, e.g. foolish, prudent, innocent, guilty.

Autonomy includes all the features of responsible agency and in addition the autonomous agent: chooses and acknowledges that she chooses the principles, rules or criteria used in her reflexive monitoring, not just of particular actions but also of her project as a whole, honestly and resolutely.

While both responsible agency and autonomy refer to features of character and disposition of the agent and while both report that the agent is prepared to live in accordance with her principles, the autonomous agent, in contrast to the heteronomous responsible agent, puts her principles to the test in terms of their truth or rightness as grounded in her project.⁵⁵

I-self's understanding of her project is at best more or less adequate, more or less truthful, more or less transparent and, as such, can be improved by re-evaluation. As Charles Taylor says,

The question can always be posed: ought I to re-evaluate my most basic evaluations? Have I really understood what is essential to my identity? Have I truly determined what I sense to be the highest mode of life? This kind of re-evaluation will be radical, not in the sense of radical choice, however, that we choose without criteria, but rather in the sense that our looking again can be so undertaken that in principle no formulations are considered unreviseable.⁵⁶

We are now in a position to examine a number of connections between autonomy and authenticity, to examine factors which oppose responsibility and to disclose some of the conditions supportive of

autonomous evaluation, more transparent understanding and more authentic existence. In its concern for both true understanding of I-self's project and action in accordance with that understanding, authenticity points to an integrity or congruence between understanding and action, whereas autonomy is concerned with the integrity of I-self's reflexive monitoring. Although closely connected, authenticity and autonomy are also in tension.

Pertinent to our present inquiry are three types of homeostatic tension. By 'homeostatic tension' we mean a sort of congruence or equilibrium which is sought between two elements or features. In the previous section we discussed the homeostatic tension between understanding and action: faced with incongruence between action and understanding I-self seeks to resolve the disequilibrium through changes in her praxis and/or her understanding. She tries to change "reality" so it will match her understanding or she accommodates her understanding to "reality" or some combination of both.

A second homeostatic tension exists between autonomy and authenticity. Autonomy, as a disposition toward a highly competent, honest and resolute assessment of one's project, is necessary to provide the true understanding that is required for authenticity but it also tends to alter I-self's conception of her project and to upset the equilibrium she has previously achieved between understanding and action. Autonomy poses a "threat" to I-self which we tried to portray in diagram 2.2 through its revelation of the often unpalatable choice of radical transformation of self/world versus a "sell-out" to inauthenticity.

Generally I-self does not have a simple straightforward task to re-evaluate and re-define her project and get under way on it

because there is a third homeostatic tension - that between power and responsibility. In brief I-self seeks a degree of congruence between her responsibilities and her powers. Here we are using 'power' in the capacity or "can do" sense which includes personal powers such as knowledge and skills, various social powers, rights and freedoms, access to resources, etc.

COMMENTARY: Action-Man requests some concrete examples to illustrate what use can be made of these concepts of homeostatic tension while Precise asks for some elaboration on the justification for them. Both concerns are pursued in Appendix A.

FACILITATOR: We have analysed autonomy with a view to situating it within a structure involving authenticity, reflexive monitoring, responsibility and power. In the next section part of this analysis will be used in articulating and defending a conception of I-self's good while other aspects will be incorporated in subsequent analyses of social, political and educational principles.

8. I-self's good

TELEOLOGIST: What do we mean by 'I-self's good' and what kind of an inquiry do we intend to conduct? 'I-self' refers to the existential possibilities which are conceivably present to us; 'I-self's good' refers to a selection from among these existential possibilities which it would be rational to choose or which an I-self with an unreified, transparent understanding would be called to take. This is a different although related inquiry to that which I-self uses in critically reflecting on her project because in this present exercise we can take some liberties with the factual conditions

and imagine them otherwise. We are not asking what is good for slaves or workers or capitalists or psychopaths or citizens of this country or that, or persons of this character or that disposition; because this would be already to have taken a position on the matter we are investigating; but rather, "In the best of all conceivable worlds: what kind of person would I be? What kind of life would I lead? What kind of impact would I have on the world?" In asking this question we are searching for a description of a general way of being-in-the-world that is to be preferred to other possibilities and within our question is the issue of our own character and basic dispositions.

PRECISE: It is incredibly difficult even to see what categories are appropriate for such an inquiry.

TELEOLOGIST: Yes. Among many possible categories we might consider are four that are consistent with our purpose and previous analyses:

- (1) welfare;
- (2) self-realization;
- (3) self-development;
- (4) being-with-one-another.

By 'I-self's good' we mean the realization of "positive states" of each of welfare, self-realization, self-development and being-with-one-another. Goodness, for I-self, is living in such a way that each of these criteria is in a "positive state" for her. This study is not concerned with standards or specific measures for the criteria and because of the generality of our articulation of the criteria a great many matters concerning "the good" will be left open and undiscussed. Nevertheless the implications for social, political and educational theory of a commitment to these general

criteria of I-self's good should be profound. During the elaboration and justification we can clarify 'positive state', to a degree, although exactness is neither necessary nor practicable.

Welfare refers to survival, health, comfort and pleasure and can range over states from death, illness, pain and suffering to vitality, satisfaction and joy. Clearly life itself is required if I-self is to enjoy any other values whatsoever and this is all that is required to establish some sort of welfare criterion. But it is also reasonable for a degree of health, comfort and pleasure to support instrumentally the other criteria as we shall see. However it is no less true that there could be an excess of certain welfare features. Bouts of affliction may strengthen I-self's resolution and reveal her existential situation more clearly to her whereas a surfeit of pleasure and comfort is a sign of falling into the world, reification or idolatry. Yet welfare is to be seen as more than instrumental, i.e. as good in itself and hence the optimal state of welfare would be as much as is compatible with positive states of the other criteria.

By self-realization we mean the way in which I-self manages the homeostatic tension between authenticity and autonomy. In a positive state of self-realization I-self has both authenticity and autonomy as values which she pursues and achieves: she seeks authenticity and seeks it authentically through an autonomous scrutiny of her project and actions; she maintains a suitable balance between understanding and action and between re-examining the bases of her evaluations and "getting on with" her project. The 'self' in 'self-realization' refers to 'self/world' in terms of the agent's praxis and yet also picks out personality, personal accountability and

responsibility. Our previous discussions indicate that negative states will involve various forms of inauthenticity and heteronomy, e.g. self-deceptions, guilt, frustration, alienation, despair, emptiness.

By self-development we refer to I-self's engagement in thought, action or discourse which increases her understanding of self/world or which develops new or stronger powers or capacities to monitor reflexively her actions or project or to plan, organize and implement actions as part of her project. To some degree self-development is to be justified with respect to self-realization. Time spent in self-development during one period increases I-self's prospects for authenticity and autonomy at a later period. Generally self-development can be expected instrumentally to support positive states for each of the other three criteria although it is more than instrumental in this sense because, over a lifetime the development of new powers and capacities (even, or perhaps especially, when offset by declining powers in certain respects) becomes a form of personal/historical self-realization. As in the case of welfare an excess of self-development is a possibility: a person might give such undue attention to self-development that the attainment of the other criteria might suffer. Positive states for self-development will range between "enough to manage" the changing course of one's life to as much as is compatible with the other criteria also being positive.

By being-with-one-another we mean the way that I-self (i.e. each I-self in turn) experiences other I-selves in social and interpersonal relationships. 'Positive states' here refers to authentic being-with-one-another, a condition in which I-selves see each other as co-agents engaged in a mutual project. There are degrees of fraternity,

friendship, community and love and our most positive state will be the most authentic compatible with positive states for the other three criteria.⁵⁷

Turning now to justification, we have already established the validity of some welfare criterion but there may be objections of two opposed types. Some people, mistakenly, conflate all values to welfare, deny the other criteria any independent standing and only recognize them to the extent to which they advance welfare. Others may argue that welfare has no independent value and is only good to the extent that it is instrumental for other values. Keeping in mind the qualifications concerning recognition of the other three criteria; vitality, satisfaction and joy are to be preferred over illness, pain and death and this should be plain to see under critical reflexion. This is a very different claim from one that argues for ever increasing material wealth or consumption and soft or lavish life styles over more modest wealth and possessions or more challenging circumstances.

What kind of objections can be made to self-realization? Fundamentally objections to self-realization will be based on a different conception of agency than we have argued for. The welfare reductionist, for example, rejects the structure of care, project, responsibility, etc. in favour of a 'summum bonum' defined in terms of the direct experiencing of a maximum of vitality, satisfaction and joy and a minimum of suffering, illness and pain. In doing so she articulates I-self's good purely passively but actually she is not concerned with I-self's good because she fails to recognize being an agent as of any independent value and so is working with some conception other than I-self, e.g. the subject as a centre of sensation.⁵⁸

ACTION-MAN: Let's leave the objections and focus on the independent arguments in favour of the principle of self-realization.

TELEOLOGIST: The argument depends basically on the validity of the constitutive features of authenticity and autonomy. We have defined 'self-realization' as the maintenance of homeostatic tension between authenticity and autonomy such that both sets of "values" are pursued and achieved. Assuming that the analysis of homeostatic tension is agreed the justification of self-realization involves the justification of all of the following states, experiences or dispositions for I-self:

- (i) to have a true understanding of her project;
- (ii) to act in accordance with her understanding;
- (iii) to experience self-esteem;
- (iv) to have a conscience and be held accountable;
- (v) to choose and acknowledge her choice of her principles;
- (vi) to conduct reflexive monitoring honestly and resolutely.

Note: (i), (ii), (iii) define authenticity and (iv), (v), (vi) define autonomy.

It is inconceivable that a rational person who cares about herself will, in the best of all worlds, reject either (i) or (ii) because such a course subverts her prospects for a worthy life on her terms.⁵⁹ If one accepts (i) then (vi) is justified as instrumentally required for true understanding.

The justification of (iv) is more complex. To reject (iv) is to reject a conscious awareness of the project structure (i.e. caring, responsibility etc.); this can only be done by either not wanting a project or by wanting to be unconscious of the project one wants to have; but to want to be unconscious...is contrary to (vi).

Therefore the rejection of (iv) entails the rejection of the relationship of care, the project structure, responsibility, etc.; and to reject this is to reject wanting anything at all. If this position is actually held by anyone, which I doubt, that person is still faced with one last difficulty: it appears that the project structure simply "goes with" I-self and is not to be avoided or eliminated as long as I-self remains a living, conscious being.

To manage her reflexive monitoring efficiently it is advantageous and probably necessary for I-self to have rules, principles or criteria. In sections 6 and 7 we argued that she can achieve a true understanding of her project only by grounding these rules, principles or criteria in her understanding of her authentic project. Therefore (v) is required for (i).

Self-esteem is compatible with the project structure of caring, responsibility, conscience, etc. whereas for I-self not to want self-esteem is inconsistent with the care structure; not to find oneself worthy is to find one's self/world not worthy (because 'self' is 'self/world' on our analysis), i.e. not worth carrying out. We are not saying that a person whose project has gone off course or who has fallen short of her own expectations and is suffering from guilt should rationally believe that she deserves to experience self-esteem but only that in having a worthy vision I-self rationally wants to advance efficaciously toward it through her own actions and when she does this she experiences self-esteem. John Rawls, using a conception similar to ours, argues that self-respect is perhaps the most important "primary good" of all.⁶⁰ Hence (iii) is justified.

Also if one accepts self-esteem as a good for I-self through direct perception we can, by connecting it to worthy aims and

efficacious praxis as part of the project structure, justify the other aspects of self-realization as instrumentally supporting self-esteem. This concludes our justification of self-realization.

We have already discussed the instrumental function of self-development in addressing the homeostatic tension between power and responsibility. To contribute most effectively to I-self's overall good, self-development and self-realization need to be synchronized or integrated. Self-development, to be optimally concerned with I-self's good is not aimed at simply gaining powers that might be useful but crucially of safeguarding I-self's responsibility and her advance toward more autonomous states from the regressive accommodations she must otherwise make if she lacks the power for efficacious praxis on her authentic project. The threat to I-self (concerning power) generally comes from a lack of powers or resources to do specific things required by her project and so self-development must focus on these urgent demands of praxis.

HEART: This is a point of critical importance for educational theory and evaluation. "Good education" must be good for someone. Without holding that the good of the student is the only good we can agree that it is at least a basic consideration. To be supportive of the student's good, education must relate the student's self-development to her own authentic project, i.e. it must simultaneously advance both her self-development and self-realization. Under good teaching the student advances in her understanding of her project, in efficacious praxis and in self-esteem at the same time as she develops new powers and capacities. It is not enough to teach young people facts, concepts, attitudes etc. that they will need in the future if the principle of the integration of self-development and

self-realization is violated. The all too common practice of teaching new powers at the expense of diminished self-esteem, reified consciousness or a detachment from praxis cannot be justified on the basis of the student's good.

FACILITATOR: Heart's observation will be important in Chapter V. So far Teleologist has provided a justification for all the criteria except being-with-one-another.

TELEOLOGIST: Authentic being-among-one-another instrumentally supports the other criteria. Because we are all part of a system of social co-operation involving collective forms of agency we need authentic relations with others to understand that collective agency and our part in it. Later we will explore the ways in which authentic being-with-one-another advances self-development. However being-with-one-another has more than an instrumental justification and can be independently justified on the "self-evident" value of experiences of authentic relationships of love, friendship and fraternity.

SOLIDARITY: Without being-with-one-another as a fundamental criterion our conception of man's good would be excessively individualistic. Nevertheless I have my doubts whether I-self's good is a sufficient basis for educational evaluation. I think we need some specifically social principles.

PRECISE: I am afraid that 'I-self's good' looks rather idealistic and impractical.

FACILITATOR: Perhaps we should keep an open mind on the feasibility of 'I-self's good' as a basis for educational evaluation until we discuss social co-operation and social relations in the next chapter. Meanwhile it is important to stress that I-self's good is not a particular

idiosyncratic conception of man's good and that its criteria have been justified on the basis of the kinds of judgments and assessments that are rational for persons to make when they reflect deeply and transparently on their circumstances.

C H A P T E R I I

SOCIAL CO-OPERATION, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY

In Chapter I the SET established criteria for I-self's good as a preliminary step in articulating principles for educational evaluation. They are now discussing the next step in their inquiry.

9. Social co-operation

SOLIDARITY: The existential perspective on human agency is very important and I am pleased that we have built a concept of fraternity, i.e. authentic being-among-one-another, into our criteria for I-self's good. However we need to develop a comprehensive social perspective before we will be ready to consider principles for educational evaluation. Human beings are social, not contingently but necessarily; a member of the biological category 'homo sapiens' stripped of language, culture and social relations is not human and not I-self. Each individual is enmeshed within a system of social co-operation involving social practices and conventions, various institutions, inter-personal relations, and a division of labour and other forms of social and political activity. Some form of social co-operation, i.e. sharing and division of work and social and cultural activities, is absolutely essential to human life.¹

However our criterion of being-with-one-another points to man's enjoyment of certain forms of social co-operation, not merely as a means of survival, but also and crucially as a way to realize and celebrate his good. Among the types of social activity in which

human agents co-operatively engage is education and the criteria for good education, at least in part, and I believe to a very substantial degree, achieve their validity from the general purposes and values of social life.²

ACTION-MAN: You mean that we require a perspective on the good society before we can formulate our educational principles.

SOLIDARITY: Yes, we need to articulate a normative position concerning social co-operation but equally we need to understand social facts and relationships as they are.

To a significant extent, education, as a form of social activity, has its point in relation to the totality of social relations and activity. I am not arguing for a merely instrumental conception of education but rather making the point that, as part of a totality of social co-operation and activity, education should be evaluated in relation to that totality.

ACTION-MAN: I do not understand.

SOLIDARITY: Imagine we are Athenians in classical times. Probably less than ten per cent of individuals are citizens of the polis and the primary economic relation is slavery. Consider the education of boys and girls. Whatever curriculum might be proposed or whatever pedagogy applied, an inescapable issue is whether there is one conception of education for all these boys and girls or whether different forms of education are to apply to different classes and to the sexes. To argue for one conception of education for all is to presuppose a criticism of the basic system of social relations in the polis. To accept slavery and sexism is, at the same time, to commit oneself to different forms of education for slaves and females.³

Moreover, not only does education gain point and purpose from its relation to the social totality but it also contributes to the reproduction of the total system of social co-operation. Depending on circumstances, education can tend to maintain the system of social co-operation or to transform it in particular ways. That is, while itself limited and shaped by the system of overall social relations, education has the capacity to influence the direction, pace and extent of social change. For example, A wants the sons and daughters of workers to become compliant, diligent and productive workers, and loyal and obedient subjects. B, while agreeing concerning diligence and productivity, disagrees with compliancy and obedience, rejects the very idea of 'subject', and advocates a form of education that develops powers of analysis, criticism and verbal fluency; she wants these children to become intellectuals with such dignity, self-esteem and sense of justice that they refuse to accept or impose a dominated status in work, politics or cultural activity. A and B have different social perspectives, not contingently but because any minimally rational person seeks consistency between his educational and social/political principles.

Because education has a formative effect on character the connection between educational principles and social/political perspective is at the most basic level. What kind of character, virtues, dispositions and powers do we want in the educated person? How can we even address this question without taking particular positions on social co-operation?

Accordingly I suggest that our agenda should be directed toward establishing general principles for social co-operation that are consistent with our analysis of I-self's good. From this foundation we can develop the educational principles we seek.

10. Rawls and categorial power

LIBERAL: The major concern with social co-operation is social justice and Rawls' A Theory of Justice can provide relevant and useful insights.⁴

Rawls correctly argues that social justice arises from concerns with social co-operation.⁵ Nozick disputes this point but his objections are based on too narrow an interpretation of 'social co-operation'.⁶ Rawls points out that social co-operation produces both an identity of interests and conflict of interests. Therefore principles of social justice are required for choosing among various social arrangements to determine the division of advantages and the distribution of shares.⁷ Accordingly he defines 'social justice' as the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation.

Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men's rights and duties and influence their life-prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances.⁸

Rawls follows the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant and uses the idea of the social contract as an expository device for an original agreement concerning the principles of social justice for the basic structure of society. "They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association."⁹ These principles are

chosen behind a "veil of ignorance" which establishes limitations on the kinds of considerations which agents can use as justifications or reasons for their arguments in the deliberations concerning the original agreement. This device is designed to achieve impartiality and to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or by the contingency of social circumstances.¹⁰ After choosing a conception of justice these rational moral persons choose a constitution and a legislature to enact laws etc. in accordance with the principles of justice originally agreed upon.¹¹

Rawls argues that, given these conditions, the participants would choose two principles:

- (1) equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties;
- (2) social and economic inequalities are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society.¹²

PRECISE: Will you please explain 'the basic structure of society'?

LIBERAL: In a slave society there are: slave-owners, slaves, free men without slaves, women and various sub-groups within these; the rights and powers which each of these positions carries; rules governing all these positions and their interactions; rules establishing how particular individuals come to fill these positions and to have these rights and powers. All of these features establish the basic structure of the slave society. Similarly feudalism, capitalism, the variations of each and other social forms have their basic structure. Depending on this basic structure I may find that my position or status in the social order is slave, serf, freeman, King, citizen,.... This position is not one I earn but one which

the system of social co-operation assigns to me and which is the basis for my rights to education, political and civil action, control over various resources, etc.

PRECISE: But under liberal capitalism no one is assigned to a particular position, is he?

COMMENTARY: Scholar's next speech is not an exegesis of Rawls but my own analysis.

SCHOLAR: It depends on how we define 'position'. As an infant and child I do not decide on the kind of society I will be initiated into but I have a particular status and place in a general scheme that has already been worked out, i.e. I experience facticity. The subjects in a system of social co-operation are human agents who engage in a variety of different types of social action including work, cultural activity (including education) and political action. They carry out these social actions through resources and powers available to them and they enjoy or suffer various outcomes in terms of I-self's good, i.e. welfare, self-development, self-realization and being-with-one-another. (Scholar illustrates these ideas using diagrams 4 and 5.) In the sense I am using, to have a position in a system of social co-operation is the destiny of everyone - it is not necessarily to be stuck in a particular caste, estate or job but to have a certain range of possibilities and a certain set of limitations.

To be born into capitalism is to be initiated into a particular way of determining the social actions engaged in by the community; a particular way of dividing those actions to form social positions; a particular way of assigning people to those positions; and a particular way of directing resources and powers to the incumbents in various positions. To be born into capitalism is to have open

DIAGRAM 4 - CATEGORIES FOR SYNCHRONIC ANALYSIS





DIAGRAM 5 - CATEGORIES FOR DIACHRONIC ANALYSIS



various possibilities for becoming a capitalist, a worker, a middle class professional or whatever but it is to have closed off the possibilities for becoming a slave, a slave-owner, a feudal lord or any number of other possibilities, including that of being an autonomous agent whose relations with all other agents are free, equal and fraternal.

LIBERAL: There are several points in Rawls' analysis that I support.

Rawls stresses the importance of self-esteem to the well-being of each person and he defines self-esteem as having two aspects:

a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out;

secondly,

self-respect implies a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power to fulfil one's intentions. When we feel that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in our endeavors.¹³

This reinforces the points we made in the previous sections. Rawls is also correct in seeing society as a co-operative venture for mutual advantage.¹⁴ I also agree with him that social justice demands that the distribution of natural talents be regarded as a common asset, which follows from the previous point.¹⁵

TELEOLOGIST: In addition to these points of agreement we may benefit from exploring some points of disagreement.

Rawls' conception of the human agent is based on Kant's idea of moral personality, an impressive account and one which is correct in many respects, but our conception of I-self provides a more adequate basis.¹⁶ While Rawls thinks he has corrected the defects of Kant's conception through the device of the original position he

does not succeed in overcoming the most fundamental flaw, which is the failure to make the distinction Heidegger draws between Dasein's existence and the being-present-at-hand of objects. I believe that it is because of this defect that Rawls finds it necessary to introduce his "Aristotelian Principle", which appears rather incongruous in the context of his liberal, anti-teleological stance.¹⁷

Rawls is opposed, in principle, to a teleological foundation for social justice. He defines a teleological theory as one in which the good is defined independently from the right and then the right (in this case, social justice) is defined as that which maximizes the good.¹⁹ I disagree with Rawls on this point. We have already articulated I-self's good and we should consider 'justice' in terms of realizing that conception of the good.²⁰

I have other disagreements as well, e.g. concerning consent and the nation-state, but I want now to consider Rawls' device of the original position.²¹ While I concur with Rawls that we are looking for principles to govern the basic structure of society and with Scholar's analysis of that basic structure, I challenge Rawls' time perspective. He seeks principles that are to establish the basic structure of society in perpetuity;²² and his articulation of the original position is based on his quest for an enduring charter or constitution.²³ Without in any way derogating the moral and political insights that can be achieved through his method I criticize its implications and presuppositions.

The implication of Rawls' programme is that the basic structure of social relations should be set in perpetuity. On Scholar's interpretation of the basic structure this means that the system of rules for creating positions and assigning people to them should remain

unchanged. I object to this on fundamental epistemological and moral grounds, but I will need some time to justify my position.

What are Rawls' presuppositions? Firstly he holds that imaginary agents in the original position can know and understand principles for social justice that will endure forever. Presumably imaginary agents can do anything but Rawls argues for two basic principles and a constitution based upon them which he says these imaginary agents would agree to and this is because he presupposes that he and at least some of his readers, i.e. actual agents, can know and understand principles of justice that will hold in perpetuity. I am extremely sceptical of this.

Who does Rawls see as the actual agents who are to implement his principles of social justice? He does not tell us; his principles are set down on a "To whom it may concern" basis and he does not elaborate on the concept of agency applicable to the agents who are to bring about the realization of social justice. We understand them to be Kantian moral agents and yet there is a curious ambiguity here because Rawls says that the original position shows which principles free, equal and rational persons would choose, and he says these principles must be applicable in practice. But in practice, according to Rawls, we, as actual persons, display our nature as free, equal and rational by choosing these principles. "Thus men exhibit their freedom, their independence from the contingencies of nature and society, by acting in ways they would acknowledge in the original position."²⁴ So, for Rawls, at the point where actual agents establish a system of social justice they abolish their own facticity! But this is invalid reasoning - simply by making the same choice as free, equal and rational beings does not make one free, equal and rational any

more than monkeys typing for an indefinite time and eventually producing a copy of Romeo and Juliet become Shakespeare. More fundamentally man is never free of natural contingencies and social structuration - he cannot escape facticity. The agents who actually bring about social justice will not stand in a relation of freedom, equality and rationality to one another because they have been initiated into conditions contrary to these. The real issue is how can we move from a system in which agents have unequal powers and freedoms and some, at least, are not perfectly autonomous, authentic and rational to one in which Rawls' conditions apply?

LIBERAL: Your last comment suggests that ultimately you agree with Rawls that in a just system of social co-operation, persons are free, equal and rational. Moreover I am not convinced that we are not free to choose Rawls' principles.

TELEOLOGIST: Like you I am aiming for a world in which everyone becomes free, equal and autonomously rational. Perhaps if Scholar does not mind elaborating on 'social structuration' we can address your points about the degree of freedom of actual agents.

SCHOLAR: There are two opposite sorts of errors we can make concerning human agency: on the one hand to assume that we are, "in the nature of things", free and rational; on the other to interpret all human activity as determined by forces or laws which are beyond our power to alter. I doubt that Rawls assumes that all human beings have the degree of freedom and rationality postulated for the agents in the original position but his theory does not face the discrepancy between the facticity of human beings and the freedom, equality and rationality of idealized moral agents. A more correct account in this respect is provided by Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration,

which essentially holds that social structure determines man's facticity and constrains his possibilities of action, without determining his specific actions.²⁵ What is 'social structure'? Giddens refers to the structuring properties of social systems and argues that they "can be understood as rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems". He sees structure as recognizing the existence of:

- (a) knowledge of how things are to be done by social agents;
- (b) social practices applying that knowledge;
- (c) powers and capacities of the social agents presupposed by those practices.²⁶

Clearly power relations between and among individuals and groups are present in all social structures.

Actions need to be seen not as discrete and separate occurrences but as flowing through time.²⁷ At any particular point in time I-self is thrown into a situation which has been "historically determined"; he finds himself within a structured social system embodying language, routine practices, institutions, rules, expectations, patterns of interaction, distributions of resources, power relations and the like. Without a factually given social situation embodying the elements listed there can be no I-self. It is in this sense that I-self is "produced" by the social structure. The social structure determines his possibilities and so always limits the possibilities of existence but to the extent that the social agents are autonomous then the future reproduction of social structure is not uniquely determined.

I think it is important to discuss the question of power in human practices because this idea is basic to the critique of Rawls'

programme. Let me illustrate my claim that agents within a system of social co-operation carry out their social actions through resources and powers available to them, with a few examples.

X decides to pass a new law concerning abortion; Y plans to develop a coal field into a productive mine; Z wants to take a holiday in Paris. In each case whether, to what extent, and with what consequences the agent can carry out his intended action depends upon his powers and resources. If X is an absolute monarch he has the authority to pass his law whereas if he is a member of a legislative assembly he has the authority to propose a new law but the decision is reached by majority vote. In this case the efficacy of his action depends in part on the wishes and predispositions of others and in part on his powers of influence. His powers of influence depend in part on his personal powers - character, personality, knowledge and skills - and in part on the resources at his command - is he rich and able to bribe other legislators? Does he exercise control over appointments to offices and positions, or lack such powers, or have others?

Y's prospects for developing his coal field also depend in part on his personal powers but crucially on his social powers, e.g. because he has property, i.e. an enforceable claim to the use of the coal field or authority, e.g. he is chief executive officer of a public corporation that can make use of the coal field.

Z, who lives outside France, requires the social freedom to leave his own country and enter France and he needs the resources to pay the costs of his journey and holiday.

PRECISE: You are saying that some sort of power is manifested in all human action; but how are you defining 'power'?

SCHOLAR: Many sociologists and political theorists define 'power' as a relation between agents, groups or classes, i.e. essentially as 'power over'.²⁸ However we should not let go of the existential sense of 'power' as the ability to act or do, which I contend is basic. While relations of power are generally present we want to retain both existential and social dimensions in our analysis.

We distinguish personal from social powers. Within 'social powers' are included the categories of: social freedom, in which an agent is not constrained from doing a class of actions by any other agent, group or institution; authority (or rights of recipience) in which a particular agent (or position) is entitled to call on the co-operation of others and the others are obligated to perform specific types of co-operation;²⁹ and property as an enforceable claim to the use of resources.³⁰ All of these social powers are clearly relational in that to say that R has such and such social freedoms, authority or property is to give a type of shorthand report about the relations between agents, groups and institutions. Subject to a qualification I will make shortly, the social powers possessed by a particular agent are produced by the social structure.³¹

What about personal powers, i.e. the character, personality, dispositions, knowledge, understandings, skills, "gifts", talents, etc. of the individual? Personal powers are less directly relational than social powers because the social practice, rule or institution is manifest in the exercise of the social power. For example, I have property in the form of a lot and house; the relational content of this social power is revealed not only in my right to order off a trespasser but especially in the support which my claim receives from the judicial and law enforcement institutions of my society.

Personal powers do not reveal social structuration in this direct fashion but it is incorrect to interpret them as independent of social structure; rather they are subject to social structuration, genetic endowment and natural environmental influences. This is not to say that I have no personal responsibility for my own personal powers but rather that whether and to what degree I am responsible are functions of natural contingency and social structure.³²

TELEOLOGIST: In answer to Liberal's question of whether we are free to choose Rawls' principles of justice, if the system of social co-operation is so organized that many persons do not develop autonomous agency those persons cannot choose Rawls' principles in the autonomous spirit, i.e. as Kantian moral agents, that he clearly wants them to. Because these agents lack the capacity for autonomous agency their possibilities are limited to heteronomous decisions. When power relations are highly asymmetrical, i.e. when some persons or groups are dominated by others, social structure limits the development of autonomy.³³ In brief, a society marked by highly unequal distributions of powers and resources is not only unjust on a prima facie basis but lacks the free, equal and autonomous agents to bring about a system of social justice on Rawls' terms.

SOLIDARITY: Teleologist is sceptical concerning our ability to understand principles of social justice holding in perpetuity and, while concerning detail and specific application I concur, with respect to basic principle, I disagree. Indeed I am prepared to offer a general formulation of a principle of social justice that stands up at all times and places. It follows from our analysis of I-self's good that, from the perspective of any particular member, social co-operation should be so organized as to promote the good of that

member and of others with whom he has fraternal relations. The only principle meeting this criterion is one directed to the good of everyone. This is not a complete or sufficient articulation of social justice but it is a beginning.

PRECISE: Assuming you are right it establishes only a very weak condition.

A particular system of slavery may advance the good of the slaves in terms of security, food, clothes, shelter, worthwhile work to do, etc., and yet we consider slavery fundamentally unjust.

SOLIDARITY: We can strengthen the conditions demanded by our principle by including the equal consideration of all members....

FACILITATOR: Before you elaborate on your principle Teleologist should tell us why she thinks broad general principles of justice, applicable in perpetuity, are unknowable.

TELEOLOGIST: Because our character and dispositions, which are shaped by social structuration, affect what we can understand by 'justice', the basic structure of society limits our ability to understand 'justice'. Take Precise's example of slavery - not even Aristotle, a thinker of immense power, subtlety and integrity, could see the injustice of slavery. When Solidarity eventually refines her principle, if it rules out slavery it is a principle that Aristotle and other great thinkers did not know or understand. Aristotle could not escape the factual determinations caused by his society and we cannot evade those set by ours.

LIBERAL: What a terribly depressing conclusion! Also the fact that Aristotle did not understand the injustice of slavery does not prove that he could not.

TELEOLOGIST: The example of Aristotle does not prove my point - it only illustrates it. If our interpretation of social structuration is

correct we are unable to establish principles of social justice in perpetuity and Rawls' programme is flawed. Why should we be depressed at the prospect of improving on Aristotle or Rawls? There are moral as well as epistemological objections to Rawls' programme. If the rules for organizing the division of labour and other social actions into positions, assigning persons to these positions and allocating powers and resources to positions or persons are in fact applied by a particular generation, according to Rawls' principles, then one generation has a preferred status and responsibility regarding the determination of social justice.

SOLIDARITY: Why does that matter? Are we concerned with who first establishes a system of social justice or only that it be established and maintained?

SCHOLAR: With your permission I think this is a good time to elaborate on 'categorical power'. The point of Teleologist's analysis is that power relations and power behaviour are basic to I-self's realization of his good, both in the sense that I-self needs power to carry out his actions and to conduct his project and also that the way he experiences power relations contributes to his realization of his good. For example, in domination, i.e. a form of asymmetrical power relations, persons cannot realize authentic being-among-one-another. Generally asymmetries in power result in unequal welfare, self-development and self-realization. Moreover, the way one experiences power relations has a direct bearing on self-esteem.

Because agency and the experience of agency are so important to I-self a satisfactory conception of social justice must address the distribution of powers and resources supportive of agency. Our rejection of slavery is based on its unacceptable asymmetry in the

distribution of social freedom, authority and property between slave-owners and slaves. Likewise capitalism establishes unacceptable asymmetries between capitalists and workers.

SOLIDARITY: Our principles for social justice have to confront the distribution of powers and resources but how does this bear on who establishes the basic constitution of a society and when?

SCHOLAR: If a group of agents at some particular time change the basic structure of a society, do they exercise power?

SOLIDARITY: Yes.

SCHOLAR: What kind of power do they exert?

PRECISE: It does not seem to fit any of the categories - not personal power, social freedom or property. It is a bit like authority.

SCHOLAR: Authority, property, personal powers and social freedom may affect the agent's categorial power but none of them is it. These powers flow from the way the basic structure of society is organized whereas categorial power is the capacity to determine the basic structure.³⁴ An "absolute" monarch has vast authority and scope of freedom but he does not necessarily have the power to change his absolute monarchy into a fundamentally different kind of society. Likewise the powers of slave-owners or company presidents arise from the way the basic institutions of their society are organized. In changing the basic structure of society agents change the categorization of positions within that structure, e.g. King/subject, slave-owner/slave, capitalist/worker, professional/client, teacher/parent/child, etc. When agents act to change the categories of the basic organization of a society and of the principles and rules for assigning persons to these categories and governing relations among the positions, they exercise categorial power. Existentially, to have categorial

power is to experience responsibility for a destiny.³⁵

Now, is the distribution of categorial power a matter of social justice? If, say, only ten per cent of the population has some significant power to determine the basic structure of society, can there possibly be social justice?

SOLIDARITY: Certainly not! Categorial power is one of the most important "goods" in society. Unless some special reason is offered there should be an equal distribution.

SCHOLAR: Therefore it matters greatly who determines the basic structure. If justice demands some sort of égalitarian distribution of categorial power then principles for the basic structure of society cannot be determined at some particular time, in perpetuity, because this denies future generations categorial power.

Moreover, as we live together, even according to the best principles of justice we can conceive, our social praxis will put new possibilities and new problems before us - requiring further changes in the basic structure.

FACILITATOR: There appears to be a rather reluctant agreement that Teleologist and Scholar are right in their criticisms of Rawls' programme but what does this suggest for our own approach to social justice?

TELEOLOGIST: While we cannot establish principles governing the basic structure in perpetuity, Solidarity is right that we can articulate some general principles which point us in the right direction.

Also, because categorial power must be included within the scope of social justice, our programme should be directed toward an indefinitely extended series of social transformations designed to make society more just in relation to criteria which also change.

FACILITATOR: In our next session we can explore general principles for social justice that "point us in the right direction" for social transformation.

11. Justice and democracy

FACILITATOR: Solidarity will elaborate on her principle concerning advancing the good of every member of society.

SOLIDARITY: Yes, let us build in an equality condition so it reads, "social co-operation should be so organized that it advances the good of every person, considered equally and impartially".

This articulation needs further elaboration regarding powers and resources but before that do we agree on the basic idea?

(A number of objections to this principle are discussed in Appendix B.)

ACTION-MAN: Is such a basis for social justice practical? Can we really manage a system of social co-operation in which millions of people engage in self-realization of their own authentic projects?

HEART: If I-self's authentic project and hence his good were essences or present-at-hand things to be discovered rather than the constructions of social praxis they are, then Solidarity's principle would be hopelessly impractical. In subsequent discussions we can explore how individual self-realization is not only compatible with but also an integral part of the common interest of groups.³⁶ For now let us keep an open mind on feasibility and focus on the normative issues.

PRECISE: There is still the question of whether it is right to allow persons who are cruel, selfish, dishonest, depraved and the like to engage in self-realization.

SOLIDARITY: During our discussion of H. L. A. Hart's arguments for certain principles of law we found that man needs standing laws

backed with coercive sanctions. (See Appendix C for a summary.)

I think it is consistent with that analysis to argue that individuals can and will be constrained by law, and because there is no single pre-given way for an individual to realize an authentic project, the society can use legal means to prevent or punish cruelty, dishonesty, etc., without denying individuals the rights of self-realization.³⁷

TELEOLOGIST: This formulation is still open to authoritarian and paternalistic interpretations, although in other respects I agree with it.

FACILITATOR: Because 'good' in the principle refers to the four criteria of I-self's good, do you not agree that authoritarian interpretations are ruled out?

TELEOLOGIST: You are right that our articulation of I-self's good points to a non-authoritarian, non-paternalistic interpretation of social justice but until we incorporate our concerns about power into the formulation of our principle(s) there is the danger of failing to exclude interpretations condoning the decisive action and power of groups believing or claiming they have a privileged insight into their fellows' good or a special right to exercise categorial power.

SCHOLAR: Equal and impartial consideration of the good of everyone suggests, at least on a prima facie basis, that there should be an egalitarian distribution of categorial power.

PRECISE: Determining principles for social justice is extremely difficult and it would be both foolish and wrong for dull, disinterested, dishonest or selfish persons to have as much say as someone like Rawls.

HEART: We need to incorporate Scholar's idea of an equality of categorial power into our principle of social justice if it is explicitly to

express our rejection of authoritarianism and paternalism in favour of democracy. By 'democracy' I do not mean the emasculated revisionist accounts which try to re-define it in narrowly political terms, i.e. by treating much of economic, social or cultural life as outside the scope of popular political control and/or which envisage only a minimal level of participation by most citizens in political processes.³⁸ Rather, I refer to a conception which is authentic in two senses:

- (a) it fosters I-self's authentic existence;
- (b) it is faithful to a core of values in the classical tradition of democracy.

While catchwords such as 'equality', 'freedom' and 'fraternity' are too ambiguous and too cryptic to convey precisely these democratic values they are suggestive of the equal and impartial consideration of everyone's good and of the participation of everyone, on the basis of equal civil and political rights, in the life and government of the community and society. 'Freedom', in this classical tradition, can be essentially understood as 'autonomy' in our terms. In the classical tradition of democracy the people control their government, which means they exercise power over the basic structure of society. Hence in its ancient traditions democracy is understood as a form of social life in which citizens have an equality of categorial power.

There are both positive and negative reasons supporting equality of categorial power. Negatively, if categorial power is unequally distributed the corruption of government, i.e. rule in the interests of sectoral groups to the general disadvantage, is virtually assured. Many have commented on the corrupting effects of power but more accurately it is not the possession or exercise of power but

asymmetries in power relations that corrupt. Positively how can we, as autonomous I-selves, have authentic communal relations? Only when, as citizens, we all have and take responsibility for our social relations, including the organization of the basic structure of our society.³⁹

Is this authentic conception of democracy utopian? We are certainly many generations from realizing it. Precise is concerned about sharing categorial power with people who are "poor citizens" but this is one of the great challenges of authentic democracy - to develop the character and personal powers of young people so they become good citizens, and come to share in the exercise of categorial power. The end we are aiming for is a society in which, as Solidarity says, "Social co-operation is so organized that it advances the good of every person, considered equally and impartially". Moreover, I want to add, "and so that categorial power concerning the basic structure of society is shared equally among all its citizens".⁴⁰

LIBERAL: This is good. Until now I have felt most uncomfortable about engaging in a series of social transformations without having at least a criterion of justice already agreed. While we lack a set of rules for establishing a constitution or for organizing the basic structure of society, we have criteria for assessing the state of social justice at any particular time and for judging "the right direction" concerning social transformation. If every citizen is autonomous and authentic; if categorial power is equally shared by all citizens; and if, on these bases, the citizens have together chosen the basic structure of social co-operation and, individually, their own positions in it, then we have social justice. These criteria provide stringent tests for what constitutes "the right direction"

with respect to democratic social transformation.

FACILITATOR: From your nods we agree on this principle and Liberal's elaboration but we will have problems in future discussions unless we have a shorthand reference to it. In full, it reads:

Social co-operation should be so organized that it advances the good of every person, considered equally and impartially and so that categorial power concerning the basic structure of society is shared equally among all its citizens.

It is understood that 'good' refers to our particular articulation of I-self's good in terms of welfare, self-realization, self-development and being-with-one-another. Moreover there are no exclusions from citizenship, except children on a temporary basis.⁴¹

Let us call our principle for social justice 'the fundamental principle for social co-operation', the 'FPSC' for short.

COMMENTARY: Given that actual agents engage in critical reflexion together to find a mutually beneficial, mutually agreed principle for social co-operation, under conditions of equal categorial power, the FPSC is that principle. There is more that needs to be said about rationality and the conditions of deliberation but these issues are dealt with in Chapter III.

12. Class, capitalism and meritocracy

COMMENTARY: In this section, because I have to summarize so much discussion into a short report, I focus on the main findings. The issues concerning the SET are: whether the FPSC is valid regarding intergenerational justice; how racism, sexism, "ageism" and social classes are related to the categorization of the basic structure of society and to the division of social actions within it.

Rawls formulates a "just savings principle" as part of his theory of justice to safeguard the rights of future generations but we have articulated the FPSC in terms of the good and interests of actual agents living, working and deliberating together. Does our FPSC ignore the interests of future generations? Not at all. Any actual society factually is multi-generational, consisting of individuals varying from newborn to ninety or more years, with new entrants constantly joining through birth and old veterans leaving as they die off. Provided the communities in which people live are characterized by love, fraternal feeling and authentic being-among-one-another, citizens will want to maintain the community which they love, and to bear and raise children. Without this condition, which transcends justice, no system of intergenerational justice is possible.

Moreover, if, as new citizens are initiated into society and old ones leave, there is a continuous process of social transformation resulting in ever more adequate and complete identification and realization of the common interests of all those living together, then the interests of future generations are safeguarded in the best way possible because on this basis, self-love and altruism are integrated and there is no "sacrifice" by one generation for its descendants.⁴²

Indeed the approaches of Rawls, and also Ackerman, to intergenerational

justice, can be criticized for assuming that a just distribution of resources can be established independently of the deliberations concerning the good of particular individuals and that this distribution can be expressed as a one dimensional scalar quantity such as money or "manna".⁴³ I dispute both of these ideas: reasons for my position on the former are offered in Chapter III, especially sections 15 and 16; and for the latter in Appendix D.

The SET concludes that the FPSC is adequate intergenerationally, provided our communities are characterized by authentic being-among-one-another. Whether these conditions pertain depends crucially on the division of social actions. By 'division of social actions' we refer to the division of labour, cultural and political activity and to the arrangement and relation of sites where these activities occur. The division of social actions corresponds to the positions which agents occupy in society. Because we require some form of social co-operation there is no question of abolishing the division of social actions; but there are two main approaches to its organization. We call a simple division in which all actors carry out the same or similar functions 'replication by function'. For example, if each of five workers building a fence performs the same functions: digging the holes; setting the posts; nailing on the rails; nailing on the pickets; and painting the fence, we have division by replication of function. If, on the other hand, the workers specialize the tasks we have division by 'differentiation of function', or 'functional differentiation'. Because functional differentiation creates and extends interdependencies it can be described as an organic system. It is possible to combine both approaches as in the assembly line.⁴⁴

Ever since the industrial revolution the trend has been toward differentiation of function. Accordingly social co-operation has been marked by ever greater specialization and complexity. As well the inter-dependencies are elaborated on a larger scale, e.g. world markets, high degrees of international economic interdependence, large units of economic and productive organization.

In Appendix E we consider the advantages and disadvantages of functional differentiation and conclude that we face the challenging task of finding an appropriate blend of replication and differentiation, although strict limits have to be placed on the degree and range of functional differentiation, especially in the sphere of politics.

There is a type of dialectical relation here - a just and democratic organization of social co-operation is one which all citizens determine through deliberations carried out in circumstances of equal categorial power and authentic being-among-one-another. However the categorial power which agents have and the state of their inter-relations are determined by the historically changing system of social co-operation.⁴⁵

Next the SET considers three bases for categorizing agents in positions - age, sex and race/ethnicity, and one possible consequence - social classes. Concerning age, there must be a significant differentiation between adults and children because children are either incapable or less capable than adults in political deliberation and most kinds of work. What starts out as virtually total incapacity in infancy progressively becomes a matter of degree until the child reaches a stage of maturity when full citizenship rights should apply. Because everyone in an authentic democracy has an equal say in determining the basic structure of society we should reject out of hand any system in which political participation is differentiated by age, sex or race (or any number of other irrelevant

considerations).⁴⁶ However differentiation in work or cultural activities may be satisfactory to a certain extent. Certain types of work that are extremely strenuous may be restricted to age groups that can manage them; old age pensions can be paid and retirement rights based on age and service can be provided - such differentiations are supportive of the FPSC and not contrary to it.⁴⁷ Nevertheless there should be significant areas of inter-generational participation in work, cultural and social activity to foster authentic relations among persons of all ages and to ensure that the FPSC applies intergenerationally.

Concerning gender differentiations the biological fact that only women bear children has undoubtedly been the basis of much of the division of labour in a wide variety of different societies. Sex-related differences in size, strength, temperament and various capacities are, at most, matters of tendency and do not in themselves warrant any formal regulations concerning opportunities available to girls and boys, women and men. I basically skip over most of the empirical findings on gender differentiation with the exception of a point by Mary Midgley who argues that the empirical evidence suggests that innate biological differences between men and women are best accommodated by a degree of differentiation of roles according to sex.⁴⁸ While Midgley is probably right, at least to a degree, we need to be cautious concerning the implications. There are great variations among the members of the same sex, variations that, with the exception of the capacity to bear children, are much greater than the differences between the averages for the two sexes. If Midgley is right about the biological facts then it is contrary to the FPSC to forbid or discourage differentiation by sex; but equally it would be wrong to mandate or encourage sharp sex role differentiation.

What is in any case clear is that women now have not only a different but also an inferior status to men and one not justified by biological differences. Work is important to everyone and the work, rewards and recognition that women do and receive in an authentic democracy must be equal, in terms of I-self's good with those of men. Practically, to put the career opportunities for women on a par with men's there must be both an immense change in the status, conditions and economic returns for the "traditional" women's work of child care, family maintenance and housework, and also special provisions in terms of maternity leave, professional child care and other conditions to support the participation of women in work outside the home. There must also be changes in the education of girls and boys, with a particular vigilance to root out both implicit and explicit ideologies and practices which reinforce or assume an inferior status for females.

Concerning racism we need to distinguish two forms: one involving discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, colour, body-type, accent or other such characteristics; the other manifesting cultural domination. A society that establishes special rights regarding language and culture in which certain ethnic, religious or national traditions have a privileged status in relation to others which are dominated can have "clean hands" regarding the first form. Racism can arise as much from treating everyone alike as from arbitrary discriminations if by 'treating everyone alike' we mean requiring minority groups to speak the language of the majority (or vice versa), establishing qualifications for jobs or organizing the school curriculum arbitrarily to privilege certain cultural traditions.⁴⁹ The general finding of the SET regarding this extremely complex and sensitive matter is that only a culturally pluralistic society, which decentralizes substantial political authority

to neighbourhood communities can ensure that members of different cultural traditions have equal categorial power.

The SET defines a 'social class' as "a group of social agents who share the same relation to the division of social actions and who have, with respect to one or more other groups who share a different relationship:

- (a) different resources and powers;
- (b) different outcomes in terms of I-self's good."

There are three objectionable possibilities regarding classes:

- (1) when the differences clearly favour one class over another;⁵⁰
- (2) when individuals are formally or legally assigned to a particular class on the basis of their parents' status;
- (3) when the structural principles of the social system indirectly establish class membership according to parental status.

I skip the arguments justifying these findings although readers should have little difficulty in demonstrating that each of these possibilities is contrary to the FPSC. Moreover, practically speaking, class systems per se are contrary to the FPSC and therefore the issue is not how to ensure that members of different classes receive justice but rather how to organize a just, democratic and classless society.

The members of the SET live in a liberal capitalist society, 'liberal' in that it has a limited set of constitutional democratic features, and 'capitalist' in that major sectors of work are governed by a labour contract which mediates the relations between free but relatively propertyless workers and capitalists who own the means of production, and in possessing certain other features we discuss below.⁵¹ The labour relation between capitalists and workers produces a class system which is objectionable in the first and third ways above. However the class structure in liberal

capitalism is considerably more complex than a capitalist/worker dichotomy.

The key features of liberal capitalism for the SET's concerns are:

- (1) the limited form of democratic political participation effectively puts the workplace under the primary control of capitalists, managers and/or a bureaucratic hierarchy;
- (2) the employer/employee relation establishes an asymmetry in power, i.e. domination of the employee;
- (3) the laws governing the inheritance of property reproduce class relations on an inherited basis;⁵²
- (4) the "free market", based on a high degree of convertibility among various resources and powers, tends to convert inequalities in one sphere into pervasive social inequality;⁵³
- (5) the state structure of centralized control;⁵⁴
- (6) the economic power and leverage of corporations;⁵⁵
- (7) the existence of many complex tensions between classes and sectors rather than a unified ruling class hegemony. One of the more significant is the struggle between the capitalist class and what Alvin Gouldner calls the 'New Class' or is sometimes flatteringly referred to as the 'meritocracy'. Some members of the New Class are employed in influential and prestigious positions while others are self-employed; as a class they are characterized by high levels of education, executive and administrative expertise and useful "connections". While there is a degree of compromise and accommodation between capitalists and the New Class they tend to be in opposition concerning the basic principles of social organization, with the former committed to the idea that the owner of the means of production is entitled to do whatever he wants with his productive property - to hire whomever he likes on whatever criteria he chooses,

to pay whatever he desires or feels the "market" requires, to promote, demote or fire persons on whatever grounds catch his fancy, and to possess a vast number of prerogatives concerning the management of his enterprise; while the latter hold that principles of justice should apply to many of the foregoing considerations, more specifically that merit and/or seniority should be the basis for preferring one person over another in the competition for jobs, positions, promotions or offices.⁵⁶

Importantly the SET, while committed to the abolition of capitalist relations, opposes a clear cut victory for the New Class and its meritocratic principles. The arguments against meritocracy are of two sorts: against merit as a principle for organizing the basic structure of society; and concerning the dangers of inherited privilege. Regarding the former and more fundamental issue we need to distinguish two very different interpretations:

- (a) where social agents within a particular form of social organization and having certain obligations related to a set of rights fulfil their obligations and thereby are entitled to or deserve their benefits;
- (b) merit as an underlying principle of the system of social co-operation.

Rawls points out that (a) pre-supposes some system of social co-operation and so merit in the sense of (a) does not provide the principle for organizing the basic structure.⁵⁷

Therefore our concern is with (b). As Rawls says a person cannot be said to deserve greater natural endowments, or his starting position in society or even a superior character which depends largely upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit.⁵⁸

He writes, "For a society to organize itself with the aim of rewarding

moral desert as a first principle would be like having the institution of property to punish thieves."⁵⁹

Although the FPSC has a teleological grounding in terms of I-self's good it is incompatible with any system of "rewards" extrinsic to that good and cannot be matched with a fundamental merit principle. To provide advantages through the ways in which the major social institutions distribute rights and duties and organize the system of social co-operation to persons whose existence is more authentic or whose self-development is more comprehensive or advanced or rapid would be utterly contrary to our fundamental principle of social justice.

Concerning the inheritance of privilege there is ample empirical evidence showing the extent to which children of members of the meritocracy are in fact advantaged in educational achievement and occupational status.⁶⁰

But how does meritocracy as the organizing principle for the basic structure of society causally produce inherited class privileges? The gist of Scholar's analysis is that families initiate their children into somewhat different cultures reflecting the parents' position within the system of social co-operation. In a meritocratic system parents holding privileged positions introduce their children to cultural practices, including patterns of language use, dialects and manners that are radically different from the corresponding cultural practices of parents in disadvantaged positions.⁶¹ The children of parents assigned to disadvantaged positions within the basic division of labour and other social actions are disadvantaged in a competitive struggle with children of privileged parents for educational achievement. It is a matter of debate to what extent they are "disadvantaged" because they have less capacity to meet the actual requirements for performance in privileged positions, e.g. doctor or lawyer, and to what extent arbitrary and technically

inconsequential differences in dialect, speech codes, manners, etc. are the basis for discrimination within educational institutions.⁶²

In any case the combination of a meritocracy in the division of labour and a competitive educational system directed to assign young people to their places within the social structure on merit produces an inherited system of class privilege. The rejection of the meritocratic programme entails not only a different approach to education but also a different basis for organizing cultural and political activity and work.⁶³ To the extent that the basic structure of a society is organized on meritocratic principles, schools are placed under irresistible pressures to serve a selective function.

13. Democratic social transformation

The SET's aim is to establish an authentic democratic society, i.e. one in which the FPSC is the organizing principle, and they see the constitution, laws and other features establishing the basic structure being instituted through an indefinite sequence of transformative social actions (political, cultural and educational) by groups of I-selves in the various factual positions in which they find themselves. They agree with Marx and Lukács that social transformation is accomplished through collective agency and that purely individual agency lacks efficacy but disagree that the collective agents of social transformation are social classes, in particular they disagree that the working class is a "universal class" destined to abolish capitalism.⁶⁴

The main basis of disagreement is that the working class is not an actual agent and cannot be expected to become one. However, human beings can organize themselves into associations of various types capable of collective agency, e.g. business corporations, labour unions, political

parties, churches and organized special interest groups. If not the organized working class, what type of organization can bring about democratic social transformations?⁶⁵


PRECISE: In what sense are we using 'transformative action'?

TELEOLOGIST: While it is impossible for I-self to escape factual determination of his possibilities of existence he can change some of his determination into new determinations. It is in I-self's interests to transform his factual conditions so that he has greater autonomy and authenticity. But there is another sense which is concerned with each I-self choosing, pursuing and realizing his authentic project. The first sense captures the transformation of the conditions of existence to alter I-self's possibilities whereas the second is concerned with grasping, from among the existing possibilities, that which is most authentic. The first is concerned with revolutionary social and political action while the second is concerned with the quality of one's existence in the here and now. What is being transformed in the second sense? Nothing less than I-self's existence which becomes increasingly authentic as I-self becomes more autonomous.⁶⁶

In diagram 6 we have tried to portray this double sense of transformative action and it should be apparent that both types of transformative action are connected. In the first sense the test of success and effectiveness is the degree to which categorial power relations are altered in accordance with the FPSC. However, in so far as the I-selves belonging to a group in the factual position are increasingly resolute and authentic in their reflexive monitoring of their transformative action, advance in self-development, celebrate their successes together and support one another in times of stress,

trouble or affliction then they have succeeded in transformative action of the second type. To the extent that such a group can function in this fashion there are prima facie grounds for thinking that it will advance our FPSC (depending on its relationships with other groups and individuals).

DIAGRAM 6 - CYCLE FOR TRANSFORMATIVE ACTION OF I-SELVES
IN THE FACTICAL POSITION



PRECISE: What do you mean by a 'group in the factical position'?

TELEOLOGIST: Rawls speaks of free, equal and rational persons in the original position, i.e. moral agents who can "bracket out" their social world and imagine themselves creating a new social structure "from the ground up". 'Factical position' describes the status of actual agents who organize groups to monitor social conditions and

to transform their social relationships and structure. Unlike the free, rational and equal persons who deliberate in Rawls' original position the I-selves in the factual position vary widely in their experience of authenticity, manifest widely different degrees of responsibility and autonomy, and experience social relations of domination and dependence in important spheres of their lives. Whereas in the original position the participants in deliberation have hypothetically severed their connections to the social world and are free of the determinations of any particular system of social co-operation, in the factual position I-selves are enmeshed within a system which has formed their characters, determined their possibilities, limited their rationality, their vision and their goodness and which twists and distorts their communications and deliberation.

SCHOLAR: Does it not also follow that in their method of inquiry a transformative action group should lay great stress on philosophical analysis? By 'transformative action group' I mean a group of I-selves in the factual position working for democratic social transformations.

ACTION-MAN: Why is philosophical analysis particularly important?

SCHOLAR: Philosophical analysis of social, political and educational issues and of theories and principles about such issues can improve the efficacy of the transformative action of I-selves in the factual position by:

- (a) revealing formerly concealed conceptual connections between social phenomena;
- (b) assisting in the conversion of practical consciousness of self and social relations into discursive consciousness;⁶⁷
- (c) stimulating more profound and true self-understanding and otherwise fostering self-development.

By 'philosophizing' I mean activities involving conceptual and logical analysis of terms, ideas and theories, the examination of reasons and justifications for actions, and ontological, epistemological or metaphysical inquiries that yield I-selves a more profound or a more accurate conception of their individual and collective projects. Philosophical activity has a unique contribution to make to transformative action and this is particularly true concerning reflexive monitoring. It follows from our analysis of responsible agency that I-self must do his own reflexive monitoring and hence his own philosophizing and this has a crucial bearing on the form and methodology of studies of social and political philosophy.⁶⁸

FACILITATOR: We find that we can only create the possibilities for good education for everyone within a just, democratic and classless society. We are committed to social justice, specifically to the FPSC, and we appreciate that this commitment calls for ongoing processes of democratic social transformation. Furthermore we envisage this transformative action being carried out by transformative action groups or "TAGs", for short, which have two basic tasks:

- (1) to transform categorial power relations and the basic structure of society in the wider society in accordance with the FPSC;
- (2) to foster the good of the members of the TAG in the here and now.

As a task the first is obvious while the second is concerned with providing an internally democratic climate within the TAG. In the next chapter we explore both the need for internal democracy within a TAG and the general conditions for its realization.

C H A P T E R I I I

INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN THE TRANSFORMATIVE ACTION GROUP

COMMENTARY: This chapter is mostly about interests, communications and power relations and how they are related to the question of internal democracy. The reasons for this agenda are as follows: in the discussion in Chapter II it was argued that the FPSC is the principle that social agents would agree to under various conditions and we noted that more needs saying concerning rationality and the conditions of deliberation; in this chapter we address these concerns in terms of the processes of communication and the power relations among the members of the TAG. During these arguments we establish the intimate connection between internal democracy in terms of communication processes and power relations and the realization of the individual and common interests of the members. In this discussion we begin to address the question, "What are defensible institutional structures for dealing with power relations in society?"

The other but related concern of the chapter is the articulation of strategic principles for social transformation. What kinds of people in what kinds of setting can accomplish democratic social transformation? What kinds of strategies are legitimate? For example, is it right to use undemocratic means to democratic ends? Or does 'democratic social transformation' imply democratic means? In this usage 'strategy' has a philosophical application. We are concerned with principles, indeed with principles grounded in man's good; but because we are concerned with a

dynamic rather than static conception of social justice we need, at times, to elaborate social justice in terms of strategic principles rather than static formulations.

14. The transformative action group

FACILITATOR: In this chapter our primary concern is with the appropriate principles for operating a TAG.

PRECISE: What kind of an organization is a TAG?

TELEOLOGIST: Provisionally it could be a political party, a labour union, a co-operative, a church, a transnational organization, a local or regional chapter of a national organization, a discussion group, a neighbourhood association, etc. Generally a TAG provides for face-to-face deliberations among its members.

The central purpose that defines a group as a TAG is the commitment to democratic social transformation. Because of the pervasive effects of the basic structure of society and the way it distributes categorial power among individuals one basic task of the TAG is the alteration of categorial power relations in the wider society in accordance with the FPSC. I believe this task has been adequately justified in Chapter II but what about the other basic task of fostering the good of the members in the here and now? Clearly this task has something to do with internal democracy because 'democracy' refers to social relations which are designed to give equal consideration to the good of all members.

How is the second task related to the first? Is it necessary for the TAG to conduct its internal operations democratically to accomplish its first task? Or, alternatively, can an undemocratic TAG help to bring about a democratic transformation of society as a whole?

Secondly, is it possible for a TAG to operate democratically when its members belong to an undemocratic society? If so under what conditions? These are fundamental questions because the subsequent course of our inquiry and even whether there is any point in continuing depend upon the answers.

ACTION-MAN: I do not know whether internal democracy in the TAG is necessary for the democratic alteration of categorial power relations in society but clearly the two tasks are related because the TAG is a part of the wider society and to the extent that the TAG becomes more democratic the society as a whole becomes more democratic, other factors being equal.

HEART: It is apparent that only a democratic TAG can advance the FPSC in the wider society. I-self requires congruence between her word, thought and action. Anyone who commits herself to our first mission will give a major proportion of the time of her life to that calling. Additionally she faces risks of hardship, discrimination, hurt or even death. If she is really committed to democracy, i.e. to the FPSC, and not to the pursuit of privileged power or some fantasy then democracy must be terribly important and immensely valuable to her. It is inconceivable that a group of persons who so cherished democracy would not insist on democratic relations with each other.

SOLIDARITY: Oh how I wish that it were so simple! I would like to believe that our TAG could be democratic and still succeed in our first mission but we have seen that the fundamental structure of society and the categorial power relations which that social structure embodies determine our possibilities of existence. We can never have a democratic society until we change the existing categorial power relations and we cannot change categorial power relations

democratically. The rich and powerful will never agree to it while the poor and weak lack the power and the understanding to transform society through democratic processes. If, in the future, the dominated classes were ever on the verge of asserting themselves you can be sure their oppressors would use force, violence and terror to hold them down. It seems to me that only a disciplined, task-orientated and dedicated political organization could in fact carry out such a task. While our TAG should have certain democratic features such as majority decision procedures, certain freedoms would have to be constrained in the interests of discipline and single-minded attention to the mission. Now it not only appears that there is no necessity for a TAG to be fully democratic in its internal functioning but that there is no way for it to succeed unless it rejects certain attributes of internal democracy in the interests of the primary mission.

PRECISE: Both Heart and Solidarity make a good deal of sense but I am not sure that they each mean the same thing by 'democracy'. How can we decide the question until we are clearer concerning the meaning of 'internal democracy'?

LIBERAL. I think that our previous discussions have implied what a democratic TAG is.

In so far as it is a miniature society and to whatever extent it can, a democratic TAG conducts its own affairs in accordance with the FPSC. All members of the TAG are accorded equal respect and receive equal consideration regarding their good. Their interactions and policy discussions are conducted on the basis of symmetrical relations of social power. It follows that members of a democratic TAG will evaluate alternative policy proposals on their merits and

not on a presumption that some members have a privileged or expert access to the truth or to worthwhile political insights.

SOLIDARITY: I agree with that as far as it goes but it seems to me that 'democracy' means more than that. Ordinarily we think of all sorts of freedoms and rights to dissent that would not be workable. There are two specific points you have not mentioned and I want to be clear on whether they are or are not included before I can decide whether I support internal democracy or whether internal democracy is required to carry out successfully the first mission. Who is entitled to join the TAG? For example, are fascists, aristocrats, capitalists and, in general, persons who do not support the FPSC allowed to join the TAG? Secondly, what disciplinary powers does a democratic TAG have with respect to individuals who may disregard majority decisions or undermine the primary task?

LIBERAL: Solidarity has drawn a serious omission to our attention. In section 11 we discussed and agreed to principles concerning a sphere of social justice and it seems clear that our democratic TAG must embody rules and procedures, determined by the members, administered impartially and backed by sanctions including the power to expel a member. I do not believe that we established guidelines to ensure that this institutional sphere does not get out of hand and threaten our fraternity. In principle however a democratic TAG would be capable of disciplining its members. My views concerning membership are that no one should be compelled to join but I am uncomfortable about refusing membership to persons on the basis of their background, social position or beliefs.

Also while a TAG has two basic tasks I do not agree that the alteration of categorial power relations, etc., has any sort of

precedence over the immediate good and interests of the members.

Therefore Solidarity's expression "primary task" is contrary to our understanding of the purpose of a TAG.

SOLIDARITY: I agree with Liberal concerning the need for a formal system of rules and sanctions and that satisfies my concern about discipline. I am not satisfied with our development of the issue of membership, which requires discussion. Liberal is correct concerning his last point: it is true that as a group we have not established a preference order for the two tasks of a TAG. However I argue that the first should be preferred to the second and my opening statement provides reasons in support of this position.

FACILITATOR: It seems that we have come to at least a provisional understanding of 'internal democracy'. We will be in a better position to address the issue of a preference order between the two tasks after we have completed our discussion of the two questions on our agenda for this session.

PRECISE: Now that we have a definition of 'internal democracy' where do we stand on the substantive issue? Solidarity seems content with running a TAG according to our agreed conception of internal democracy (Solidarity nods assent) but no one has answered her point that in fact an undemocratic TAG could advance a democratic transformation of categorial power relations. Not that I agree with this but I have heard no answer to her argument.

SCHOLAR: The strongest point in Solidarity's argument is that a TAG must be disciplined, dedicated and task-orientated. All this is consistent with internal democracy. But there is another condition that study of politics teaches us is also required - the TAG must not become corrupted! If we pick up on Solidarity's scenario of a transformation

of categorial power relations in accordance with the FPSC but implemented dictatorially then we will see that this logical possibility is inconceivable in fact. Presumably the TAG would at some stage participate in a dictatorship over a broad sector of society - how else could it dictatorially alter categorial power relations? But ex hypothesi the power figures in the dictatorship have the categorial power. One cannot have the power to alter categorial power relations without having categorial power. The power figures in the dictatorship dominate other persons in terms of categorial power, which is contrary to the FPSC.

The successful conduct of this vanguard strategy depends on the wisdom and benevolence of the power figures. Both Locke and Rousseau have shown the folly of this policy. When rulers have interests separate from the people we have, on the face of it, conditions contrary to the FPSC and when rulers exercise power without accountability to the people they inevitably come to have separate interests and to abuse their power. As Rousseau argues, by attempting to retain their power in perpetuity, "...all the governments of the world, once armed with the public force, sooner or later usurp the public authority".¹ The long sad history of government should alert us to the probability that the asymmetries of dictatorial power are deeply corrupting. Not only do we have the arguments of Locke and Rousseau but we need only follow through our own discussions to see that we cannot rely on the benevolence of dictators.²

Solidarity's argument requires that a TAG participate in a dictatorship over a society without becoming corrupted by its dominant power position. This is most unlikely but when you allow

the TAG itself to be undemocratic in its internal operation then there is no hope of avoiding corruption. The absence of internal democracy within the TAG means the failure to provide the conditions for authentic existence even of the power figures who, if they do not succumb to cynicism, will deceive themselves that they are acting in the common good when they in fact pursue private or sectoral interests. Even if they remain committed to the democratic ideal the power figures in their inauthentic being will be unable to imagine and plan what the democratic vision calls for.

Even if Locke, Rousseau and so many others are wrong about the inevitable tendency toward corruption of the power figures there is still the problem that the process of social transformation is being carried out without the autonomous participation of most of the citizens and many of the members of the TAG. We have already demonstrated the close connection between autonomy and authenticity. Our FPSC requires that each I-self should have the right to autonomous participation in the process of social transformation.

HEART: I want to support everything Scholar has said. We have agreed that part of I-self's good is her autonomous participation in the process of social transformation and therefore there must be internal democracy (in the TAG) to ensure her autonomous participation. Presumably Solidarity is concerned with some special, one-shot situation (although I think she is treading on thin ice even to contemplate such a deviation from democratic principles). We all agree, however, that because our aim is to make the processes of social transformation democratically determined the internal processes of the TAG must be democratic. This is the general principle - any exceptions to it will need justification in terms of special circumstances.

PRECISE: I am satisfied that we have answered the first question - at least for now but I find we have been tossing around references to "interests" and I am not sure that we have any precise idea of the meaning of this term which nevertheless played a big part in Scholar's argument.

FACILITATOR: Internal democracy within the TAG is necessary and this follows from our argument that democratic ends can only be achieved through democratic means. In the discussion our arguments have been partly based on conceptual analysis and partly on empirical generalizations. It is a conceptual fact that the imposition of any change in the basic social structure involves unequal categorial power whereas it is a long established empirical fact regarding the responses of human beings to asymmetries in power relations that those in a dominating position generally do not ever voluntarily relinquish their power - and yet conceptually they must relinquish their advantage in categorial power to achieve a democratic society; furthermore, we can have no confidence that a particular social vision shared by the power figures - even the grandest utopia or most inspiring conception of justice - exempts them from this corruption of dominating power.

In our next session we can address Precise's concern regarding 'interests'.

15. I-self's interest

COMMENTARY: At a subsequent meeting the TAG has discussed their agenda and have concluded that, because the internal operations of a TAG must be democratic, if it turns out that it is impossible for a TAG to operate democratically when its members belong to an undemocratic society, the only rational alternative would be either to reformulate the purpose and mission of the TAG or to disband. However, before directly addressing the question of whether or under what conditions it is indeed possible for a TAG embedded within an undemocratic society to operate democratically they agree that they need a more adequate understanding of internal democracy and the conditions required for a democratic TAG. They believe that an analysis of interests would be relevant to their understanding of internal democracy.

FACILITATOR: We have set our agenda for this session on a single concern - the analysis of I-self's interest. I know that several of you have done some research on this. Liberal, for one, has an analysis he would like to share with us.

LIBERAL: Thank you, Facilitator. I really do not have anything original but I think Brian Barry's analysis is a good starting point and may help us in understanding the logical structure of a statement of the form "x is in A's interest". Barry points out that 'x' is a policy and not an outcome or consequence.³ While it would be conceptually (although not necessarily factually) correct to say, "Compulsory conscription is not in A's interest" it would be incorrect to say, "Getting killed is against A's interest". A policy is the result of deliberation and decision - I think this is especially clear in a political context. Policies can be expressed by resolutions, laws, regulations or, I suppose, by regular social practices, whether or

not they have been codified. The point is that a policy can be made or altered by political deliberation. In our context 'A' represents a particular I-self.

Barry's formulation alerts us to the distinction between what I-self wants and a policy, rule or regulation which is a means to what she wants or which increases her opportunities to get what she wants.

TELEOLOGIST: I find your analysis helpful and I agree with it up to the point where you mention 'wants'. While many people would have no objection to this want formulation does not our commitment to I-self's good suggest relating interests to what is good for A rather than what A wants? Pat White, for example, disagrees with Barry that what is in a person's interests can be defined purely in terms of wants. She argues for a welfare rather than want basis and accordingly writes, "x is in A's interest if it is a means to something which is good for A, or which he ought to have".⁴ While Barry is correct in classifying 'x' as a policy, White is correct in saying 'x' makes a reference toward what is good for A rather than what A happens to want. Although what A wants and what is good for her may frequently coincide we need to be clear that in the case of a difference it is the "good notion" which prevails.

LIBERAL: My concern with Teleologist's position is its authoritarian implication. Surely we reject experts overruling a particular person concerning what is good for her and it looks like that is a real possibility if we replace Barry's want basis for interests with White's welfare concept.

SCHOLAR: First we should find out if there is an actual difference between Teleologist and Liberal here. Teleologist argues for a good basis

but we have already agreed that the good for I-self is not some essence separate from her predicament and her project but what she herself would want when, as an autonomous agent, she reflects critically, authentically and deeply on her circumstances.

While I prefer the "good" rather than "want" formulation because 'wants' is generally associated with quite immediate urges and desires and does not necessarily involve the qualification of critical reflexion and transparent understanding, if I understand Liberal correctly there is no fundamental disagreement here.

LIBERAL: I thank Scholar for clearing up my concerns about authoritarianism.

I agree that we should use the conception based on I-self's good rather than her wants. There is also another point which Barry makes and I think it stands up even after our substitution of a conception of good for a want notion. He argues that the statement "x is in A's interest is necessarily comparative". ...But if you ask whether a certain policy would be in someone's interest (etc.) this does require expansion into 'Is this policy more in his interests than that policy?' 'Being in someone's interests' is at least a triadic relation between a person and at least two policies.'⁵ Therefore we might find that x is in A's interest with respect to policy y but not with respect to policy z. This simply means that x is a better means to what is good for A than y is although z is better than x.

TELEOLOGIST: There is one additional point I would like to add to what Liberal has said. It may seem obvious but often the obvious gets missed. It follows from our analysis that, in so far as she can, and other things being equal, a person ought to choose policies in her interests. If x is a better means than y to what is good for

A then she should choose x over y. By 'ought' I simply mean action in accordance with what is good. By 'other things being equal' I refer to a situation where x and y are equal concerning their effects on other persons or other areas of care. My point here is that the idea of I-self's interest has normative force; it points to grounds for a choice.

FACILITATOR: By the nodding of heads I see that we have reached closure on the analysis of I-self's interests.

16. Common interest

COMMENTARY: Just as the SET previously moved from consideration of I-self's good to the FPSC, i.e. from the individual to the social perspective, they now address common interests. This is a part of their plan to complete the analysis of internal democracy before addressing the question of whether internal democracy is possible within a TAG embedded in a society with an unjust or incompletely democratic basic structure.

LIBERAL: With some misgivings arising from the want rather than good basis of his analysis I refer you to Barry's study again. I like his idea of simplifying the discussion by starting it with reference to two individuals. After analysing what we mean by a statement of the form "A and B have a common interest in x" or alternatively "x is a common interest of A and B" we should be able to generalize to the common interest of a TAG.

Barry writes,

To say that two people have a common interest is to say that there are two policies x and y such that each of them prefers x to y from the point of view of his own interest. On this definition it is safe to say that any two people have a common interest as between some two policies and any two people have a divergent interest as between some two policies;...⁶

Rejecting as we do Barry's want formulation we could say that,

"...such that x is better for each of them than y".

SOLIDARITY: You have good cause for your misgivings. By simply replacing wants or preferences by I-self's good we cannot overcome the excessive individualism in Barry's formulation. Also the resulting formulation lacks the normative force that is a feature of I-self's interest.

LIBERAL: Could you explain your point about normative force? Are you saying that, "If x is the best means to the good of each of A and B there is no presumption that they ought to choose x"?

SOLIDARITY: No, I agree with you that if x were the best means to the good of A and B then A and B ought to choose policy x. However my concern is that there will be relatively few instances of common interests on this formulation. Assume, for example, that there are six alternative policies [u, v, w, x, y, z] under consideration by A and B. The descending rank order of these policies in promoting A's good is u, v, w, x, y, z whereas for B's good it is z, v, y, x, w, u. Hence there is no policy which is the best for each of them. While v is the second best for each it does not qualify as a common interest on the amended version of Barry's analysis. Generally, according to this view, as the number of individuals and of alternative policies increase the chance of finding a common interest decreases towards zero. Hence there is no normative force to such a conception of common interest because the concept is either inapplicable or redundant. Where x is the best means to the good of A and also the best means to the good of B then A and B just happen to choose x and the idea of 'common interest' is otiose.

PRECISE: Your objections are well taken, Solidarity. Now, what positive suggestions do you have?

SOLIDARITY: Provisionally I suggest that "x is a common interest of A and B" means that policy x is the best means to the good of A and B "taken together". Let me elaborate on my admittedly vague expression "taken together". Our conception of 'democracy' involves the identification and pursuit of policies that advance the good of each I-self. We see each I-self as equally entitled to consideration of her good. Does this not imply that in evaluating alternative policies we ought to choose the one that treats the good of each I-self as equally worthy? Since we agreed that the concept of common interests should have normative force we want to build the ideas of equal consideration and impartiality into our definition of common interests.

Just for the sake of the argument assume that in our example of the six policies v is the best means to the good of A and B "taken together". On Liberal's amended version of Barry's analysis v is not a common interest and A and B are not obligated to select v but on a democratic conception A and B have a prima facie obligation to choose v which is their common interest.

PRECISE: That elaboration makes your position much clearer to me, Solidarity, and I could support it myself if I could be assured of two things:

- (1) that we can derive practical operational guidelines for the conduct of a TAG from your proposed analysis;
- (2) that there are no authoritarian consequences.

Specifically, who has the authority to determine which policy is the best means to the good of A and B "taken together"?

SOLIDARITY: We certainly want to avoid authoritarianism. If A and B together decide and if their decision processes are rational and

impartial then there should be no problem with authoritarianism. However I do not want to suggest that any policy a TAG determines will necessarily be in their common interest. Often, for whatever sorts of reasons, an association of I-selves fails to act in accordance with its common interest. While I do not see any external "authority" sitting in judgment of a TAG's deliberations, the members of the TAG have a criterion that serves as one of the fundamental grounds of their reflexive monitoring of their actions and choices - namely, "Have we determined the policy which is the best means to the good of all members taken together?".

Our formulation of common interest has normative force, is not authoritarian and has practical application to the conduct of a TAG.

TELEOLOGIST: I think we have reached a very significant point in our deliberations. It is apparent that any system of morality presupposes responsible agency but until now we have not given any content to a democratic conception of morality. Now, through our analyses of I-self, responsibility, authenticity, autonomy, social co-operation, etc. we have given some content to a democratic morality, i.e. we have established obligations for I-self.

FACILITATOR: Yes, we have made a great deal of progress in this session. Might we not achieve an even more useful understanding if we follow up on Precise's question about making the determination of common interests operational? This part of Solidarity's answer can be improved. Solidarity has said that her formulation of common interests provides a criterion for the reflexive monitoring engaged in by the members and this is true. However the criterion is very general and I understand Precise to be requesting more specific criteria that could serve as indicators for the general criterion of the policy

"which is the best means to the good of all members taken together".

We need an elaboration on 'taken together'. How would a TAG know whether or not it had found and chosen the common interest? If a TAG fails to act on its common interest has it necessarily operated undemocratically? Is it always, in principle, possible to find a common interest policy to choose?

Reference was made to "rational" and "impartial" decision processes and while the latter is clear enough from the context, we need more elaboration of 'rational decision processes'. Does 'rational' simply mean processes which result in the common interest being chosen, in which case it is redundant, or does it refer to some criteria governing the processes of deliberation?

HEART: Thanks to Facilitator's questions and the analyses of Liberal and Solidarity I can see a lot of things coming together. Precise and Facilitator have asked for criteria. What sort of criteria would serve? Our general principle and the foundation of our democratic morality is teleological, i.e. based on our conception of I-self's good but what procedures can we use to know whether or to what extent we have succeeded in acting in accordance with this principle?

The criteria for judging whether a TAG has pursued, found and chosen its common interest will be indications in one way or another of the quality of the interactions, interpersonal relations and communications processes within the group. Whereas Barry's want formulation and utilitarian ethics in general treat the wants, preferences and good of an individual as simply given our analysis portrays I-self as constantly reassessing her good and struggling to discover it. Every act of critical reflexion is a re-evaluation or re-discovery or perhaps even reconstruction of I-self's good. To

change the transparency of our reflexive monitoring is to change our conception of our good which is to change ourselves and our good.

Although Solidarity's example of the six policies was illuminating it presented the policies as givens for A and B to choose from. It was almost as if the policies had an existence independent of the agents who conceived them. In fact policies are created, refined and modified by persons engaged in political deliberation. Once the members of a TAG enter into democratic dialogue to find their common interest there are no pre-given policies from which they must choose and there is no fixed relationship of a policy to a particular I-self's good which is independent of the process of deliberation. We must not forget that the members of the TAG are transformed - their character, their purposes, their good and their interests are changed in the process of democratic deliberation. In principle, i.e. neglecting time constraints and imperfections in their characters and communication skills, they need not settle for mere compromises and bargained solutions: they can emerge from their dialogues with the conviction that they have indeed made the best decision possible. Even under less than ideal conditions they can share the conviction not only that a just decision was reached but that they have participated in a mutually beneficial process of self-development and authentic being-with-one-another. When this occurs there is no real difference between the policy which is best "for each" of the members and that which is best for the members "taken together" because their deliberation has transcended such a distinction.

Crucial to our self understanding is the authenticity of our being-with-one-another.⁷ When a TAG carries out its policy deliberations in a fashion in which all members have an authentic being-with-

one-another they have grounds to believe that they will create and grasp their common interest.

What kinds of conditions support authentic being-with-one-another? In the most basic sense these are the conditions for truth seeking and fraternity; they are concerned with openness, honesty, mutual regard and trust. The connection of openness and honesty to truth seeking should be obvious but both are undermined if people are punished for the open and honest expression of views unpalatable to their punishers. Hence mutual regard and trust which are obviously connected to fraternity are also required to provide the security for openness and honesty. This is basically why I argue that the criteria we are seeking are concerned with interpersonal relations, communications and the context of the interaction among the members of the TAG. The questions the members of the TAG can put to themselves are:

- (1) Do I trust the other members of the TAG?
- (2) Do they trust me?
- (3) Am I open and honest in our deliberations? (If not, why not?)
- (4) Are others open and honest? (If not, why not?)
- (5) Do I feel that I have the respect of the others?
- (6) Do I respect the other members?
- (7) Am I concerned for the good of the other members?
- (8) Are others concerned for my good?

FACILITATOR: The common interests of a TAG are the policies that represent equal consideration of each member's good. Common interests can only be ascertained through a process of political deliberation and because there is no essence of I-self's good standing independently of her own critical reflexion the test for whether a TAG has or has not found its common interest must be procedural, i.e. in terms of the power relations,

interpersonal relations and communications processes in the TAG.

These have been articulated in terms of symmetrical power relations, authentic being-among-one-another and open, honest, undistorted, rational, etc., communications. And these procedural conditions define 'internal democracy'.

PRECISE: I agree with the general approach being taken but I think our discussion of communicationa has been too sketchy.

FACILITATOR: Then let us address communications and the conditions for democratic discourse at our next session.

17. Communicative action

COMMENTARY: Scholar initiates this session by comparing Heart's analysis to Jürgen Habermas study of communicative action.⁸ We join Scholar in his presentation.

SCHOLAR: Perhaps Habermas can give us a general perspective on these issues. In a chapter entitled "What Is Universal Pragmatics" he explores the general presuppositions of communicative action. For Habermas action aimed at reaching understanding is the most fundamental form of social action and strategic action such as conflict and competition are derived from this fundamental form.⁹

Habermas argues, "...that anyone acting communicatively must, in performing any speech action, raise universal validity claims and suppose that they can be vindicated...". He goes on to list four validity claims that any speaker cannot avoid raising:

- (1) intelligibility, i.e. the speaker must choose a comprehensible expression so that speaker and hearer can understand one another;
- (2) truth, i.e. the propositional content can be demonstrated to be true so the hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker;

- (3) sincerity, i.e. the speaker wants to express his intentions truthfully so the hearer can trust him;
- (4) rightness, i.e. the utterance is made with respect to a recognized normative background so that the speaker and hearer can agree with one another.¹⁰

He writes,

The goal of coming to an understanding (Verständigung) is to bring about an agreement (Einverständnis) that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another.¹¹

For Habermas, who sees the task of universal pragmatics as "to identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding", the four validity claims are these universal conditions.¹²

Although Heart has a different purpose, namely to establish the communicative conditions for internal democracy within the TAG, it may be helpful to compare his analysis with Habermas'. Habermas mentions 'intelligibility' while Heart does not. No doubt Heart has presupposed the intelligibility condition which in a way is Habermas' point but we should make explicit mention of the intelligibility condition because we can readily imagine circumstances in which this condition is violated, e.g., if members lack a common language or if specialized jargon is used to befuddle, confuse or mystify. Habermas' sincerity criterion corresponds more or less to Heart's 'openness', 'honesty' and 'trust', while 'rightness', i.e. the mutual recognition of a normative background is the general formulation which in our conception of a democratic TAG is manifested in the belief in the FPSC, the associated positions respecting authenticity, responsibility and autonomy and the specific criteria for discourse which Heart articulated. They have each stressed the importance of truth seeking.

Habermas has expressed the conditions for communication to occur whereas Heart has provided an elaboration of the normative background constitutive of internal democracy.

Moreover Habermas points out the possibilities arising when the conditions for mutual understanding are lacking. These claims may or may not be met and may be realized to different degrees.

The typical states are in gray areas in between: on the one hand, incomprehension and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and open discord; and, on the other, pre-existing or achieved consensus. Coming to an understanding is the process of bringing about an agreement on the presupposed basis of validity claims that can be mutually recognized. In everyday life we start from a background consensus pertaining to those interpretations taken for granted among the participants. As soon as this consensus is shaken, and the presupposition that certain validity claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended, the task of mutual interpretation is to achieve a new definition of the situation which all participants can share. If their attempt fails, communicative action cannot be continued. One is then basically confronted with the alternatives of switching to strategic action, breaking off communication altogether, or recommencing action oriented to reaching understanding at a different level, the level of argumentative speech (for purposes of discursively examining the problematic validity claims which are now regarded as hypothetical).¹³

Based on Habermas' analysis we can distinguish four alternative states for a TAG:

- (1) communicative action directed to mutual understanding;
- (2) argumentative speech used by members seeking understanding at another level after one or more of the validity claims has been challenged;¹⁴
- (3) strategic action which is action directed to attaining the aims of a sub group of the TAG without mutual understanding of all members of the TAG;
- (4) the breakdown of communication altogether, i.e. the end of the TAG.

Heart captured the essence of the conditions for internal democracy as truth-seeking and fraternity. In practical terms the above analysis points to the need for communication skills to address (2) above but it also points to strategic action as the key indicator of an undemocratic TAG.

ACTION-MAN: Would you please explain, briefly?

SCHOLAR: In brief I am saying:

- (1) Strategic action is incompatible with authentic being-with-one-another. Why? For all sorts of reasons but principally when I-selves fail to pursue mutual understanding they treat at least some members of the TAG instrumentally, i.e. as ready-to-hand rather than as co-agents.
- (2) Authentic being-with-one-another is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a TAG to construct and grasp its common interest. Why necessary? Because our conception of I-self's good involves authentic self-transformation.¹⁵ This in turn requires all members of the TAG to meet together, at times, and to engage in critical reflexion on their common predicament.¹⁶ This follows from our belief that no one can "know" a particular I-self's interest unless that particular I-self engages in critical reflexion; that I-self's interest is subject to the possibility of rapid change; and that interests have no existence independently of deliberative activity. Authentic being-with-one-another fosters communal critical reflexion and communal critical reflection is in turn required for the highest degree of authenticity and resoluteness.¹⁷ Only if individual and common interests are brought into harmony can individuals within a group achieve the greatest possible authenticity in their

projects. (This is a conceptual point.)

Why sufficient? Because when the members have an authentic being-among-one-another their reflexive monitoring will become ever more transparent. Assuming that the TAG continues its activities over a long period of time then the members of the TAG will come increasingly close to realizing their common interest.¹⁸

- (3) Therefore strategic action is contrary to the TAG achieving internal democracy.

LIBERAL: I would like to hear more about strategic action and why it is so threatening to internal democracy but my concern about Scholar's argument concerning authentic being-with-one-another is that this position may have totalitarian consequences in that limitations on the scope or openness of the communications within the TAG are portrayed as undemocratic. I would not want us to take the view that there is to be only a single TAG and that members shall have no secrets from the TAG.

FACILITATOR: Scholar has given us a lot to think about. I wonder if we should pursue this matter of strategic action as Liberal suggests and return to the concerns about the possibilities of totalitarianism at a later point.

SCHOLAR: Note 2 to Habermas' "What Is Universal Pragmatics" distinguishes communicative action and strategic action.¹⁹ Within the category of strategic action he distinguishes 'openly strategic action', which I assume would include open conflict or competition from 'latently strategic action'; latently strategic action is subdivided into 'manipulation' and 'systematically distorted communication'. He writes,

Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least one of the participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparently being maintained, the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about his own strategic attitude, in which he deliberately behaves in a pseudo-consensual manner.²⁰

ACTION-MAN: So in practical terms we are concerned about manipulation and systematically distorted communication because conflict or competition would be easy to detect and obviously contrary to the purpose of the TAG.

SCHOLAR: Yes you may be right that we should focus on manipulation and systematically distorted communication although it is not apparent to me that competition or conflict is contrary, per se, to the first task of the TAG because there may be genuine disagreement over how to achieve an alteration in categorial power relations in the wider society in accordance with the FPSC.

FACILITATOR: We did agree to assume no external constraints on the TAG as it pursues its second task. Perhaps we should agree to leave the problem of competition and conflict until we address the first task.

PRECISE: Certainly we do not want to discuss the problem of the genesis of competition and conflict nor the issue of whether they are or are not avoidable at this stage. However we need to be clear about whether they are incompatible with internal democracy and if so what kinds of behaviour would be instances of competition and conflict. Therefore I do think we need to address conflict and competition with this limited focus.

TELEOLOGIST: It seems to me that we can distinguish two kinds of conflict, a fundamental difference of view concerning the good and who is entitled to the good versus the question of the proper means to

that good. To those who share our democratic conception of the good there is no question of strategic action which treats their fellows as either of no account or as mere means - this is contrary to the FPSC and is simply not on. However, because the second sort of conflict is always a possibility and is often unavoidable we need to have democratic means for resolving conflicts. I think people can disagree and can exercise power in support of their positions without treating others as of no account or as instruments in their strategic action. Perhaps Scholar has mixed two senses of strategic action - one in which there are all the suggestions of war and of planned trickery and the other as an umbrella category including conflict, competition, manipulation etc.

I will forego an analysis of competition although the general distinction in this context is that 'conflict' involves struggle over what is to be done and 'competition' over who is to do it. For example, if two members contest a leadership position within a TAG, that is 'competition' whereas if they advocate different policies that is 'conflict'. It is easy to see how the two ideas become tangled in practice. Competition can be bad when it is intended to or results in one person's good being sacrificed to another's. Whether competition has harmful consequences depends on circumstances.

I think it best, to avoid confusion, if we define 'strategic action' as action which is intended to treat other persons either as instruments or as of no account, i.e. not as co-agents. Accordingly, only certain sorts of conflict and competition would be instances of strategic action.

SCHOLAR: I accept your points and your suggestion.

ACTION-MAN: Yes, I am satisfied concerning conflict and competition.

We need to get at intentions and also the openness of relations.

Where conflict or competition is open and "above the board" it can be examined and the agents confronted concerning intentions and consequences. However, by definition, 'manipulation' is an instance of strategic action (according to Teleologist) and, on Scholar's argument, contrary to internal democracy. It seems strange to classify systematically distorted communication as strategic action in that intention is not present. Anyway, 'systematically distorted communication' does not seem to tell us anything more than that there are members who do not understand their own circumstances and projects - how else could they deceive themselves?

PRECISE: There are three points related to the analyses of Heart and Scholar that need mention.

Before making these points I think we should note that another way of looking at undistorted communication is in terms of rationality, i.e. that distorted communication implies that relevant information is withheld or incorrect information used in the discussions of the TAG which subverts the rationality of the deliberation. However democracy has long been characterized as a method of settling issues through discussion and has presupposed the virtues of truth telling and rationality.²¹

Now to the three points:

(1) The representation of third party interests;

Our analysis of interests has shown that A's overall interest cannot be ascertained unless A engages in critical reflexion.²²

This raises a problem whenever a TAG tries to represent the interests of third parties. For example, if B is trying to represent A's

interest in a TAG of which A is not a member there is a danger of distorted communication: B is caught between twin dangers - either sacrificing A's interest, or introducing distortions into the deliberation because B is unable to put A's interest into the discussion (in so far as it might reflect unique or special features of A's good) for the critical reflexion of the TAG. A's good will tend to be articulated as a fixed, concrete thing rather than as a constantly changing possibility revealed through her critical reflexion. It may well be possible to overcome or at least mollify these distortions but I think you can see that this is a matter of extreme importance for democratic theory. For example, the practice of binding delegates to a convention or legislature to vote for positions determined by their constituents, while motivated by the desire to uphold the interests of third parties, so severely distorts the communications at the convention as to render deliberation at that level impossible.

(2) factions or caucus groups within the TAG;

Rousseau has warned us of the dangers of factions and partial associations within a community,²³ and yet liberal democrats have stressed freedom of association. However, if there are factions or caucus groups within the TAG, who deliberate in partial associations with a view to getting the TAG to take a particular policy, then we have strategic action and a violation of internal democracy. This is especially clear when the deliberations are secret.

LIBERAL: Please excuse me for interrupting, Precise. While it is true that secret deliberations are prima facie evidence of manipulation and hence are undemocratic it is not necessarily the case that meetings of sub-associations are undemocratic. The key consideration,

and this is illustrated by your example of binding delegates, is whether the sub-association precommits its members to a certain course of action prior to the deliberation of the TAG. If the members are precommitted to a particular policy or course of action the communications will be distorted in one way or another and the TAG no longer able to pursue the common interest.

PRECISE: Thank you for clarifying that point, Liberal. It leads very nicely into my third point concerning

(3) dissent, discipline and punishment.

We have already agreed on the need for formal rules backed by coercive sanctions but we need to consider some conditions concerning sanctions. I am sure you can see that the use of sanctions without the normal safeguards of procedural justice would tend to distort communications; more specifically there must be impartial hearings, laying of charges, right of the defendant to be present, to have access to all charges and evidence, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine the evidence, etc. No democratic TAG would have rump groups administering sanctions or ostracizing members. Attention should also be given to ensuring, so far as possible, an equality among members with respect to the power to dissent or to coerce or punish others.

Furthermore, although the TAG requires the power to compel the compliance of members to act in accordance with rules those members have made it ought never to use sanctions to prevent dissent. Any policy, rule or decision in a democratic TAG is, in principle, subject to reconsideration. Otherwise there would be artificial and unwarranted limitations to the transparency of the reflexive monitoring of the members. In a democratic TAG this right to dissent

must override concerns about efficacious implementation of decisions, rules or policies. If the implementation of a policy or decision would be jeopardized by the mere expression of dissent concerning the value of that policy or resolution it is highly unlikely to represent the common interest and accordingly should be reconsidered.

FACILITATOR: I think we have a good picture of the many considerations that may be relevant to internal democracy. We appreciate the need for trust, truth, mutual respect and always regarding our fellows as co-agents. We are alert to the dangers of distortion and manipulation and while there is a great deal more that could be said we can leave this matter now.

18. The general social conditions for democratic TAGs

FACILITATOR: An undemocratic society is one in which the FPSC is not the basis for social co-operation. At this point we need to clarify in general terms what we mean by a democratic society. In Chapter IV we will elaborate on more specific criteria that can be applied to distinguish democratic from undemocratic societies. By a 'democratic society' we refer to a rather weak condition in that we are concerned with the principles and general pattern of social organization and not with isolated or exceptional deviations from those principles or patterns. Hence an undemocratic society is one which manifests fundamental violations of social justice. For example, a slave society or a society which provides differential benefits on the basis of race is undemocratic because it grossly violates the principle of equal consideration. The question which is the focus of our inquiry is whether it is possible for an internally democratic TAG to function within a society organized on undemocratic principles.

If so, under what general conditions?

It is important for us to understand why we are addressing these questions and how they relate to our practical concerns. Otherwise we may find ourselves in a long, inconclusive and frustrating inquiry. If there are no conditions under which a TAG can operate democratically within a society organized on undemocratic principles then our hope for democratic social transformation is vain. However if there are conditions in undemocratic societies supportive of internal democracy in TAGs then we will be concerned with the general features of these conditions as a guide to our praxis. At this point we can reconsider the two basic tasks of the TAG to see if a priority can be established between them or perhaps whether there are principles for integrating the two.

Our discussion of internal democracy suggests two broad sorts of social conditions in the wider society supportive of democratic TAGs: one is concerned with the formation of agents with a suitable degree of responsibility and autonomy; the other with social freedoms and powers relevant to organizing and operating TAGs. While ideally we would want the wider society to form fully autonomous agents this seems to be more than is strictly required because individuals can be expected to develop more fully autonomous characters within the democratic TAG. However this is a very complex question in that we are dealing with matters of degree, probably along several dimensions. Different patterns of undemocratic principles in a society may make different demands on the level of responsibility, autonomy, communication skills, etc., demanded of members of the TAG. A rather depressing thought is that it is likely that the more the general society deviates from democratic principles, the greater the demands

placed on the character formation of potential members of a TAG, and the less likely that individuals meeting these high standards of responsibility, autonomy and communication skills will be formed. By social freedoms I am thinking of freedom of conscience, speech, association, of the press and so on.

Do these very broad conditions make internal democracy possible?

Can we be more precise in their articulation?

LIBERAL: I think Facilitator has got us off to a good start in terms of the two broad sorts of social conditions supportive of democratic TAGs and I want to pick up on the first of these right now. I want not to get into a discussion of the precise degree of responsibility and autonomy required but rather to make clearer what this general condition calls for and so to articulate this condition in a different way. There is the particular matter of the education of children and young people but because this is the concern of Chapter V I will say no more now than that we will want our educational system to be as supportive of the development of autonomous agency as possible. However we should focus at this time on the general social conditions, other than formal education, that foster responsibility and autonomy.

The crucial condition that I advocate is that the society needs to provide a region of "individual" stewardship and responsibility which I call a selfidual sphere. By the 'selfidual sphere' I mean a region of social life which is to be distinguished from the 'institutional sphere' in that the evaluation, planning and implementation of action are left to the individual who is accountable to herself. In the institutional sphere evaluation, planning and implementation are collectively conducted and the accountability is generally held by some political body. I have used the term 'selfidual'

to refer to a region which is 'private' in one sense but not in the sense of 'private property'; which is self-regulated but not equivalent to autonomous (we have focused on autonomy as describing the integrity of reflexive monitoring and while this is consistent with self-regulation, autonomy does not necessarily pick out individual as opposed to collective self-regulation); while 'individual' captures part of what I want to say I do not suggest the selfish, possessive, atomistic individualism of laissez-faire liberal theory. Indeed rather than focusing on the individual being left a region in which he experiences no interference I prefer to emphasize that the individual needs a sphere for which he is personally responsible and in control of accountability. The crucial consideration is whether significant choice, decision and responsibility are left to the individual.

Examples of matters in the selfidual sphere will tend to be culture specific and in advanced western capitalist countries may include matters such as choice of career, eating habits, clothing, sexual practices, location and decoration of the home, budgeting for personal goods and services, recreation and holidays. In contrasting the selfidual with the institutional sphere it is not the existence of institutional regulation per se which erodes the selfidual sphere; it is perfectly consistent with sexual practices, for example, being within the selfidual sphere for there to be institutional rules concerning sexual practices. If these institutional rules leave significant decisions and responsibilities in the hands of individuals then a selfidual sphere has been maintained regardless of the fact that there is a degree of institutional regulation.

Why is a selfidual sphere necessary? In section 7 we discussed

the homeostatic tension between power and responsibility: the existence of a selfidual sphere is the guarantee of certain social freedoms and powers supportive of individual responsibility and autonomy. It is also reasonable that responsibility and autonomy require practice for their development and that in exercising responsibilities I-self has the possibility of strengthening her powers for autonomous agency. While it is possible, in an undemocratic society, for the selfidual sphere to occur without other supportive conditions, e.g., there may be insufficient attention to the development of personal powers or a lack of assistance or resources available to the individual, this points out that the existence of a selfidual sphere is not sufficient for the development of responsibility and autonomy but it nevertheless appears necessary.

This is the main argument for a selfidual sphere. Additionally individuals who experience some success within the selfidual sphere are likely to have the self-esteem and confidence to participate in a TAG. This suggests that an important principle for TAGs is to support a selfidual sphere and measures which will strengthen the efficacy of individual action within the selfidual sphere. Moreover to the extent that there is general public support for a selfidual sphere this can be used in arguments in favour of self-realization as a social value and specifically in support of the second task of the TAG, i.e. support for each individual to make the most authentic choices among the possibilities available.

SOLIDARITY: Facilitator suggests that there are two general types of social conditions in the wider society supportive of internal democracy in the TAG: one concerned with the development of responsibility and autonomy; the other with social freedoms and powers. From this starting point

Liberal advocates a selfidual sphere - a proposal that baffles me. Liberal argues that a selfidual sphere is required to foster the development of responsibility and autonomy. Why should the whole development of responsibility and autonomy not be collective? In clarifying his technical term 'selfidual' Liberal conceded that it is not equivalent to a sphere of autonomy; he stressed individual stewardship and responsibility and not autonomy, which is not only compatible with collective agency, but, as both our experience with and discussions concerning democratic TAGs show, requires collective agency for its full development.

Not only is a selfidual sphere not necessary but it could be positively harmful: it provides a "safe place" for individuals to withdraw from collective praxis and to spin out inconsequential a-social "projects". How on earth does a selfidual sphere support the functioning of a TAG? I am sorry, Liberal, but your proposal seems to subvert the process of social transformation by draining off energy into individualistic activities. Do we not already have this selfidual sphere within our liberal capitalist "pseudo democracy"?

LIBERAL: To deal with your last point first, yes, we do already have a selfidual sphere and it is a good thing we do. The fact that we can meet together with the aim of transforming our society into something different is a credit to the rights and freedoms available to citizens in our society. While our society is not an authentic democracy, it is not a mere "pseudo democracy". The rights of citizenship which are supportive of the functioning of TAGs to implement authentic democratic transformations are extremely important. I prefer to call our society a "constitutional democracy" because it makes available the rights and freedoms which we require for the internal

democracy of TAGs.

I will not try to answer whether or why in an authentic democratic society there must be a selfidual sphere although I am predisposed to believe so but given our assumption of an undemocratic society, which we are trying to transform into an authentic democracy, the case for a selfidual sphere should be clear.²⁴ If there is no selfidual sphere then it follows that every aspect of individual responsibility will be governed by the state or the major institutions of the society. Solidarity asks, "Why cannot the whole development of responsibility and autonomy be collective?" Aside from a fundamental concern that I am opposed to a totalitarian state control over society and I believe this would be a consequence of Solidarity's position there is the fact that in granting collective control over all aspects of responsibility Solidarity at the same time grants undemocratic institutional control over every aspect of action. If there is no selfidual sphere within an undemocratic society there will be no place or space for individuals to begin remaking themselves according to principles at variance with those in their general society.

SCHOLAR: I see that Solidarity is not yet convinced of the case for a selfidual sphere but I am convinced not only for the reasons Liberal gave but also because I think the selfidual sphere can be related to our earlier arguments for limitations on the sphere of social justice; and so I think that we could indeed justify a selfidual sphere as a constituent feature of an authentic democracy. I am also persuaded by Liberal's argument concerning the development of self-confidence and self-esteem. Moreover a selfidual sphere is supportive of the second task of our TAG, which is the realization of the good of all members within the factual possibilities available. In this respect

I disagree with Rousseau who argues that the lawgiver "must weaken the structure of man in order to fortify it". Rousseau says, "In a word each man must be stripped of his own powers, and given powers which are external to him, and which he cannot use without the help of others."²⁵ Perhaps Solidarity believes, as Rousseau before her, that only an agent lacking independent powers and resources can be a good citizen but this cannot be right as I will make clear. I also want to reinforce Liberal's point that an important social condition is the existence of powers and resources in support of the individual's efficacious conduct within the selfidual sphere. I hope to persuade Solidarity that we must strengthen, not weaken, the independent powers and autonomy of individuals. Is it plausible that an agent who is incapable of the independent exercise of power and responsibility, who "can do nothing whatever except through co-operation with others"²⁶ can articulate her own good and pursue deliberations concerning her interests with her fellows? No. A person so stripped of rights and powers as Rousseau recommends could not participate in the determination of either her own good or the common interest. Hence the policy of weakening individual power and responsibility is antithetical to democracy.

SOLIDARITY: Liberal and Scholar have thoroughly demolished my case and part of me wants graciously to concede to superior argument but another wants to hold out and I believe this is not because of pride but rather reflects some very deep-rooted commitments. It is no secret that I have long been a socialist and that I believe that public ownership and other socialist principles are necessary for equality and fraternity. While I cannot as yet articulate a clear objection to the arguments of Liberal and Scholar I am deeply concerned

that they may lead to some sort of reformed capitalism or at least a private enterprise system and I do not want to end up with capitalism or private enterprise.

HEART: While it is legitimate to object to arguments on the basis of their consequences do we really know if Liberal's and Scholar's arguments lead to the conclusions Solidarity fears? We have found capitalism to be fundamentally antithetical to authentic democracy but we have yet to articulate an alternative social ideal. Therefore why not keep an open mind on where our deliberations may eventually lead and address the kinds of concerns Solidarity raises when we have concrete proposals?

FACILITATOR: Yes. Also we really have answered our main question. We see that it is indeed possible for a democratic TAG to function within an undemocratic society if that society provides a selfidual sphere and certain rights and freedoms of association, organization and expression, i.e. if the society is a constitutional democracy. While we are at it we can answer the question of whether there is a priority order between our two tasks of (1) altering categorial power relations in the wider society in line with the FPSC and (2) fostering the good of each member in the here and now. In general there is no priority that can be established independently of specific conditions. The principle that makes sense is to focus on the major problems and opportunities facing the TAG, i.e. on responding to whatever helps or hurts most under specific conditions. For example, if a repressive totalitarian government threatens radically to curtail the freedom of action and powers of individuals and voluntary associations then task (1) should be the highest priority; if members lack confidence or vision, are overcome with grief or depression or lack

personal powers for new stages of social change our emphasis should be on task (2).

We are now ready to proceed to Chapter IV.

C H A P T E R I V

PRINCIPLES FOR ORGANIZING A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

FACILITATOR: Our main concern in Chapter IV is with the first task of a TAG, the transformation of categorial power relations in the wider society, or alternatively with the modification of the basic structure of society in accordance with the FPSC.¹ While until now we have not explicitly said so I assume our time perspective is the mid-term, say one to three generations.

PRECISE: What are the reasons for a one to three generation time perspective?

FACILITATOR: If we are going to make major changes to the basic structure of society and do so through democratic processes then a shorter time period would be unrealistic. Because we reject a dictatorial imposition of social change, even in the name of "democracy", a shorter time period is ruled out.² However if the time span increases to much past two or three generations there are two major sorts of objections: it becomes increasingly difficult for our generation to understand and appreciate facts and considerations bearing on the possibilities or the range of desirable and feasible alternatives; more fundamentally there is an authoritarian presupposition behind such a programme. Because the values of autonomy and symmetrical categorial power relations should apply intergenerationally as well as intragenerationally it would be wrong for us to seek to organize the basic structure for remote generations. By basing our goal on

a two to three generation perspective we retain the possibility for those who are to live within the basic structure to participate in its determination. Therefore our agenda should now focus on the formulation of mid-term goals and objectives for the transformation of the basic structure of society.

19. A strategy for democratic transformation

ACTION-MAN: So a TAG has one task of transforming the basic structure of society over the mid-term and a second of promoting the good of its members in the present and immediate future. It is perhaps important to note that our two tasks, while distinct, are related. Facilitator's call for the articulation of mid-term goals and objectives for social transformation in effect asks us to sharpen up and give some specificity to the first task of the TAG. Perhaps this can be done by connecting it more closely to the second. Indeed, if by some chance we find ourselves in one big TAG including everyone, would there be any difference between the two tasks?

PRECISE: But that is impossible! There are far too many of us and we are too dispersed to meet together and deliberate concerning our individual and common interests; but a TAG provides processes for face-to-face deliberation.³

ACTION-MAN: Yes, one big TAG is impossible but hypothetically if we were in one TAG then the only issue would be internal democracy and our first task would collapse into our second which we would pursue in accordance with the principles we articulated in Chapter III concerning power relations and communications processes. While one big TAG is impossible is there something that achieves or comes close to achieving the same effects and results?

LIBERAL: The answer that is frequently given is that a constitutional democracy based on elected representatives in a parliamentary or congressional system is the best feasible alternative to an authentic democracy. What do you say to that?

ACTION-MAN: There are many positive features of constitutional democracy that should be retained, e.g. rights of free thought, expression and association, standing laws, popular suffrage,..., however the scope of democratic control is too restricted and the extent of citizen participation in political deliberation is too limited. Specifically, the employer/employee relation denies workers democratic control over the work-place and excessively constricts the autonomy of individual workers. Also too much power is vested in elected representatives and too little in the citizens, especially concerning legislation, broad policy objectives and the level and major priorities of the public budget; moreover this problem is related to the other in that, even within the public sector, the highly centralized differentiation of political authority generates a bureaucratic hierarchy incompatible with democratic control of the work-place. Finally the system of constitutional democracy does not provide for TAGs and for their integration within its basic structure of political deliberation, i.e. it permits TAGs as peripheral organizations to the main social and political functions without supporting their incorporation within the formal processes of political deliberation. There are many other criticisms of actual liberal capitalist societies that we could articulate but these are fundamental.

LIBERAL: In what sense are they fundamental? Are these features of constitutional democracy in a liberal capitalist society necessary or are they merely contingent? I can see that the restriction of

legislation and policy determination to representatives is a defining feature of constitutional democracy and so these sorts of limitations simply go with the concept of 'constitutional democracy'.⁴ But why is the employer/employee relation a necessary feature of constitutional democracy and why cannot TAGs be built into the structure of official political representation?

ACTION-MAN: In a constitutional democracy the vast majority of citizens do not participate, except possibly vicariously, in the determination of public policy. Indeed they will often have little idea of what the policies of their legislature are and so citizens generally will be unable to supervise or enforce the implementation of public policy. How then is public policy to be implemented? The answer is obvious - by an employed civil service whose members take orders from the elected representatives. The political representatives are accountable to the citizens as a whole at periodic elections. In between elections the representatives collectively hold the powers of dictators and within the logic of the system their manner of accountability to the citizens demands that they have the power to command their civil servants. Because their societies are populous (which is the reason for representative rather than direct democracy) they generally require many civil servants. It can be shown that a bureaucratic hierarchy is the most efficient and generally acceptable way of directing large numbers of workers to carry out political orders.⁵ Therefore, within the public sector, the employer/employee relation is necessitated by the commitments to control of public sector workers by elected representatives and by the manner of accountability of the representatives to the citizens.

Within the "private sector" the employer/employee relation is

the logically necessary accompaniment of capitalist property relations. Therefore while any constitutional democracy necessarily has employer/employee relations in the public sector, a liberal capitalist society will also have at least some employer/employee relations in the private sector as well.⁶

Concerning the integration of TAGs into the basic structure of political deliberation this can be initiated within a constitutional democracy, even of the liberal capitalist sort, and can be progressively developed but I believe that, at a certain point, the citizens, in the emerging TAG Network implied by this process, will want to remove the remaining constraints on the full realization of the FPSC and thus transform their limited constitutional democracy into a fully authentic democratic society. My grounds for this finding are based on a variety of considerations which should emerge in our discussions but, in brief, as the TAG Network emerges a stage will be reached where any minimally rational person will want to achieve an authentic form of democracy.


FACILITATOR: Am I right in thinking that you were about to suggest a better approach than a constitutional representative democracy, Action-Man?

ACTION-MAN: Yes, my basic idea is very simple. We should have every citizen in at least one TAG and all the TAGs connected, through representatives, into networks. Very roughly our goal is a network of TAGs - call it a 'Tag Network' which is organized to provide internal democratic relations to the members of each TAG and inter-relations between TAGs characterized by symmetrical power relations and open and undistorted communications.

However our idea is not yet feasible in such a simple form - I think this will be apparent after we elaborate on the somewhat

more involved model that is workable. In this respect it may be helpful to distinguish three spheres in which political authority may be exercised, i.e., citizenship, work and culture. Corresponding to these three key dimensions of human activity we should have three basic types of TAGs, all integrated within a structure of political deliberation and decision: geographic units to represent common citizenships concerns, interests and rights; functional and work-place units to represent workers as workers; cultural units to represent various ethnic, linguistic, religious, aesthetic and other cultural traditions and values. See diagram 7.

DIAGRAM 7 - THREE SPHERES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY



In our previous deliberations we developed a number of principles and findings to which our mid-term goal should conform. Of course the FPSC is the general formulation of our goal but we have also reached the following, more specific, conclusions:

- (1) we oppose domination/dependence relationships in politics (citizenship), work and culture;⁷
- (2) we favour equal civil and political rights for all citizens and the assurance of social freedoms such as freedom of speech, association, the press, etc.;⁸
- (3) political deliberations should be conducted in circumstances of equal categorial power and authentic interpersonal relations;⁹
- (4) we favour a culturally pluralistic society in the sense that we support the autonomy of individuals and groups to assert or celebrate such cultural values as do not plainly contradict the FPSC;¹⁰
- (5) we favour a classless society;¹¹
- (6) we oppose the employer/employee relation because of the fundamental and unacceptable asymmetry in power relations it sets over the work-place;¹²
- (7) we reject meritocracy as the basis for the organization of social co-operation;¹³
- (8) we oppose the imposition of social transformation by an elite or revolutionary vanguard;¹⁴
- (9) the TAGs (or other structures) in which citizen-workers deliberate concerning their good and interests should be internally democratic, i.e., there should be symmetrical power relations, authentic interpersonal relations and open, undistorted communications;¹⁵

- (10) to the extent feasible, persons should participate in the representation of their own interests in face to face deliberations within a TAG;¹⁶
- (11) individual responsibility and autonomy should be fostered through a selfidual sphere;¹⁷
- (12) finally, there is the feasibility criterion that our mid-term goal must be realizable through transformation of our existing institutions and practices.

Now these highlighted principles, as well as other findings from our previous deliberations, serve as constraints on the solution we seek. Our challenge is unlikely to be how to select one from among all the alternative possibilities that conform to these principles but rather how to find even one that meets or nearly meets these criteria. Moreover we must not be too hasty in rejecting ideas as impractical or we will probably be left with no goal at all. For example in Chapter V of his book The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, C. B. Macpherson discusses two ideas that are very important: the use of computer and telecommunications technology to make possible direct democracy in a society of millions of citizens; and a pyramidal model of participatory democracy. With respect to the former he says that the idea does not pay sufficient attention to the need for someone to formulate the questions.

No doubt something could be done with two-way television to draw more people into more active political discussion. And no doubt it is technically feasible to put in every living-room - or, to cover the whole population, beside every bed - a computer console with Yes/No buttons, or buttons for Agree/Disagree/Don't Know or for Strongly Approve/Mildly Approve/Don't Care/Mildly Disapprove/Strongly Disapprove, or for preferential multiple choices. But it seems inevitable that some government body would have to decide what questions would be asked: this could scarcely be left to private bodies.¹⁸

Concerning a pyramidal model of participatory democracy he elaborates it as a "direct democracy at the neighborhood or factory level - actual face-to-face discussion and decision by consensus, and election of delegates who would make up a council at the next more inclusive level, say a city borough or ward or township". Level by level, local, regional, national and transnational councils can thus be established to deal with matters appropriate to each level.¹⁹

Macpherson goes on to discuss the conditions under which this participatory model could work and he is more hopeful of its prospects than for the direct democracy through an electronic communications/ deliberation system. But I suggest that by combining these two ideas in an appropriate way and by an appropriate differentiation of the political control over work and culture we can formulate a mid-term goal which offers an authentically democratic transformation of our society.

I would like to elaborate and clarify this idea which I call a 'TAG Network' at our next session.

FACILITATOR: I appreciate the way Action-Man has highlighted key principles constraining our choice of mid-term goal. I wonder if we can use diagram 7 to give an even sharper focus on our major problem. To oversimplify a little, perhaps, we are seeking a system of social co-operation which combines (or reconciles) political accountability to all citizens on the basis of equality, worker autonomy and cultural pluralism. In our next session we can examine Action-Man's TAG Network idea as a possible solution to this problem.

20. The TAG Network

ACTION-MAN: My plan for this topic is to articulate a general vision of the TAG Network in a fully authentic democratic society in which all agents are somehow in the "correct" position.²⁰ After outlining the functioning of the TAG Network in this idealized and simplified circumstance we can address the ways in which new citizens, principally young people joining the work force, are initiated into full citizenship and come to take their positions within the system of social co-operation. This leads to an analysis of the two basic ways of categorizing and organizing workers - the professional association and the workers' co-operative.

At this point we can relax our assumptions that everything is "correct" or right and consider the identification and resolution of problems, complaints and disagreements. The point of the whole discussion is to show that a TAG Network establishes a division of social actions into positions, assigns agents to those positions, allocates resources and powers and does so in accordance with the FPSC; moreover that there is a strategy for moving from a constitutional democracy to an authentically democratic TAG Network. In following this programme we will have to skip over many details, problems and concerns. Let us see if we can keep our discussion to those issues that bear on the acceptability of the basic strategy and omit those that can be clarified during the refinement or implementation of the strategy.

All workers will be in a work-related TAG and all citizens will belong to a neighbourhood TAG which is part of a geographically organized TAG Network containing political units as part of a centralized/decentralized system of political deliberation and

decision. The work-related TAGs will participate within the TAG Network in ways that will be clarified shortly. Citizens will also participate in self-chosen cultural TAGs.

The principle guiding the organization of the TAG Network is to combine autonomy with political accountability. This principle is actualized by an appropriate combination of representation with communications. Each TAG selects its representative to the next level of the TAG Network and since this is a system based on accountability to the people and the pursuit of the good of everyone it is the TAG and not some central authority that determines the way in which representatives are chosen. Hence the TAG may use election, lot, rotation or any other method it considers will best present its interests or concerns at the next level.²¹ The key task is for the TAG to determine its common interest and then find a representative who can re-present the concerns, needs and interests of the TAG at the next level. At each level there are representatives speaking for the TAG or branch that selected them at the more local level.

SOLIDARITY: Your initial comments are puzzling in that you refer to a TAG Network in a fully authentic democratic society as if the TAG Network is our goal; and yet I have understood the TAG as a merely transition mechanism.

ACTION-MAN: Because the TAG's second task is concerned with the good of its members in the here and now the TAG is not merely a transition mechanism but is an integral part of the structure of a democratic society. Moreover in my mid-term perspective the organization of the TAG Network is the means for democratic social transformation and the resulting TAG Network is the form of the basic structure of society that realizes our mid-term goals and objectives. If the

progressive development of a TAG Network makes our society more and more democratic, does it make sense suddenly to jettison it like a spent rocket on a space ship as we near our destination of a society based on the FPSC?

PRECISE: How does the TAG Network differ from Macpherson's pyramidal system?

ACTION-MAN: The TAG Network incorporates the pyramidal approach with these differences:

- (1) it provides a three track system of representation - citizenship on a geographic basis, work on two bases I will elaborate shortly, and culture;
- (2) it places legislative authority in the hands of the citizens in a jurisdiction.

At levels above the most local (where direct face-to-face democracy pertains), the representatives formulate possible policies, propose resolutions concerning legislation, budget and policy implementation, and debate them in their assemblies. These debates are broadcast to the citizens in the jurisdiction who use the telecommunications system to approve or reject the resolutions. In this way we combine Macpherson's two ideas to achieve democratic participation and control.

To be workable representatives must limit the range and complexity of issues put to the people for decision. This can be accomplished through the policy of making decisions at the most local level feasible. Therefore at the more central levels the decisions discussed should be only those affecting the whole jurisdiction and which cannot be justly determined at more local levels. Centralized paternalism, with the best of intentions, destroys participatory democracy.

PRECISE: Is the telecommunications system technically feasible now or is it a remote future possibility?

ACTION-MAN: Yes, the technical problems have been solved.²²

LIBERAL: What powers do the representatives have?

ACTION-MAN: They are responsible for preparing plans, policies, budgets and legislation and for debating them in the assembly; they have such executive powers as the law provides; but they cannot vote and they do not rule.²³ In a world in which communications are perfect, in which there are no conflicts between one region or level and another and in which representatives represent the interests of their constituents perfectly, we might give our representatives the power to make law - but it is more prudent to be sceptical of such a world and to have the citizens themselves make the laws directly.²⁴

FACILITATOR: Would you please elaborate on the principles or criteria for conducting the political deliberations, particularly concerning the power and responsibilities of the various parties?

COMMENTARY: The following notes summarize Action-Man's presentation.

Criteria for a Democratic Communication/Deliberation System

To avoid misinterpretation let me set this discussion in a context: I will outline the powers and responsibilities of the parties within the citizenship sphere but you must keep in mind two other considerations which I address elsewhere. Firstly, while the citizenship sphere has the greater political authority, the spheres of work and cultural activity have substantial autonomy. Secondly, the principle of the maximum local autonomy compatible with social justice ensures that, with respect to cultural values and life styles, groups finding themselves in the minority in the society as a whole, can generally organize themselves to become the majority in some local jurisdiction and thereby protect themselves from

abuses of majoritarian power. Therefore the principle of decision by consensus or majority vote within any particular jurisdiction need not be oppressive to minorities. Nevertheless majoritarian power should not be recklessly employed. A sense of fraternity and authentic being-among-one-another suggests the pursuit of common interests and not the sectoral interests of the majority. Exercise of majority power in the face of widespread and intense minority opposition can rarely be justified and then only when an urgent decision is demanded and consensus appears impossible. The abuse of majority power releases the minority from the moral obligation to support or adhere to the decision.

In what follows I focus on the communications and deliberations within a given jurisdiction in the citizenship sphere.²⁵

A. General

1. Any new legislation, budget or policies which are to bind or directly affect the citizen in a particular jurisdiction:
 - 1.1 shall be presented to him with any relevant facts and arguments pro and con for his consideration;²⁶
 - 1.2 shall be determined by a direct vote of all citizens in the jurisdiction with a majority required to carry the bill or proposal.
2. Any existing legislation can be reconsidered on the motion of a single representative for the jurisdiction and once so moved shall be treated as a new bill with respect to consideration and decision.²⁷

B. Powers and Responsibilities of Representatives

3. The representative shall:
 - 3.1 advocate the common interests and represent the concerns of the TAG or branch he represents;

3.2 report to his own TAG or branch the concerns and interests of other groups;²⁸

3.3 assist in the preparation of legislation, policy papers and budgets for the consideration of the citizens, participate in debate concerning the proposals presented to the citizenry, and carry out such executive functions as the laws prescribe.²⁹

Note: If citizens veto a bill or budget then representatives may present alternative proposals that may be approved, or return to their constituencies to renew the process of decision and deliberation.

4. The representative is entitled to change his mind as he becomes acquainted with various concerns and arguments and to propose and argue for proposals different from those endorsed by his TAG or branch. The TAG or branch need not and should not bind their delegate to a fixed line or position but should respect his autonomy and authenticity. These rights of the representative foster rather than undermine political accountability because citizens vote directly and control the selection of their representatives. On the other hand to bind the delegate to a fixed line would result in distorted communication and the irrationality of ignoring relevant information.

C. Powers and Responsibilities of Citizens

5. The citizen shall:

- 5.1 attend meetings of his TAG and participate in the deliberations to establish common interests and to select representatives;
- 5.2 keep himself informed regarding matters of concern to the TAG and the various jurisdictions representing his interests;
- 5.3 carry a "fair share" of the executive and representational duties of the TAG;

- 5.4 obey the laws and pay the taxes set by each jurisdiction representing him;
- 5.5 vote on bills and proposals presented for his deliberation.
- 6. The citizen is entitled to access, through the communication system, to all information available to his representatives or advisers.

In this form of government citizens' participation will not be restricted to the election of their rulers and the citizens will not be ruled between general elections by their representatives. Indeed there will be no general elections because citizens can continually alter their representation starting with the TAG and proceeding through all the branches of the TAG Network. Whereas in modern parliamentary "democracies" political élites and party "machines" wield enormous power, in the TAG Network there is no "plum" of political power and patronage associated with the highest levels of government and therefore political élitism and manipulation by party machines can be greatly reduced or even eliminated.

LIBERAL: Would you please explain how work and culture are integrated with the citizenship sphere in the overall network?

ACTION-MAN: That is a challenging task which I can only begin here.

Clearly workers should have the right to represent their own interests through their own democratic organizations, and also citizens should be able to exercise certain broad policy controls over work in the public interest. However the idea that the citizenship sphere should represent the public interest and the workers' organization the workers' interests is too simple because the workers' organizations should have the responsibility for articulating and enforcing standards of work practice designed to achieve the public policy goals set by the citizenship jurisdictions.

In the next two sessions we can discuss in some detail the integration between the citizenship and work branches of the TAG. In Chapters V and VI we discuss education and at that time we can touch on some of the ways in which culture is integrated with citizenship and work. If you refer back to diagram 7 (p. 144) you will see that the region marked "E" is the intersection of the citizenship, work and culture spheres. I will not make too much of the spatial metaphor implied in the diagram but it does draw attention to the fact that while education can be viewed as a type of cultural activity it is also very much within the citizenship and work spheres, e.g. it is the job of teachers.³⁰

One point I should mention here is that whenever public policy bearing on work or culture is debated in the citizenship assemblies the representatives of the appropriate work or cultural organizations should be able to participate directly in the assemblies' deliberations.

PRECISE: But that is multiple representation!

ACTION-MAN: The power of decision rests with the citizens but they should be able to hear the arguments and considerations presented by workers' or cultural communities' representatives directly.

FACILITATOR: We have the general idea of the TAG Network and are ready to address the political control of work in our next session.

21. The political control of work

ACTION-MAN: What is the problem that calls for political control of work?

In our authentic democracy we will all be both workers producing goods, services and resources for other citizens and consumers using goods, services and resources produced by others. To realize the FPSC the outcome of the complex processes of production, exchange and

consumption must be good for each of us in our role of worker and of consumer. This problem cannot be reduced to a matter of incomes and prices: as workers we are concerned with the nature of our work activity, the conditions under which we perform our work and the income from our labour; as consumers we are concerned with the variety, quantity, quality and price of goods and services available to us.

As a worker I-self needs: autonomy which translates into choice of profession and place of work, self-discipline, self-chosen direction and supervision, participation in the determination of all conditions of his work, the exercise of professional judgment in work; authenticity which translates into transparent understanding of work relations and undistorted communications and symmetrical power relations in the work-place; self-development which translates into opportunities to develop and apply his knowledge, understanding and expertise; welfare which translates into the right to work and earn income, to gain esteem and recognition through work; authentic-being-with-colleagues which translates into democratic self-governance of co-operative activity and a general equality in responsibility. However, as a consumer, I-self needs access to goods, services and resources to advance his authentic project. As a consumer, I-self would oppose a hypothetical system of social co-operation in which seventy-five per cent of workers are university professors and there is a shortage of farmers and workers in transportation, construction and manufacturing.

How is I-self to meet simultaneously his own needs as worker and as consumer? In a complex division of social actions, if citizens do whatever gives them satisfaction as workers it is implausible that they will meet their needs as consumers. Some kind of constraint has

to be placed on either work or consumption or both. How can this be done without violating I-self's autonomy or establishing a class relation in which the interests of one class are met at the expense of those of another? Surely we must reject all the constraint being placed on consumers because this would result in producers manipulating and controlling consumers and trying to shape their tastes and life projects in order to increase the income, prestige or power of the workers. In general we should seek to minimize the control over consumers to that which is in the common interest of the community and not permit worker/producers to dictate consumer taste and choice. The principle should be that the entitlement to income arises from producing goods, services or resources that advance the politically determined common interest of the community or society, or which are freely purchased by consumers.

I am free to work on my authentic project - to write a book no one wants to read, to paint a painting no one values, to produce vast numbers of trinkets nobody will buy but I am not free to earn an income from my work unless I perform a task that the political jurisdiction or some citizen wants to pay for.

There are two significant findings that emerge from this discussion:

- (1) the community or society is justified in placing labour under political control;
- (2) the starting place for the planning of the division of labour and the allocation of social resources to production is the needs for consumption and use of the citizens as articulated in the TAG Network.

In discussions of political control one often hears of the 'public/private enterprise' distinction but this is a rather muddled categorization. By 'public' is meant enterprises which are controlled by the political jurisdictions and whose goods, services and resources are available to all or to certain categories of persons subject to definite rules and regulations. But in an authentic democracy all enterprises which involve income flows will be under some form of political control. The term 'private' is of little value to us because in everyday usage it might apply to personally chosen activities of individuals, or intimate relations among individuals - usages close to our term 'selfidual' - or to vast national or multinational corporations such as General Motors or Shell Oil, which are social institutions in every sense in which public enterprises are. I propose that we use 'public' to refer to those enterprises directly paid for by the society through taxes or revenues accruing to the community members or citizens in common and 'market' to refer to those enterprises holding franchises authorized by the political jurisdictions and whose revenues, and most importantly whose income levels of their workers, are dependent on sales of their product or service to customers or clients. Nevertheless political jurisdictions may, in their wisdom, provide grants or subsidies to market enterprises just as they may charge user fees for public enterprises. The market approach is to be preferred where there is great diversity in tastes or a sharp disagreement within the community on whether the product or service is of general value.

LIBERAL: I am not clear why we need to have political control of the market enterprises.

ACTION-MAN: There are a number of reasons. The community rationally desires a general control over production and consumption. For example, if the market enterprises were totally unregulated we might have a business marketing assassination kits, an industrial plant polluting air and water, a developer ruining the beauty and living standards of a community, a drug company whose lack of quality control represents a health menace. Although there will be disagreements about the specifics of what should be provided on the market under what conditions (e.g. pornography, prostitution or hand guns) there should be no dispute over the need for some control. Additionally is it not legitimate to protect workers against over-competition by limiting the number of franchises to particular fields? Or to protect consumers from too little competition or too limited a range of goods or services by making particular sorts of work opportunity available? There are also efficiency considerations: the citizens' needs can be the basis for rational planning of production. Moreover does not justice apply to the work-place and cannot the political jurisdictions establish rules and regulations to provide fair access or rotation to especially favoured jobs and some sorts of compensation or rotation for particularly disliked work?

LIBERAL: Yes, I agree that some extent of political control of market enterprises is called for although I do not want to see a great bureaucracy set up to police these enterprises.

ACTION-MAN: My point in distinguishing the public from the market enterprises is to clarify the two different approaches to work organization. In both cases the political representatives draft statements of franchises for the various enterprises to be approved by the citizens in the political jurisdiction. These franchises establish the rules

and regulations concerning the operation of public and market enterprises. In the case of the public enterprises workers' co-operatives will apply to fill contracts negotiated between the political jurisdiction and a workers' co-operative.³¹ These contracts will provide for definite goods or services to be provided by the workers' co-operative in exchange for income for the workers. For the market franchises the political jurisdiction's involvement will generally be limited to authorizing a workers' co-operative to run an enterprise; income flows, volume of work, specific nature of jobs and other such matters will be a matter to be determined in free contracts between the workers' co-operative and its customers or clients.³²

Having outlined the powers and duties of the political jurisdictions I will consider the workers' co-operatives and the professional associations. The workers' co-operatives are self-governing associations of workers who plan, organize, manage, direct and perform the work according to the conditions spelled out in the franchise. The workers, who may belong to the same or different professional association(s), voluntarily belong to their co-operative.³³ Concerns of the professional association include the education and training of workers for a particular profession, standards for professional practice, in-service education and research to improve professional performance, assisting members to find suitable positions and representing the interests of the members of the profession regarding the drafting of policies and legislation for the consideration of the citizens. Representatives of the professional associations would participate in policy and legislation discussions at certain citizenship jurisdictions within the TAG Network.

SOLIDARITY: Before you go on, Action-Man, I wonder if you could explain some of your ideas? I agree with the citizens approving legislation and budgets directly. If it is feasible it is a more democratic approach than having representatives make law. However, I have a number of concerns about your discussion of franchises, workers' co-operatives and professional associations. I do not like the idea of professions or the word 'professional' but my major objection is that your idea is getting too complicated. Why go into all this fragmentation of political authority? Surely the political jurisdictions can control work directly without such devices as workers' co-operatives and professional associations.

ACTION-MAN: I would be pleased for you to elaborate your ideas for simplifying the political control of work.

SOLIDARITY: To begin with I would cut out your 'public' versus 'market' distinction and go entirely with a public sector. As you suggest the political jurisdiction will define the goods, services and resources needed and will design franchises - only I prefer to call them production units - to produce the desired output; then it will appoint managers to run the production units; the managers will hire employees and direct the production.

The workers will be paid for their work and will be able to purchase the goods and services they choose. If consumers are dissatisfied with the range, quantity, quality or price of goods or services they can complain to the political jurisdiction; if workers are dissatisfied with their conditions of work, managers, supervisors or wages they can complain; and in each case the political jurisdiction, which the citizens control directly, has the authority to alter plans, reallocate resources, direct, discipline or replace managers, etc.

SCHOLAR: Solidarity's plan appears simpler but is it acceptable? Does it meet the criteria Action-Man articulated for the needs of workers? It seems to turn workers into employees of state enterprises run by a hierarchy of politicians, managers, supervisors and foremen and to control work through obedience to the orders passed down this hierarchy. As I understand Action-Man's proposal it is predicated on the abolition of the employer/employee relationship and of the hierarchy and bureaucracy that inescapably goes with it. Solidarity's plan leaves us with employers, employees, asymmetries of power within a hierarchy and the affront to professional autonomy that comes from following the boss's orders.

SOLIDARITY: Scholar seems to be under the misapprehension that I favour authoritarian, insensitive and uncaring management and supervision but I do not. Has it been demonstrated that the employer/employee relationship per se is undemocratic?

Many relationships are unsatisfactory but not all are. Within our society there are some situations in which employees exercise professional judgment, have a high degree of autonomy in their work, enjoy their work, appreciate the conditions under which they perform their duties, and find their managers and supervisors to be competent, caring, helpful and committed to democratic ideals. If it is possible to reconcile worker autonomy with employee status in some capitalist institutions, and it seems to be, surely there is no need to abolish the employer/employee relationship. Rather we should exercise the authority of the political jurisdictions to ensure that the employer functions of the state are conducted in accordance with the workers' interests. The abolition of the employer/employee relationship is

unnecessary to advance workers' interests and leads to complications that undermine political accountability.

SCHOLAR: It seems that our dispute concerns means but that we are agreed on ends. It is also possible that we are interpreting 'employer/employee relationship' somewhat differently. What is it that makes a relationship an employer/employee relationship? While there are many different features of the relationship arising implicitly through precedent or practice, or established in collective agreement, labour legislation or the contract of employment, its essence is that the employee shall perform such functions and duties as the employer assigns, directs or commands in exchange for benefits, wages or salary. The fact that limits are placed on what or how an employer may assign or command his employees or under which conditions does not alter the fact that the worker, while on duty, turns over to his employer the basic responsibility for directing his work, i.e. his social action.

I argue that labour legislation, collective bargaining and other forms of political control over employers, unless they abolish the employer/employee relationship entirely, do not provide professional autonomy for workers. In our ordinary usage we understand that authority to direct the work of employees is constitutive of the meaning of 'employer'. To say that "I am an employer but I do not have any employees" is to express a logical contradiction. To say that "X is an employer who lacks the authority to direct the work of his employees" is to utter nonsense because if X cannot direct Y's work then X is not Y's employer. Not all contracts involving the performance of work manifest an employer/employee relationship. A promises to deliver a tool shed to B in exchange for £x but this is not a contract of employment - not even if A builds the tool shed

himself. Moreover even where the contract stipulates that one party will actually perform the work this is not sufficient to make it a contract of employment. For example, I contract with my dentist for him to perform certain dental services for a fee according to a schedule. Is my dentist my employee? I pay him. I insist that he perform the work. Nevertheless we say that my dentist is a professional, not an employee, and I am a client, not an employer. The function of the employer is to direct the employee; the basis of the employer's authority is neither moral excellence nor professional expertise but his asymmetrical (in relation to the employee) control over resources. In Solidarity's analysis of the capitalist/worker relation she analysed this very asymmetry in power but she has yet to appreciate that this asymmetry is not resolved by making the state, even a "politically democratic" state, the employer.³⁴ It is even arguable whether the worker's lot will be generally improved if he is employed by a state which monopolizes all enterprises and governs and directs every worker in his job performance, i.e. it is conceivable that he would be better off under capitalism.

There is one part of Solidarity's argument that, while possessing a surface plausibility, is gravely mistaken. I refer to her call for enlightened management and good personnel practices to reconcile the worker's professional autonomy with his employee status. Well, it cannot be done. Having professional autonomy is a different thing entirely from happening to have a benevolent employer who chooses to treat you well. The difference is in power and control. While a professional controls his own working life an employee enjoys such privileges as his employer chooses to grant. To illustrate this

I want you to think about what is wrong with the following argument:

The problem is not with slavery as an institution but with the brutal and inhuman treatment of slaves by some slave owners. The fact that some slaves are well treated, happy and have substantial autonomy in the direction of their work shows that slavery is not necessarily contrary to the interests of a slave as a worker.³⁵ All we need to do is to establish a system of collective bargaining between slaves and slave owners that will equalize their power and ensure that there is democratic political control and supervision of the slave owners.

As an alternative to the abolition of slavery this programme is daft. Although it might ameliorate the living conditions of slaves in the short run or lead to the eventual abolition of slavery in the long run we all agree that it is mad.³⁶ But what makes it mad? It simply ignores the most fundamental fact about slavery - the asymmetry in power between slave owner and slave. Just as "democratic" political control of the slave owners in Athenian society did not make slavery democratic so too "democratic" political control of employers according to Solidarity's plan does not overcome the asymmetry between employer and employee.

PRECISE: But the parallel does not hold: the slaves in Athens had no political rights but Solidarity's employees are citizens.

TELEOLOGIST: Yes, and if Solidarity's citizens are content to remain employees that would surprise me as much as if "enfranchised slaves" would choose to remain slaves! (Again, would the minimally rational person agree to slavery?)

SCHOLAR: My point is that it is not enough for workers to be well treated, listened to, respected etc. by kindly employers and managers; the workers need the authority, responsibility and power to manage, direct and operate their own work-place.

PRECISE: I am convinced that we need to abolish employer/employee relations and I generally agree with Action-Man's plan. I disagree with Solidarity's idea of a single track political control not only because of its effects on working life but also because it may threaten the rights of minorities to express divergent beliefs and live alternative life styles. I am not convinced concerning collective bargaining - why can collective bargaining not be used as part of the strategy for abolishing the employer/employee relationship? Perhaps the discussion of professional associations will clarify the point.

ACTION-MAN: Yes, let us leave the issue of collective bargaining to another session although we clearly would not have collective bargaining in an authentic democracy because in the sense relevant to our discussion collective bargaining is a process for regulating, not abolishing, employer/employee relations.

SOLIDARITY: I am coming around toward Action-Man's idea although I still have some concerns. Scholar has helped me to appreciate the basic problem inherent in the employer/employee relation, in principle, and if you can answer three questions I might well be convinced:

- (1) How are the workers' co-operatives to be managed? By rotating amateur managers? By Committee? By professionally trained managers? If the latter what is the relation of the manager to the workers' co-operative and to the political jurisdiction?
- (2) How can the public service be run without employees?
- (3) How can we ensure efficiency and quality in our major institutions if they are run by workers' co-operatives? How does this bear on political accountability? Consider the post office, railways, airports and most important of

all our communication/deliberation system which simply must operate according to specifications?

ACTION-MAN: You are asking, "How can we have political accountability without giving political bodies or officers the authority to direct and command at least the senior managers of large, complex and vital enterprises?" This is the great strength of the proposal - that it reconciles political accountability with worker autonomy. The citizen's representatives for each jurisdiction must focus on categorial power decisions, i.e. on defining the general nature of what is to be done and the conditions under which it is to be done, e.g. health, safety, justice, beauty. It is appropriate for this categorial authority to be expressed in standing laws, regulations and authorized budgets but not in specific direction or ad hoc commands. It is true that to realize the public interest policies the citizen must do more than pass laws and approve budgets and plans. However, because the citizens as a whole cannot carry out the specific interpretation and application of their policies they must establish a division of the political supervision. In a parliamentary or congressional system the people's representatives establish a hierarchical bureaucracy and then run it through directives and orders passed down from the top. But in a TAG Network this is unnecessary and undesirable. Instead, when it comes to interpreting and applying the common interest policies set by the people as a whole, we should follow the principle of autonomy - which is to say the democratically decentralized division of political authority - and this is where the workers' co-operatives and the professional associations come in.

SOLIDARITY: We are agreed that the citizens should have the authority to make law but if we turn over to workers' co-operatives and professional

associations the authority to interpret and apply the law what assurance do the people have that their laws are obeyed or their intended policies pursued?

LIBERAL: We have already agreed that we require a system of law enforcement and I assume that the basic approach using police and courts of law, lawyers and judges that pertains in a constitutional democracy would apply in our authentic democracy. If this is right the citizens can protect their sovereign authority through the law courts. Concerning "intended policies" there are generally many ways to pursue policies, follow a plan or act in accordance with the law. In this respect the representatives or other officers have no privileged access to the "true intentions" underlying the laws and policy decisions approved by the people and so there is no justification for having them interpreting and applying the policies, determined by the citizens, through orders or directives to managers of the major enterprises. This, I gather, is why Action-Man wants the decisions concerning interpretation and application of common interest policies, in respect of work, to rest with the workers themselves.

ACTION-MAN: Yes, exactly, but I do want to address Solidarity's questions concerning managers and management. In preparing legislation, budgets and policy proposals for political deliberation the representatives will require the services of managers, researchers, secretaries, clerks, etc. but this work can also be performed through workers' co-operatives - it does not require employees. For example a co-operative can be engaged to prepare draft franchises, carry out research regarding the franchises and to provide advice concerning negotiations with workers' co-operatives, relations with professional associations and action on "consumer" concerns.

What about the question of management within the workers' co-operative? If a workers' co-operative fails to meet the conditions of its franchise the political jurisdiction can cancel its franchise and replace it by another workers' co-operative. There is nothing soft or fuzzy about this contract: it is "produce or lose the franchise". The workers have responsibility for the organization of their own work but they must meet the conditions of their franchise. Assuming that workers' co-operatives want to keep their franchises they are motivated to exercise the internal discipline required to meet their production or service standards. Accordingly they will require the authority to expel members who do not meet their obligations or who violate the regulations of their co-operative. The internal structure of a workers' co-operative is that of a TAG or of an interlocking network of TAGs. Hence it has internal democratic deliberation procedures. It is also faced with the constraints imposed by the political jurisdiction and professional associations.

Given this context and these general conditions the role of managers should rest with the workers' co-operative as a whole. The members of the co-operative should be able to determine whether professional managers, rotating amateurs, committees or whatever are best for their circumstances. Provided that the co-operative achieves the standards in its franchise what business or concern need the political jurisdiction have other than it be the democratically determined decision of the workers? On this basis professional managers will not be employers but will only have and exercise such managerial authority as the democratically operated co-operative grants them; they belong to workers' co-operatives, not as employers or high status employees, but as co-professionals and colleagues.

If managers' performance is unsatisfactory they can be replaced, as can any other worker whose performance is unsatisfactory, by a decision of the workers' co-operative.³⁷

TELEOLOGIST: Basically workers achieve autonomy but lose security because in this system a poor performer may be turned on by his colleagues.

HEART: No system can guarantee compassion but I think that there will be a compassionate concern for colleagues within the workers' co-operative and that the co-workers of a poor performer will encourage and assist him to meet the production standards. If their attempts fail he should be let go and encouraged to try again somewhere else, perhaps in a field or in circumstances more suited to him. In any case the worker's security is more firmly in his own hands than in systems, such as capitalism, where "good" performers are likely to be laid off during depressed markets. Finally, if he is let go he would not be consigned to the "reserve army of the unemployed" but would be encouraged and assisted to take a position in some other enterprise or region or to be retrained for a different profession.

Do you agree, Action-Man?

ACTION-MAN: Most definitely.

SOLIDARITY: Of course I have some detailed concerns which we need not pursue now but I am in favour of the TAG Network idea in general, provided the elaboration on the professional association is satisfactory.

FACILITATOR: It appears that we agree on the general idea of the TAG Network and are now ready to address the issue of professional organization.

22. Professional organization

ACTION-MAN: I share Solidarity's preference for as simple a system for organizing and controlling work as is compatible with our democratic ideals: simplicity makes the system of social co-operation more understandable and hence more readily harnessed to achieve both individual and common interests of the members of the community.

Because we agree on the need for the political jurisdictions of the TAG Network to exercise overall control over the division of labour, and for worker autonomy within that overall political control expressed, at least in part, by the workers' co-operative, we will need some other organization to make our system workable.

PRECISE: Why?

ACTION-MAN: How do workers get into a particular co-operative? How do professionals get trained? What control over professional qualification and certification should there be? Who is to exercise it?

The political jurisdiction cannot assign workers to co-operatives because we agreed this would be a voluntary arrangement. Furthermore workers' co-operatives have the authority to expel members and this would be incompatible with workers being assigned by the political jurisdictions or indeed by any other body. Although we want the membership of a worker in a particular co-operative to be a matter of mutual agreement both workers seeking positions and co-operatives seeking workers would benefit from an organization that could provide research and assistance to support and supplement the communication/deliberation system. This would be convenient but not essential.

However when we consider the matter of certifying the qualifications of professionals we meet a function which demands a new institution. In the argument to follow I am going to assume that a profession

involves substantial specialized knowledge, understanding, expertise or skill in addition to that possessed by a citizen with a good general education.

PRECISE: In that case will there not be a great many unprofessional jobs and many workers who will not need professional qualifications?

ACTION-MAN: As long as you agree that there will be some professionals I can continue my argument and we can return to your question later. I am sure you agree that we need some control over professional qualifications and certification in the common interest. After all we do not want incompetent or unethical medical doctors, airline pilots or automotive repairmen practising, do we?

Well, the political jurisdictions are in no position to exercise this control because neither citizens nor their representatives generally possess the specialized knowledge, expertise, etc., to assess professional qualifications, at least on more complex issues.

There will be circumstances in which a workers' co-operative may be well positioned to assess the professional qualifications of aspiring professionals e.g. a long standing lawyers' co-operative. However there will be many situations in which workers' co-operatives could not or ought not determine the professional certification of their members. Many co-operatives will have a mix of different professions among their workers. For example, a co-operative might consist of one manager, one accountant, one lawyer, ten engineers, ten secretaries,.... While co-workers can make many judgments about the work performance and relationships of their colleagues they have no more grasp of the intricacies of professional practice, outside their own field, than do lay citizens.

Moreover new co-operatives can form at any time. Suppose a

group got together to apply for a medical clinic franchise: as a workers' co-operative they vouch for each other's qualifications, which might be anything at all. This type of self-bestowed certification is worthless.

By similar sorts of arguments we can demonstrate that neither political jurisdictions nor workers' co-operatives are in a position to control the professional education of future professionals.

The professional association is the institution that can and should control both the professional education and the certification of qualification for professional practice. What is a professional association? It is an organization of practitioners in a certain field or occupation which has certain rights and powers and exercises certain functions, principally control over certification, professional education and standards of good practice for its members who have rights of autonomous practice. I will glide over a number of complex questions concerning the ways of categorizing professions and establishing boundaries between them: for example, is teaching a profession? Is university teaching a different profession from primary school teaching? Are teachers of different subjects in the same or different professions? Can a person belong to more than one profession?

However professions may be defined, a professional association is an actual organization, which in its structure, internal functioning and relationships to other institutions embodies a particular, historically determined categorization of the division of social labour. The members of this organization are practitioners carrying out certain specialized functions within their system of social co-operation. There are a number of grounds for believing that they are collectively in the best position to determine the criteria for competence and good

practice within their field. Provided that it has an appropriate organization of its internal operations and suitable rights and powers, the professional association can and should exercise control over the professional education and certification of its members. Briefly, the grounds are: the practitioners have more experience concerning their practice than any other group; they have generally received education and training designed to prepare them for their practice; they generally have public trust and confidence in their capabilities as practitioners.

PRECISE: What if they do not?

ACTION-MAN: If my last point turns out to be false a case might be made for placing the authority over education and certification in the hands of some other institution. However it cannot justifiably be left indefinitely with an institution other than the professional association because the reason for denying the practitioners control is that the public lacks confidence in them, i.e. they are considered incompetent or unethical; but if the institution that does exercise this control continues to turn out incompetent or unethical practitioners then it is incompetent in the exercise of its authority and does not deserve to retain it. On the other hand if this institution rectifies the problem of competence and ethical practice then this argument against the practitioners exercising control no longer applies.

While I can only touch on the question of appropriate organization of the internal operations of a professional association it will need to carry out programmes of research and in-service education to improve practices, have some systematic approaches to articulating good practice, have mechanisms to monitor practice and deal firmly with instances of

unprofessional conduct to demonstrate it deserves its authority to control the education and certification of its members.

SCHOLAR: Action-Man's analysis raises some fascinating philosophical issues. His arguments are not too tight in places because he bases so much of his case on tendencies and his assessments of probabilities. However this is not my concern because as Aristotle says, "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions,...".³⁸ Nevertheless there are two interconnected points that do concern me: we are left with a problem of self-bestowed certification; there is a failure to justify grounding the applicable authority in practice. If it is unacceptable for workers' co-operatives to certify professionals because a self-bestowed certification is worthless, how can it be acceptable for practitioners to certify themselves through the professional association?

Concerning the second point, do we not often criticize practice? If practice is to be the basis of certification then how can good practice be distinguished from poor, or competence from incompetence? As I understand Action-Man's idea of the professional association the judgments concerning good practice and competence are made collectively, i.e. by some kind of consensus of the practitioners. But is this adequate? If a profession is generally characterized by good practice and competent performance then I am sure that consensus of the practitioners will identify good practice. Equally so, if a profession is characterized by poor practices or incompetence the consensus of practitioners will fail to identify good practice! For example, suppose that in a certain community most second-hand car dealers are crooks who swindle and deceive their customers. Would

these practitioners establish the criteria for good practice? It is more likely that they would de-certify the minority of honest dealers. Are you willing to grant these second-hand car dealers professional self-governance? Consensus may correspond with good practice on occasion but it is not consensus that makes practices good or bad, competent or incompetent, ethical or unethical. When people deliberate concerning good practice they are (or ought to be) pursuing some objective criteria and not merely reporting their opinions. Moreover, defining good practice in terms of a consensus of practitioners is too conservative a policy and could retard the rate of improvement in practice.

What are the policy implications of my concerns? In addition to practitioners there should be lay and expert representatives on the boards of bodies with the powers to control professional education and to determine certification. Let me illustrate some of the problems in Action-Man's analysis with the example of school teachers. In many jurisdictions university teachers control the education of school teachers in training. Because many of the university teachers do not (or have not for a long time) practised school teaching they lack the experience to ground their assessments of good practice but in a different sense they are practitioners - in that they teach school teachers in training - and therefore they have the best claim to control the education of school teachers! So there seems to be some indeterminacy concerning the application of 'practitioner'. Common sense suggests that we are better served to have the control of the education of school teachers shared among lay citizens, school teachers and the university teachers who train school teachers. It is easy to generalize this finding for other professions.

Lay representatives are required to represent the public interest, practitioners to express the insights and interests only they can, and experts to bring to bear specialized knowledge unavailable to practitioners and lay members. In any field systematic research into the conditions and requirements for good practice can provide valid and useful information for professional improvement. People who do this kind of research or who are very well versed in its findings are the experts I refer to.

TELEOLOGIST: Scholar's criticisms should prove helpful in clarifying this part of the discussion. However I think she missed the point concerning self-bestowed qualifications. At the time when a professional association certifies a particular candidate that candidate is not a member and so there is no problem of "You certify me and I will certify you".

ACTION-MAN: May I add something before you continue, Teleologist? I want to pick up on your point about historical continuity and connect it to the initiation of young people into full citizenship and work because the professional association has a crucial function in this regard. In an authentic democracy the education of children and young people will have two main aims: a general education developing knowledge, understanding and skills for social, cultural and political participation and, most importantly the democratic character, i.e. responsibility, autonomy, authenticity, self-esteem, etc.; a professional education which will develop knowledge, expertise and skill relevant to further training in a wide range of professions, and specific training to attain the qualifications to practise at least one.

I see this training for a specific profession as the

responsibility of the professional association. For the young citizen initiation into a profession begins with his specialized professional education and a milestone is reached when he is certified to practise. There is a very important issue here concerning the control over professional education and certification and the way this social policy affects personal autonomy. During his period of apprenticeship and initial professional education the trainee is not granted the same authority as practitioners; his work experience is under the supervision of certified practitioners. How do we justify the subordinate status of the trainee?

PRECISE: He lacks the knowledge, skill, experience or competence of the certified professional.

ACTION-MAN: Yes and perhaps additionally he has yet to internalize the norms and ethical principles of the profession, which include a concern for the client's interests, a capacity for sound judgment and a disposition toward autonomous practice. Our understanding of I-self's good is the basis of our commitment to autonomous practice by workers: this is why we choose professional rather than employee status. During his period of apprenticeship and professional education prior to certification the trainee is equipped with the capability for autonomous practice. If his training and education are successful he will be capable of distinguishing good practice from bad and of producing competent performance. He and his certified colleagues comprise the only group that can claim both the ethical and the technical authority to control training and certification. Moreover, because we oppose a group of mere functionaries carrying out the specialized aspects of professional education according to the standards set by the practitioners, the professional association

should arrange to provide the teachers for these specialized aspects from among its own membership. Also, assuming they have sufficient pedagogical skill, practitioners' experience and understanding will tend to make them the most effective teachers.

To connect this argument to individual worker autonomy: when control over education and certification rests with the professional association the trainee knows that his subordinate status is temporary and, if successful, he will join a self-governing, collegial community of professionals. However, if this control rests with some other institution then the principle of autonomy is violated and authoritarian principles are at work: rather than the unequal status of the trainee professional being temporary - to be ended when he becomes initiated into the profession - it is permanent, and all his life he is fated to work subject to political or "expert" authority incompatible with professional autonomy.

FACILITATOR: Thank you, Action-Man, I believe that Teleologist has some other points concerning Scholar's arguments.

TELEOLOGIST: Scholar is concerned about the primacy of practice and about "objectivity" concerning good practice. I agree that consensus does not make practices good or bad but this argument is a straw-man because there is no reason to suppose that a professional association would be arbitrary or irrational in its deliberations.

Perhaps we need to go back to first principles. Good practice is good for someone. For whom? If we think of work involving the worker, the worker's colleagues, the client and the general public then we can say that good practice will be good for the worker himself, the worker's colleagues, the client and the general public. The workers' co-operative represents the interests of co-workers and

the political jurisdictions, through general legislation and the terms and conditions of franchise approvals, those of citizens and third parties.³⁹ What about the client, particularly the individual client? How can the individual's interests be represented in dealings with professionals? It is most important that the legislation and policies of the political jurisdiction ensure that a client/professional relationship pertains and that citizens do not have "professional" services imposed on them. Hence we insist on a freely negotiated relationship between client and professional. Given the foregoing safeguards there is one additional protection needed by the client - the assurance that the professional is both competent and ethical, i.e. that he understands good practice and that he acts in his client's interests. Action-Man argues, and I agree, that the professional association, through its control over the education and certification of professional workers and its capacity to monitor and improve practice, is uniquely capable of providing this assurance. Hence the professional association, in conjunction with the other institutions of an authentic democracy, fosters an equal consideration of the good of everyone, i.e. it fosters the realization of our fundamental principle of social co-operation and justice.

Then Scholar directs us to a more fundamental problem - that of grounding the assessment of good practice in practice itself. She suggests that there is a circular justification in going with "what works". Is basing good practice on practitioners' judgments of what works really circular? Not according to our analysis of reflexive monitoring in section 7: we agreed that rules, principles or criteria for evaluating any particular action must be grounded in I-self's authentic project. In terms of the project structure to say that

certain practices "work" is to claim that they represent efficacious praxis towards the aims of one's project and even when we do not explicitly articulate our aims, "it works" is our assessment that our project, or a particular part of it, is proceeding satisfactorily. While this assessment is not necessarily the same thing as authenticity, the determination that one's project is or is not authentic involves an "it works" judgment as well. The concern with efficacy, i.e. with practices that work, is a basic feature of the authentic project. Hence the grounding in practice is in accordance with our finding, in section 7, that the basis for evaluation is I-self's authentic project.

Moreover, any practices which people have followed for some time have passed a feasibility test - it may not be extremely stringent - but there are nevertheless any number of theories, principles, notions and ideas about practice that have never passed the test of working or, if they once worked, they no longer do. Importantly the judgment of workability is both lay and professional: chiropractors and neurosurgeons have clients who choose to use their services and who have a certain degree of confidence in their practices. Hence prevailing practice involves multiple judgments of workability subject to ongoing tests and criticism. Although practice is always imperfect and continually requires revision the only sound policy is to determine standards for good practice through a consensus of practitioners. If these practitioners deliberate within their own TAG Network under conditions of symmetrical power relations and undistorted communication, i.e. if the professional association is internally democratic, a consensus of practitioners offers the best chance of identifying good practice and this consensus will embody a suitable degree of

agnosticism concerning indeterminate matters that will foster research and innovation. Modifying and transforming existing practices rather than trying to institute new practices "from scratch" based on ideal theoretical models accords with our general strategy for social change.

Scholar's arguments concerning lay and expert representation have a certain plausibility for liberal capitalist systems but are not appropriate for an authentic democracy. Right now we are concerned not with professional control within our existing system of social relations but within the TAG Network which provides for citizen control in a number of ways. Perhaps Action-Man will summarize these for us.

ACTION-MAN: The legislation, targets for training new professionals and the allocation of public funds to the professional association are approved by the political jurisdictions. However it is important for professional associations to have the right to prepare draft legislation and policy proposals and to address the citizens directly concerning them. In other words the professional associations are part of the TAG Network and "plug into" particular political jurisdictions. The performance of a particular unit, e.g. a school, is subject to political control through the performance standards in the franchise establishing the unit. Teleologist has already mentioned the workers' co-operatives and the legislation concerning client rights. Incidentally professional status is much more supportive of client rights than is employee status as we will see in Chapter V.

Within the TAG Network, the ends, purposes and interests of citizens and clients will not fall under professional control but it is precisely because, and in so far as, the professional association can exercise assessment and control of professional practice which is

beyond the capacity of the client, political jurisdiction or workers' co-operative, that this institution serves the common interest.

TELEOLOGIST: Also Scholar was overly pessimistic concerning the possibilities for improving practice. Consider her example of the second-hand car dealers - a pretty sorry lot to be granted professional self-governance. Nevertheless let us see how this group fares within the TAG Network. A dealer has to gain and keep a franchise and so has a motivation to provide good service. He faces excessive regulation (for him) through legislation and the franchises unless there is public trust and confidence in his profession. Even a crook and a swindler will want to have high standards, including ethics, of training and qualification for new entrants because this will build public confidence and tend to make clients less wary of his sharp deals. Therefore, over time, we can expect ever higher proportions of competent and ethical practitioners.

I agree with Scholar that systematic research into professional practice can provide insights and information to improve professional practice. The question is, should this research be performed as part of the professional development activity of the practitioners and under the auspices of the professional association or is it to be done by experts and specialists apart from the professional association? The answer, although it is at odds with our present social relations, should be obvious. Unless the professional association controls and directs this activity we will have either: a deprofessionalized work force of worker functionaries, who do not know what they are about, counterposed to a body of "experts" who do not practise the occupation but claim to be able to assess good practice in it; or a conflict between a professional body of workers who lack resources for systematic

research, and a body of researchers isolated from both practice and practitioners. The former is a form of class system in which the "experts" have greater prestige and resources than the functionaries, while the latter represents a waste of social powers and resources. Hence we must have a professional association which controls its own research activity and resources.⁴⁰

SCHOLAR: I am convinced.

SOLIDARITY: I am nearly convinced but I do not like the term 'professional' - it suggests privilege. Why not simply call workers 'workers' and their organization a 'labour union' or 'trade union'?

ACTION-MAN: I have no objection to calling workers 'workers' - I have been doing that but their association will not be a trade union because it will not engage in collective bargaining with employers, which is what trade unions do. Concerning privilege, unlike the term 'capitalist' there is nothing within the concept of 'professional' which implies privilege. If we take medicine as a paradigm of a profession it is characterized by practitioner control over training and certification, autonomous practice and professional/client rather than employer/employee/customer relations. It is true that doctors have been a privileged occupational group but this is only in relation to employees. In our authentic democratic society all workers will be professionals - including salespersons, farmers, secretaries, plumbers and so on. Therefore professional status will not represent special privilege but a general equality for workers.

PRECISE: But what about jobs that do not require special expertise, skill or knowledge beyond that possessed by any educated citizen? Someone has to sweep the streets, shovel snow and do various jobs that call for no specialised knowledge or skill and which frankly lack the

prestige of callings like medicine or law. How can you make a profession out of such jobs? It would be a farce!

ACTION-MAN: There will be such functions and we will not call them 'professions'. It is undesirable for anyone to be assigned to such tasks as a career and by their very nature unnecessary. Because virtually anyone can do such tasks on a short-term basis and hardly anyone will want to make a life-time career of them they will be rotated around or done as part of our civic duty. Here we follow the principle of replication of function because we are committed to a general equality of esteem, responsibility and satisfaction.

SOLIDARITY: We have yet to discuss whether child-care is work or how political control is exercised over parents.

FACILITATOR: May we leave that question until Chapter V?

SOLIDARITY: Fine. I am persuaded by the general idea of the TAG Network although I wish it were less complex. I am somewhat uneasy about the many unanswered questions, most importantly the issues of the internal functioning of the professional association. I want some assurance that it really will promote the improvement of practice and not drag down and constrain innovators or become a lobby for sectoral interests.

LIBERAL: Yes, the complexities are of the right sort, are they not? They reconcile worker autonomy and political accountability; citizens are spared the costs of an extensive bureaucracy and the threat of a "New Class" domination through a managerial/supervisory meritocracy.

Moreover I doubt if our future worker-citizens will find the TAG Network complicated or in any way difficult to understand. In every form of work and political activity our future citizen starts with a face-to-face group within which he actively participates. He can follow all the deliberations that concern him and readily

trace every political decision affecting his life to a definite body and he will understand what he can do to influence these political decisions. Perhaps the TAG Network is difficult to understand for one looking out from some central perspective with an aim of trying to control or influence every citizen or the system as a whole. The three track system of official representation and the vast number of groups expressing interests or concerns of people in the areas of cultural and religious activity will make central direction according to some blueprint envisaged by a political or spiritual elite unworkable. Hence the TAG Network has a simplicity at the "grassroots" level that strengthens democratic participation and a complexity from the central perspective that protects society from the dangers of totalitarianism.

FACILITATOR: We have achieved some significant findings. In our next session we sketch out a transition strategy from constitutional to authentic democracy through organizing a TAG Network.

23. The transition strategy from constitutional to authentic democracy

ACTION-MAN: Our target or vision is some form of TAG Network and our existing situation is a constitutional democracy, i.e. a society which provides a selfidual sphere and rights and freedoms of association, organization and expression. Essentially we want to make use of the possibilities available in our constitutional democracy to transform our society into an authentic democracy. In a nutshell our strategy involves simultaneous actions directed to:

- (1) organize TAGs in all significant spheres of life, such as the work-place, trade unions, the local community, political parties, the churches, ethnic and cultural communities, etc.;

- (2) connect existing TAGs into communication networks operating on democratic principles;
- (3) use the combined economic and political power of the members of the TAG Networks to develop new and extend existing forms of co-operative activity in production, exchange and cultural activity;
- (4) gain control over aspects of the information and communications system of the society through political regulation of public networks and systems and/or the co-operative ownership of television and radio channels, newspapers, publishing houses, information storage and retrieval systems and the like;
- (5) gain increasing political control over the system of nation states and use this control to implement reforms in law, the structural organization of political life, property, human rights, the allocation of social resources and so on;
- (6) carry out systematic educational activity to prepare people to participate as autonomous agents in the democratic transformation of their society, to be good citizens, to enjoy life and to realize their own authentic projects.

COMMENTARY: In fact the TAG elaborated the six points outlined above in detail but I do not report that part of their deliberations because it is peripheral to our theme of educational evaluation. However I do follow up on the sixth point concerning educational activity in Chapters V and VI.

This chapter concludes with Facilitator's summation.

FACILITATOR: The citizens of the authentic democracy organized as a TAG Network have the power to transform the social activities of their society and the economic, cultural and social aims these activities are designed to further; to make all the laws binding citizens in

their various jurisdictions; to establish all rights and powers including the civil, human and political rights of individuals and property rights, e.g. rights to practise various professions; to make rules concerning the organization of work and cultural and educational activity. They establish the division of social actions, the assignment of individuals to positions and their access to resources and social powers. Therefore categorial power is exercised within the TAG Network and because this categorial power is held and exercised equally by all citizens we have an authentic democratic society - a society in which future transformations are determined by the people.

C H A P T E R V

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY24. Basic aims

FACILITATOR: Let us take time to recapitulate. We agree that principles for educational evaluation should be grounded in some conception of the good for human beings and we have taken and justified a position on this in terms of two related ideas - I-self's good and the FPSC. With these two basic ideas and the analyses of the project structure, authenticity, autonomy, reflexive monitoring, social co-operation, categorial power, social transformation, TAGs, TAG Networks, etc., we should be ready to begin the articulation of principles for educational evaluation. Of the four main criteria of I-self's good clearly 'self-development' is most directly related to 'education'.

PRECISE: Before we begin I think we should define 'education' and review our concept of 'self-development'.

HEART: 'Self-development' refers to developing or strengthening powers and capacities to understand self/world, to monitor reflexively one's actions and project and to plan, organize and implement actions as part of one's authentic project. How is this concept related to or distinguished from that of 'education'?

'Education', in the sense important to us, refers to a process of learning involving the acquisition of dispositions, attitudes, skills, knowledge and understanding; generally, although not necessarily, through somewhat systematic approaches.

Many scholars offer persuasive definitions of education which incorporate particular normative positions they support. We are better to remain faithful to the everyday idea of education and use the normative principles that we have justified as the basis for our evaluation of educational processes rather than trying to define unacceptable educational practices out of existence.¹

Now what follows from our commitments to I-self's good, the FPSC and our analyses concerning justice and democracy?

Clearly democratic social life makes challenging demands regarding the character, dispositions, virtues, communication skills, knowledge and understandings of each citizen. Democratic social institutions are not "people-proof" but depend upon responsible, moral and intelligent action by the citizens. Moreover, consider the tasks of transforming incompletely democratic or undemocratic institutions - this makes these demands even more challenging. Therefore the task of education for democracy is crucial.

SCHOLAR: I hope you do not consider education to be a merely instrumental means to social justice.

HEART: Surely education should have two types of functions and two corresponding sorts of justifications. The education of a particular individual should instrumentally foster the good and interests of other citizens - the FPSC directs us to take a position concerning the character, dispositions, virtues, attitudes, knowledge, skills and understandings we should develop in students to promote the common interests of all citizens.

LIBERAL: "Character shaping" has dangerous authoritarian implications.

For example, Bereiter challenges the right of society to educate children - to the extent that 'to educate' suggests the inculcation

of knowledge, beliefs, values, habits and personal traits. He opposes the imposition, through public education, of particular values resulting in the shaping of the child's character or her formation as a whole person. He writes, "Education, therefore, in so far as it deals with these characteristics of a person should be provided only in the form of options for people who are old enough to choose how they want to change themselves."² Bereiter holds that the only justified kind of teaching is skills training because it is non-authoritarian.

HEART: Bereiter is right to alert us to the authoritarian dangers in character formation through public education and we should keep his warnings in mind when we address the political control over education but even Bereiter concedes that some approach to character formation is unavoidable, as indeed our analysis of social structuration shows.³ I am not saying that teachers or public education officials should have a blank cheque authorizing them to shape children's characters as they see fit or that they should be directed to mould the personalities of students according to the dictates of parliaments or legislatures. Those are horrifying ideas. However, is education that consciously and deliberately develops those features of character that go with just and democratic social co-operation wrong? Is it really, in Bereiter's words, "a terrible affront to individual liberty"?⁴

LIBERAL: Provided public authority is not used to impose particular conceptions of morality or the good life through education and is restricted to the promotion of core values necessary for justice and democracy we should support public educational activity directed to the development of the child's character, dispositions, virtues, etc.

But what does HEART say concerning the other type of function education is to serve?

HEART: The other function is to advance the self-development of each student in a way that supports her self-realization in both the present and the future. This dimension of education must be personalized, it must: connect to the personal meaning systems of the student; help her to a more authentic grasp of her project; develop the personal powers she needs to advance toward her own visions; do all this in a way that respects the quality of her lived experience in the here and now.

LIBERAL: I am sure that we all agree with both functions - indeed we have determined two broad aims for education:

- (1) the self-development of each individual in accordance with her own authentic project;
- (2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship.

HEART: I am pleased that we agree but let us not think that everyone will readily consent to these two broad aims. It is unfortunately true that meritocratic values have deeply penetrated our society and especially our educational institutions.⁵ In endorsing these two basic aims we are at the same time rejecting and opposing education that serves a selective function for a meritocratic social order. Apologists for selective education come in many shades and hues and they variously define 'desert' in terms of the appropriation of particular cultural traditions, social class, wealth, intelligence, leadership ability,.... However they all advocate restricting or ending the access of some students at some point within the educational programme on some basis of "desert". As grounds for selection,

intelligence, family wealth and social class are each unacceptable to us. Selective education is contrary to both our aims. As a "good" for I-self, education should be equally accessible to all citizens. Secondly, the character, dispositions, powers, etc., of democratic citizenship are needed in all citizens.

Many questions are still left open concerning more specific aims, processes and relationships but it is important to stress our two basic aims and our fundamental opposition to selective education and meritocratic values.

SOLIDARITY: Therefore the opposition to education for democracy will largely come from the proponents of meritocracy as a principle for organizing the basic structure of society.

HEART: No doubt one source of opposition to education for democracy comes from "up front" advocates of meritocracy but we can demonstrate the unacceptability of their thesis quite readily and defeat their ideological position through rational argument. However there are other positions which are more difficult to deal with - for example, the argument that "standards" are built into subjects or disciplines; this produces selective education and justifies it on the grounds that the standards are simply given and nothing can be done to make the discipline or subject accessible to the less able students. There are also some religious traditions which may find our position regarding man's good unacceptable but there is nothing in religion per se that contradicts our principle that man's good is a sufficient basis for educational evaluation.⁶ Our position regarding cultural pluralism commits us to ensure that the adherents of these traditions have the opportunity to pursue their commitments and celebrate their beliefs within their cultural communities but

to the extent that their values contradict the FPSC they should not be recognized within the organizing principles for the basic structure of society or of its public educational system.

PRECISE: But disciplines do have practices and standards built into them.

TELEOLOGIST: Are not disciplines and subjects actually rather convenient shorthand expressions to describe certain cultural practices and traditions? And do teachers and others responsible for education not have to justify the subjects and disciplines used as resources in education? How can they do this except by reference to I-self's good?

ACTION-MAN: What practical problems result from the many cases in which teachers or academics create a mystique that covers up the true justification for the discipline?

TELEOLOGIST: The main danger is that the teacher fails to connect the educational activity to the authentic project of the student because the discipline is seen as self-justifying.

PRECISE: Do even very young children have authentic projects?

TELEOLOGIST: An awareness of project emerges over time from an initially fairly undifferentiated care structure present at birth.

PRECISE: Precisely what do we mean by 'project' here?

TELEOLOGIST: By 'project' we mean the structure of care and responsibility bound up with a continuous, meaningful flow of actions connecting a future vision to I-self's present predicament.⁷ While at a pre-school level the child demonstrates in her play the crucial sense of engagement and destiny that goes with having a project and in her joys, fears and anxieties she shows that the issue of authenticity, while not articulate, is present to her.

To advance the student's good, education must support her

self-realization in the here and now; must foster her understanding and efficacious praxis concerning her present project. This does not ignore future needs because the project structure is inherently futural, going from a present situation to a future vision grasped in the present. Worthwhile educational activity helps the student see her project more truly and generally this requires that teachers be sensitive to the present understandings, self-definitions and "personal meaning systems" of their students.⁸

This does not mean that the teacher should refrain from introducing her students to cultural traditions and academic material until they develop a "spontaneous" interest in them. Such passivity would be irresponsible and inauthentic because it involves the teacher in ignoring crucial aspects of her students' predicaments. Nevertheless the cultural traditions and academic material have to be connected to the student's project and this is an immense challenge to the teacher.

If her project is ignored, the student's needs are not met. Not only does she fail to develop needed powers and resources but her autonomy and self-esteem are undermined and she may develop a distaste for formal education that will cut her off from future opportunities.

Self-development is more than gaining knowledge, skills, powers etc. for efficacious praxis on one's projects; it is above all concerned with the truth of being. The truth that matters is the truth of our own existence, not that of a subject matter detached from human agency.

PRECISE: You are saying that good education must reveal our existence as it really and truly is and must help us to see the distinction between I-self's way of being-in-the-world and that of things. But this does

not seem to justify a focus on the student's unique project.

TELEOLOGIST: It is truth, responsibility and caring rather than uniqueness that generates the authenticity of a project. Hence the teacher must intervene without taking the student's care and responsibility from her; must see her student as a responsible agent and not as a recipient of teaching acts or a centre of various "behaviours". We need liberal in the sense of 'liberating' education, in which the student is left with her own care structure, her own project and her own responsibilities but in her growing transparency of understanding and personal and social powers she becomes free, self-chosen and powerful.

Because thought and action, theory and practice are integrated in our conception of the project we agree with John Dewey that education should arise genuinely from the experience and activity of the student.⁹

25. Elaborating educational aims

FACILITATOR: From our analyses of man's good we have derived two basic aims of education. Because the social commitment underlying these aims is democratic we can say that, "The two basic aims of education for democracy are:

- (1) the self-development of each individual in accordance with her own authentic project;
- (2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship."

For short we refer to the first as 'the existential aim' and the second as 'the social aim'.

We have also seen that the existential aim implies that the

student's project and personal meanings must have a central place in the more specific elaboration of the aims and in the actual conduct of educational activity. In this session we inquire into the problem of giving greater specificity to educational aims.

SOLIDARITY: The logical next step is to set out goals, objectives and curriculum contents derived from our basic aims. Then we can establish detailed evaluative criteria.

TELEOLOGIST: That seems a very natural approach but of course it raises the question of what procedures and considerations should be used in giving specificity to our aims. May I suggest an approach? I-self's good is the source of our ~~existential~~ aim and the FPSC is the source of our social aim. But what kind of an activity is educational evaluation? Is it not simply a form of reflexive monitoring, applied specifically to education? If our processes of evaluation are well conducted they will amount to critical reflexion focused on education. This suggests the kinds of things we need to keep in mind in performing an educational evaluation. Clearly our existential and social conception of the good have to be kept in view but equally we need to monitor:

- (A) the natural and social world of the participants, i.e. their situation;
- (B) the future visions of the participants;
- (C) the outcomes of the educational activity in both existential and social terms.

These considerations can be shown to be important to educational evaluation by tracing through our analyses of reflexive monitoring, I-self's good and the FPSC.

SOLIDARITY: Those three considerations are quite obvious. Let us get on with setting our objectives and curriculum.

TELEOLOGIST: If we follow through our discussion of procedure we will see that we should not be in the business of setting specific objectives and curriculum! Please consider diagram 8.

DIAGRAM 8 - CONSIDERATIONS IN ELABORATING EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Conception of the Good	(G1)	(G2)
	Aim (1) Existential	Aim (2) Social
(A) Analysis of natural and social world	(S1)	(S2)
(B) Vision	(V1)	(V2)
(C) Educational outcomes	(O1)	(O2)

I will give a gloss on each of these entries:

(G1) is the existential conception of man's good, i.e. I-self's good;

(G2) is the social conception of man's good, i.e. the FPSC;

(S1) is the actual situation or predicament of the learner;

(S2) is the common situation or predicament of a community or society;

(V1) is the learner's vision in her authentic project;

(V2) is a communally shared vision of a community or society for their social co-operation;

(O1) is the existential experience the learner has in relation to her vision;

(O2) is the achievement, within individuals, of the character,

dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and skills in relation to the communal vision.

PRECISE: Can these considerations really be separated the way you suggest?

TELEOLOGIST: In practice educational activity cannot be disentangled to reveal these dimensions as separate, independent strands. The student cannot detach her social character from her personal meanings and commitments and turn it over to her teacher to shape according to community standards. Please do not interpret diagram 8 as revealing sharp distinctions between discrete entries but rather consider it as identifying considerations that reveal profound dimensions, e.g., the existential and the social, that are inextricably joined.

What needs stressing is that all these "entries" must be considered in educational evaluation. "Horizontally", existential and social dimensions should be considered; "vertically", the conception of the good, the analysis of the natural and social world and the vision. Moreover, there should be both horizontal and vertical coherence. As an example of horizontal coherence consider I-self's good and the FPSC; these two ideas are consistent, mutually supportive and can be understood as harmonious polar dimensions within a unified value system.

HEART: Therefore the achievement of horizontal coherence between (S1) and (S2) and between (V1) and (V2) is crucial; if it is not accomplished existential and social outcomes will tend to conflict. I think we should address the question of coherence between these various elements now.

ACTION-MAN: Just before we do, it would help if we filled in the various entries of the diagram with our main findings.

DIAGRAM 8.1 - SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN ELABORATING EDUCATIONAL AIMS

Conception of the Good	I-self's good	the FPSC
Aims	self-development in accordance with individual's authentic project	formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, and skills for democratic citizenship
(A) Analysis of natural and social world	I-self's predicament	analysis of social structuration, division of social actions, social freedoms, capitalism, classes, meritocracy, sexism, racism, telecommunications,...
(B) Vision	I-self's vision	TAG Network including pyramidal political jurisdictions, cultural TAGs, franchises, workers' co-ops., professional associations,...
(C) Outcomes	I-self's experience	achievement of democratic character, dispositions, etc.

PRECISE: Where does the student's project fit?

HEART: I-self's predicament, vision and experience together constitute her project. But what do the corresponding entries in the right column (i.e. (S2), (V2) and (O2)) refer to? Simply, to the possibility of a community "project". If there is an actual community that actually carries out communal critical reflexion, reaches a common understanding of the community situation, determines a shared vision and engages in collective social action we have the conditions for horizontal coherence. If this coherence cannot be achieved then there is no possibility of even articulating specific aims, objectives and curriculum on a satisfactory basis. If the participants in an educational system are unable to elaborate their educational programmes,

whether in terms of objectives, curriculum, subjects, disciplines or whatever, in a manner that achieves both vertical and horizontal coherence, then there is a fundamental flaw in the way they have articulated their educational purposes, and therefore there will be no coherent criteria for evaluating the system of education on a basis agreed to by participants who are autonomous and authentic.¹⁰

What is involved in achieving horizontal coherence? Although this is a vast inquiry that we can only probe in a few places, at the most basic level we are concerned with various social relationships. Moreover the range of possible social relationships through which the participants, principally students, teachers and parents, achieve or fail to achieve coherence will be largely determined by the political control exercised over educational activity. Therefore, with respect to our agenda, relationships within, and political control over, education, are rationally prior to learning objectives, curriculum and pedagogy.

By 'rationally prior' I mean that if we want to evaluate, manage or change an educational system, school or classroom the sensible course is to elaborate our two basic aims for education in terms of the appropriate kinds of relationships among teachers, parents, students, other institutions and the overall system of political control before articulating learning objectives, curriculum and pedagogy.

Clearly this principle has implications for educational practice but equally it bears on the way educational theory should be formulated. Indeed a great deal of educational theory is fundamentally misconceived because it violates this principle.

PRECISE: It might help if you clarified what you mean by curriculum and pedagogy. Also is it not possible that an understanding of curriculum and pedagogy might help us to determine appropriate relationships and political control?

HEART: There is a certain tradition in American educational thought of proceeding from aims to objectives to curriculum contents.¹¹ This is supposed to establish the "what" of educational activity with pedagogy concerned with the "how", i.e. with the means for teaching whatever you are trying to teach. There is a danger in the distinction between curriculum and pedagogy producing a too sharp separation of ends and means although this varies according to different perspectives on curriculum and pedagogy.

Concerning your question, an understanding of curriculum and pedagogy is helpful to the degree that we address various categories cyclically rather than sequentially but to the extent that there is a sequential order it is politics, power and communications before curriculum and pedagogy.

With respect to principles or theory there are four main reasons supporting this finding:

- (1) By proceeding from our basic aims to objectives, curriculum, pedagogy, evaluation or some similar sequence, categorial power and many of the key actors in the educational drama are left completely out of account. The political relationships and the system of political control cannot appear within this schema. Pedagogy is concerned with teacher/student relationships but no pedagogy can put those relationships into a social and political context unless that context is already given. Pedagogy cannot generate a socio-political context but a set of social and

political principles for relationships within education can generate the framework for a pedagogy.

- (2) Assuming that inquiries into curriculum and pedagogy are relevant and useful at some point and to some degree, which we surely do, the most efficient approach is to work out the position on relationships and political control first so that the inquiries into curriculum and pedagogy are carried out by the appropriate parties and their findings directed where they will be most helpful.
- (3) If the community is to use the actual predicaments and authentic projects of its members in articulating educational aims they must address relationships and political control temporally prior to determining their aims. This is because the actual relationships among the parties and the actual system of political control are crucial aspects of their predicament, and because the visionary aspects of their projects must embody some transformation of these actual features. Objectives, as elaborations of aims, must also be determined after consideration of relationships and governance; and curriculum, which I prefer to think of as a selection of cultural resources to support educational activity, must also be decided later.¹²
- (4) Decisions about curricula, subjects, disciplines, courses of study, etc. involve judgments, evaluations and selections concerning culture; the rationality of these judgments, etc. must be defined procedurally, i.e. in part, in terms of the kinds of considerations raised in sections 16 and 17 regarding communications. Curricular decisions will be arbitrary if made independently of some justifiable set of relationships and system of political

control whereas principles for relationships and political control can be derived from our analyses of I-self's good, social co-operation, etc. and do not require the prior determination of principles for curriculum.

ACTION-MAN: Could you give us an example of rational versus arbitrary judgments about culture and how they relate to curriculum?

HEART: 'Rationality' suggests systematic ways of thinking that apply to all of us, leading us to objective, necessary and normatively appropriate conclusions.¹³ Rationality can take us a certain distance irrespectively of our position within a particular system of social relations and irrespectively of the nature of those relations, e.g. the FPSC expresses a rational vision for persons living within all or at least a very wide range of different circumstances. Nevertheless there is an extremely limited length to the journey in terms of specifying educational aims and processes, that rationality can take us before we must take detailed features of our circumstances into account. Take language as an example. Rationally we agree that our community needs a common language, but given the many choices is there a rational procedure for deciding which of many possible languages should be privileged? More precisely is there a rational way to make this sort of decision independently of the relations and interactions of the members of the community?

Decisions about curriculum, e.g. whether and in what specific form mathematics, sciences, social studies, the arts, literature, etc. are taught, like those concerning language, involve 'cultural arbitrariness', i.e. there are no right answers applying to all circumstances. This does not mean such decisions are unimportant, for they can be crucial. It means that their correctness and

rationality depends on the procedures used and on the communication processes and power relations connecting those affected by the decisions.

So far we have discussed an inquiry into principles. However a particular educational system may use the sequence of aims, objectives, etc. as the actual process of political and administrative decision-making. Within its jurisdiction it operates as if there is one set of aims, one formulation of objectives, one curriculum, etc. and after centrally formulating this programme it imposes it on communities with diverse circumstances. In this case in addition to the foregoing arguments there is a fifth objection concerning the inherently authoritarian, centralizing and irrational form which political and administrative control takes. The decision procedure is authoritarian because the good, interests and autonomy of those affected have been violated, and irrational because information relevant to the decision has been disregarded and the decision-makers are incompetent to make the sorts of decision they make.

SOLIDARITY: Why will relevant information necessarily be disregarded?

Why are the decision-makers necessarily incompetent to make these decisions?

HEART: The authentic projects of the students and members of the community are relevant to these sorts of decisions. Since ex hypothesi, the communities have diverse circumstances the authentic projects of the members of the various communities are different and it is unreasonable that common aims, objectives and curriculum can appropriately recognize the diversity in authentic projects. Because the central body imposes these features on local communities communications between levels will be distorted and inauthentic, leading to relevant information being withheld. Moreover, because of the vast scope of

central decision-making there will simply be too much "data" required to represent everyone's interests for this data to be understood by central decision-makers even if they could somehow gain access to it. Hence central decision-makers cannot have the ability or competence to make such decisions in accordance with the good, interests and autonomy of all those affected.

SOLIDARITY: A very interesting argument but its validity is a matter of degree, is it not? For example I am going to suggest an elaboration of aims, mostly under the social aims heading of diagram 8.

Concerning the democratic character, our citizen is to be autonomous, authentic, truthful, courageous (in carrying out her responsibilities and defending her autonomy) and obligated by commitments to the FPSC or similar principles, i.e. justice, compassion, fraternity, respect for others as persons,.... She will require the powers and capacities for critical reflexion, for planning and organizing personal and shared projects, for participation within TAGs and the TAG Network and for work. Accordingly she will need a number of types of literacy concerning speech, print, audio and visual media; a vast amount and range of knowledge to follow the political deliberations; research skills to utilize the communication system and to pursue particular concerns; specialized knowledge, skill and experience to qualify for and practice a profession.

Are you saying that we cannot elaborate aims in this fashion without first establishing a position on political control over and relationships among the participants?

HEART: I agree that it is a matter of degree, and incidentally, I basically agree with your elaboration of the aims. (Other members also nod agreement.) Your elaboration is at a general level and is implicitly

based upon a number of principles concerning political control and relationships which are inherent in our commitments to I-self's good and the FPSC.

ACTION-MAN: It would help if you give an example of elaborating relationships and political control.

HEART: If you recall our problem of getting coherence between the existential and the social dimensions of our projects it follows that this can only be done if the educational processes involve communal critical reflexion. The student must have a vision of her participation within a communal programme of social transformation and she can only have this if the processes of education develop shared understandings of a common predicament, mutual good and collective future vision. If the process by which our student-to-be-citizen articulates her vision is entirely private and individualistic how can she connect her objectives for family life, work and citizenship to the social praxis that is to achieve them? If she never engages in social action concerning these irreducibly social and political aspects of her project then her project is inauthentic and her vision a mere fantasy; but to act to realize her authentic self she needs the commitment of others to the same sort of vision.

LIBERAL: This is a dilemma. If educational activity fails to develop these shared understandings and visions young citizens cannot develop fully authentic projects. However, these shared visions can be pursued only by acknowledging that education has a public political purpose, which thereby exposes children to the risks of political manipulation and indoctrination by teachers and educational authorities.

HEART: You support the pursuit of shared understandings and visions provided students are safeguarded against manipulation, indoctrination,

distorted communications and undue pressures to conform.

LIBERAL: Yes.

HEART: In many schools the relationships and system of political control would prevent it but a TAG is an organization which accomplishes what we want.

When we discussed common interests and communications we developed criteria for relationships within a TAG which foster I-self's grasp of an authentic project that is authentically connected to other I-selves each grasping their authentic project. Under such conditions there is no indoctrination, manipulation, deception or systematically distorted communication.¹⁴

While its concerns include more than educational activity, the TAG's missions are compatible with the conditions Liberal supports and we have prima facie grounds for thinking a TAG-like organization of educational activity would be appropriate. If education satisfying Liberal's conditions is more difficult to accomplish than an internally democratic TAG this must arise from either the political control over education or from some feature of teacher/student relationships. In the TAG there is no stable asymmetry in the communications and authority relationships connecting the participants whereas teacher/student relationships are asymmetrical. But is this asymmetry necessarily incompatible with TAG-like relationships and communications?

I have only touched on the kind of elaboration that is needed but is it clear that our agenda must focus on relationships and governance?

FACILITATOR: We agree and in our next session we can inquire into educational relationships in greater detail.

26. Interests and relationships in education

We join our TAG well into this topic with Facilitator summing up the earlier discussion.

FACILITATOR: Our first finding is that the nature of the asymmetry in the teacher/student relationship cannot be specified independently of other social relations. Scholar pointed out that our commitment to the TAG Network conception of authentic democracy lands us with a number of relationships - political jurisdictions, professional associations and workers' co-operatives - but our discussion in Chapter IV neglected the family, a matter which must be included in the analysis of educational relationships.

Then Heart drew our attention to the "double interest problem": on the one hand educational activity is to be evaluated and justified by its contribution to I-self's good and the FPSC, i.e. to our basic existential and social aims; on the other it cannot occur without reproducing/transforming the cultural resources of the community.¹⁵

HEART: In the process of cultural reproduction preferences are made between cultures, for example, in terms of language, dialect, valued traditions, music, stories, myths, manners, etc. Educational activity cannot even be conducted without exercising such choices because these elements of culture provide the resources for educational processes. However at least a great many of these selections will necessarily be, in a certain sense, arbitrary with respect to our basic existential and social aims for education.

PRECISE: In what sense?

HEART: Consider a community of mostly Italian-speaking families in a predominantly English-speaking nation. The children of these families go to school and are instructed in a certain language. Which language?

Should it be the Italian of the community of the English of the nation? Some of each? This is an example of a 'cultural arbitrary'.¹⁶ Does it make any difference to the chances of the student realizing her own good or developing the character, dispositions, etc., for democratic citizenship whether she grows up speaking English or Italian? The preference for English or Italian is culturally arbitrary until we bring in the cultural history of the participants. However, for people with a cultural history, i.e. all actual agents, the choice of cultural arbitrary is very important.

In our example, if the children are educated in English then the Italian community is culturally transformed. It is likely that communications and interactions between younger and older generations will be less frequent and significant, fraternity will decline and traditions and celebrations important to the older generations will fade away.¹⁷

Therefore our system of political control over and relationships within education must provide acceptable processes for making these sorts of decisions.

FACILITATOR: Heart has pointed out the need to recognize the rights of minorities to an appropriate control over decisions about cultural arbitrariness.

It is also necessary to recognize the rights of educational workers. If professional teachers are to be engaged then our system of political control must recognize their interests as workers, e.g. in professional autonomy and resources to advance their good and welfare.

We distinguish three main stages of education. While all educational activity has both an existential and a social dimension

the stages are categorized according to their social function:

- (a) the first is the general citizenship level which begins in infancy and continues through childhood until the student has developed the character, powers, attitudes, knowledge and skills to participate as a citizen in the political deliberations of the TAG Network;
- (b) next comes professional education which develops dispositions, knowledge, understanding and skills for work, and concludes with the student qualified as a professional worker;
- (c) finally there is postprofessional education which is directed to the life-long self-development of the learner.

We agree that the most appropriate order for analysing these stages is from postprofessional to professional to general citizenship because we start with the most simple and end with the most complex.

Postprofessional Education

By 'postprofessional' we do not mean all education that occurs after initial certification to practise a profession. Professional associations may require certain types of in-service education or may require certain courses of study for specialist certificates and these requirements fall under the professional stage of education. The postprofessional stage includes all studies autonomously chosen by certificated professionals whether for their general interest, e.g. foreign languages, navigation, philosophy, gardening, or as part of the voluntary aspect of their professional in-service education.¹⁸

For the postprofessional stage 'freedom' is the watchword. Basically teacher and student have a market relationship; the teacher has cultural resources which the student wants and the student has

money or entitlements which the teacher wants. Who should decide the aims, objectives, curriculum, methodology and system of evaluation at this stage? These matters are for the mutual determination of teacher and student. If they cannot agree they have no educational relationship. Like all market relationships within the TAG Network the teacher/student relationship is subject to general political control through law and the franchises under which the professional teacher practises. The purpose of this control is to maintain the public interest regarding social justice, health, safety, etc. In addition the professional association provides protection to the student concerning the qualifications and competence of the teacher.

Because the student at this stage is an autonomous citizen there are no valid arguments for paternalistic controls over the teacher/student relationship; its only necessary asymmetry relates to the different resources teacher and student exchange and not to any fundamental power that one has over the other. The teacher serves as agent for the student and only the student and so the proper embodiment of their relationship is a contract for services.

However this relationship becomes more complicated when we have third parties. While no third party has a right to impose an educational relationship at the postprofessional stage, a tripartite relationship may be established by mutual consent. For example, a research council, workers' co-operative, cultural community or political jurisdiction may provide financial or other resources to support postprofessional education on the condition that its interests are pursued. While a great deal could be said about good practice in tripartite relationships the only point required for our analysis is that tripartite relationships can be mutually beneficial.

Professional Education

There is nothing in the teacher/student relationship at the **post-**professional stage to prevent TAG-like relationships and communications. Is this true at the professional level? What differences in relationships are required for professional education?

SCHOLAR: At the professional level the teacher has a double agency; she has responsibility to the profession and to the student. In the education of surgeons, teachers, airline pilots and other professionals the community has delegated to the appropriate professional association the responsibility for ensuring that practitioners are both ethical and competent. Accordingly professional education is a public rather than private enterprise.

SOLIDARITY: Is double agency desirable? Feasible? Or should not the teacher's primary concern be for the public interest?

SCHOLAR: Within the limits set by the public interest the choice of profession should rest with the student; indeed it is the first significant autonomous choice of the young citizen. Moreover the period of professional education is of enormous importance to the self-definition, self-esteem and overall good of the student. Whether she "succeeds" and goes on to enter her chosen profession or "fails" and has to readjust her career plans, self-definition and life project, she needs teachers who are deeply concerned for her interests and who feel responsible to her. However, if the teachers are responsible only to the profession then the students are treated merely instrumentally, which is undesirable.

If the relationship is transparent to both parties the student knows the teacher has a double agency but she wants genuinely to meet the standards of the profession herself - no conflict of

interest here; the teacher wants her student to meet the standards but she insists that only if her student truly meets them will she pass - no conflict of interest here. In principle the double agency of professional education is feasible.

Nevertheless there are severe problems when the division of pedagogic work is highly fragmented. So far we have spoken of the teacher and the student. Often, however, there are many teachers sharing responsibility for the professional education of many students. Consider, for example, a "pure" mathematics teacher providing instruction for future engineers, actuaries, physicists and statisticians. Does this teacher understand and acknowledge her agency concerning these professions? Or does she think of herself as agent for a subject or discipline? When professional education is viciously abstracted from professional practice its teachers lose sight of the persons whose good the activity is to foster: the consequences are reification, mystification and elitism - all contrary to the interests of students, profession and public.

FACILITATOR: It follows that we must prevent excessive specialization and fragmentation of professional education. In Scholar's example of the pure mathematics teacher the standards of mathematics required for engineers, actuaries, physicists and statisticians may be different depending upon the demands of practice in these various professions. Accordingly control over standards must rest with the professional association and not with specialist teachers unconnected with or incompetent concerning the standards of professional practice.

The governance of professional education is more complicated than for the postprofessional stage. At the professional level: the control of curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation rests with the professional associations; the political control is shared between the

professional associations and the political jurisdictions with the former responsible for education and certification and the latter for budget, overall targets for training and enrolment in the profession and legislation; the teacher has a double agency toward both student and professional association.

Because the teacher/student relationship is self-chosen by the parties to it, and the constraints imposed by the system of political control on teachers and students are compatible with their common commitment to the profession, TAG-like relationships and communications are both possible and desirable in professional education.

While we would now like to address the general citizenship stage of education we are unable to do this until we have determined our position on the status of the family, which is our topic for the next session.

27. Trusteeship and the family

FACILITATOR: There are three special issues raised by the general citizenship stage:

- (1) the young child is unable to represent her own interests;
- (2) the implications for the community of the decisions and practices concerning cultural reproduction are more acute at this stage than at the professional and postprofessional levels;
- (3) this is the stage where the basic character, dispositions, powers, knowledge and skills for participation in democratic social life are formed and developed.

Because the student's interests must be represented in the educational process the fact of immaturity requires that we establish

a trustee to represent the child's interests from infancy until she achieves her own agency. We conclude that generally this trusteeship should reside with the child's parents. (2) and (3) are the basis for the claim of the community to exercise a measure of political control over the general citizenship stage of education. Our discussion has focused on justifying a particular status for the family arising from the trusteeship function and reconciling parental and community control over this stage of education.

We got into a few difficulties over the definition of 'family' and whether the traditional family is to be preferred over the nuclear family, the single parent family, the "musical chairs family" (i.e. serial polygamy) and various other alternatives. We define 'family' as "a primary social group consisting of parents and their offspring".²⁰ Our case for parental trusteeship is founded on the need for an enduring relationship of love and care between the trustee and the dependent child. Any well prepared citizen can represent the very general common interests of all children but only one who has an intimate and continuing relationship with a particular child can represent the unique features of that child's interests.²¹ The child needs this enduring relationship of love and care to strengthen her sense of self-esteem, to foster her growth towards autonomy and to represent her interests.

We reject any division of custodial and trusteeship functions between parents and some formal institutional body.²² For example, if parents have the responsibility for caring for the child but some other body has educational trusteeship responsibilities the child's development towards autonomy is subverted: knowing that those adults she most loves and trusts do not have the power and authority to

represent her interests in significant spheres of her good undermines her security, her self-esteem and her confidence that she will be able to manage autonomy as an adult.²³ What are her prospects for initiation into powerful, authentic autonomy when her most enduring model of adulthood is the loving but weak, heteronomous functionary?²⁴

There appear to be no alternative candidates to the family for this trusteeship function:

- (a) the workers' co-operatives can provide no assurance of enduring personal relationships;
- (b) neither the political jurisdictions nor the professional associations are suited to the provision of personal love and care;
- (c) communal approaches to child rearing can only be both desirable and feasible as extensions of rather than alternatives to the family.²⁵

In brief, informal communal approaches to child rearing provide insufficient stability and security to the child whereas formal institutional approaches cannot simultaneously respect both the needs of children and the autonomy of workers. The family is a special institution which under ideal circumstances can accommodate both love and justice; it generates its commitment to the care and interests of children through the social recognition that the sexual union of man and woman to produce a child creates both the obligation of and the authority for trusteeship concerning that child. This commitment is in addition to those arising from "natural feelings", if any, or the imaginative reconstruction of the life projects of the parents during pregnancy and birth. As long as parents can control the

decision to have a child the trusteeship obligations of parenthood - great as they are - are autonomously incurred.²⁶ Clearly adoptive parents can be held to their obligations as firmly and justly as natural ones.

While, as a general rule, parents are the appropriate trustees for their children's interests, there should be provisions, through courts of law, to review and possibly remove the trusteeship function from particular parents where the continuation of the relationship is clearly contrary to the child's interests. This must be a course of last resort because the alteration of the trustee(s) is damaging in itself and can be justified only to prevent a greater harm.

I have tried to sum up our discussion of the family and trusteeship as a basis for addressing the appropriate relationships among parents, political jurisdictions, teachers' co-operatives and professional associations concerning general citizenship education.

HEART: And you have caught the main points very well although I think we are less agnostic about the traditional family than your summary suggests. By 'traditional family' I mean the stable marriage of husband and wife, the children, and the network of grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins and so on. This family structure can be further supported by co-operative relations among neighbours and a fraternal community. The traditional family performs the trusteeship function better than any other form of family life. For example, the single parent is unlikely to provide as stable a home because she or he may establish a marriage relationship with a new partner. In any case parental responsibilities borne alone may be extremely onerous. Children may benefit from having trustees and models of each sex.²⁷ Similar arguments can be developed concerning

serial polygamy and other alternatives.

This is a sensitive subject because so many of us have experienced divorce, carry out our trusteeship responsibilities as single parents, have homosexual or bisexual relationships and so forth. It is not my intention to moralize about these matters and it would be a mistake to feel guilty or get defensive about them. Liberal capitalism has been an extremely corrosive and destructive environment for the traditional family and so we need to arrange our other social and political institutions so that they give much stronger support to the traditional family.²⁸ Nevertheless there will always be situations where other forms of family life are either required or are more suitable in specific circumstances. In these cases our system of social support should be flexible enough to meet the interests of the parties to alternative arrangements.

Two other advantages of the traditional family are: it supports intergenerational solidarity; it is strategically more sound to stick with a proven, traditional institution, other factors being equal, than with an innovative untried one.

On the understanding that we aim to terminate the "privileges" of families to bequeath and inherit unlimited wealth and/or entitlements we support the continuation of the traditional family as a basic institution in our vision of a democratic society.

FACILITATOR: From your nods I see that we agree with Heart's comments.

We have yet to establish how resources are to be provided to children and whether parenting is a professional occupation.

SOLIDARITY: Our intention in denying families the right to bequeath and inherit wealth is to establish equality of consideration for children. Moreover we see the care and trusteeship responsibilities regarding

children as extremely important contributions to the community, as public, not private, concerns in an authentic democracy. It would be unjust and inappropriate to require parents to make financial sacrifices in addition to their contributions of time and energy. Therefore the community should provide an entitlement to children of resources to cover the full costs of life and education to an appropriate level and the parents should exercise the administration of these resources during the period of their trusteeship.²⁹

There should be public provision of benefits to mothers to cover loss of earnings from professional work during the period of maternity leave. A system of publicly supported nursery care for young children until the age of five or six is beneficial for children; parents who provide this care themselves should receive the per child amount of public resources that would otherwise have gone to professional child care workers. Without going into details, the general principle is to provide the highest quality of care for children without placing excessive burdens on their parents.

FACILITATOR: That completes our general position on the status of the family. At our next session Scholar is prepared to articulate a position on the political control of general citizenship education. Parents have a crucial social function but qua parents they do not have professional status - their function does not involve collective self-governance or specialized knowledge and skill.³⁰ Nevertheless, because the tasks and responsibilities of parental trusteeship involve public service and the public interest, they should have community support.

28. Democratic political control of education

SCHOLAR: The purpose of the trusteeship responsibility of parents is to represent the child's interests until she becomes an autonomous citizen. Accordingly parents should have general supervision over the education of their child from infancy to the completion of the general citizenship stage - subject to the requirement that they enrol her in a public school in their local community. By 'public' I mean a school in the public sector, under the control of the political jurisdictions and financed through public expenditure.³¹

The authority of the more centralized citizenship jurisdictions should be limited to ensuring basic procedural conditions concerning human rights, which are embodied in law, and establishing a general equality of opportunity, principally through equalizing gross resources available to different communities.

The specific terms of the franchise establishing public schools should be under the control of the most local jurisdiction containing the school within its geographic boundaries. A crucial function of local authorities relating to school evaluation is the determination of evaluative criteria for the school, i.e. the outcomes the community wants its schools to achieve. These evaluative criteria, incorporated within franchises for the public schools, embody the objectives, standards and choices of cultural arbitrariness of the local community and provide political direction to the teachers' co-operatives (i.e. workers' co-operatives providing educational services).

Should the teachers' co-operative fail to meet these standards the local jurisdiction can terminate their contract and establish a contract with a new co-operative. This is the extreme case: generally the evaluative criteria provide the basis for ongoing discussions

between the local jurisdiction and the co-operative in which the co-operative articulates resource requirements and problems with the evaluative criteria and the jurisdiction expresses concerns with the educational services. The co-operative can pinpoint sources of inadequacies in services and use its own powers of support and discipline concerning individual teachers to rectify problems.

PRECISE: So in this system professional teachers will have autonomous control over the internal operation of the school provided they accomplish the standards set by the local political jurisdiction. However, if they fail to achieve the standards they could all be out of work - the good as well as the poor performers.

SCHOLAR: The price professionals must pay for professional autonomy is the exercise of collective discipline over the quality of work, in this case teaching. It is in the public interest for co-operatives which are unwilling or unable to exercise this discipline to be disbanded and replaced by others which are. As for the dismissed or disbanded members being out of work, they can either seek work in a different setting or undergo retraining for a different profession.

The positive features of this approach are the elimination of an extensive network of supervisors and bureaucrats and a basis for accountability which is just, simple and effective.

PRECISE: How detailed and specific do these evaluative criteria have to be? What if there is a disagreement between the co-operative and the local jurisdiction over whether the evaluative criteria have been met? Should the courts be involved in such cases?

In some jurisdictions teachers have struggled long and hard to gain a degree of security of tenure protecting them from arbitrary

dismissal. They would not lightly toss away those gains, would they?

SCHOLAR: The courts would limit their involvement to procedural justice, ensuring fair and adequate presentation of argument and evidence on both sides, specifically the workers' co-operative must be able to present its case directly to the whole community. However the substantive decision rests with the political jurisdiction through the deliberation of the entire community. This is a far cry from our present system of decision by a handful of representatives assisted by their hired advisers and supervisors. In our system teachers will be protected from arbitrary dismissal and in addition will be guaranteed the rights to professional practice and autonomy.

The degree of specificity of the evaluative criteria is set by the need for mutual understanding between the community and the teachers' co-operative. They might be statements of this sort, "That the children: be happy at school; be interested in their lessons and activities; make good progress in reading, mathematics, science, social studies, ...; develop the knowledge, understandings, skills and dispositions for democratic participation in their community and society,...". As the dialogue between the professional teachers and the community continues some of the statements may become quite precise but in general their function is to mark off aspects of the mutual understanding emerging through ongoing discussion.

SOLIDARITY: What does it mean to be protected from 'arbitrary dismissal'?

Suppose the local community takes exception to the treatment of some parts of the curriculum, e.g. too much emphasis on world and too little on local history and geography. Can the local community replace its present social studies (or history and geography) teachers with new ones?

SCHOLAR: If the local community could select out certain teachers for dismissal they would have an employer/employee relationship with their teachers which implies a system of bureaucratic supervision, possibly counterposed by union representation to "ensure due process". If the professional teachers are to have self-governance and the rights of professional practice then the local community cannot have the authority to dismiss teachers selectively.

Instead the local community should articulate the changes it wants in the curriculum to the representatives of the teachers' co-operative indicating it is prepared to end their franchise if the situation is not rectified. The teachers' co-operative would then have to dismiss the offending teachers if they continue to flout the collective obligations of the co-operative.

LIBERAL: Generally professional teachers will have educational concerns that are more cosmopolitan than those expressed within a particular local community. By making the teachers' co-operative accountable to a local community do we not give a far too parochial basis to the political control of education?

SCHOLAR: Yes, historically teachers have tended to promote national or cosmopolitan perspectives and have played a big part in the assimilation of minority cultural traditions within a dominant culture. The dilemma is, "How can the local community have the power to protect itself from domination by a homogeneous national or elitist cosmopolitan culture whilst teachers are allowed, and indeed encouraged, to initiate their students into national and transnational culture, and to foster critical reflexion on local as well as national traditions and practices?" Perhaps if we return to this difficult question later someone will propose a solution.³²

Meanwhile I would like to say more about parental authority. Because they control the choice of community in which their children will live, parents exercise significant control concerning which school their children will attend. As members of their local community they participate in the political control of their child's school. They can provide such additional educational experiences concerning language, culture, travel or sport as they choose - subject to the general political regulation of such activities and services.

Our basic principle concerning culture is both democratic and conservative - in the best sense of each: any cultural tradition that is acceptable to the political community of citizens is not to be eliminated through majoritarian, professional or bureaucratic control of education. For example, our Italian community in a predominantly English-speaking country will have political control over its own cultural reproduction. This community may decide that all its children will learn English, that the language of instruction will be English or Italian or a matter of parental choice; may decide on the status of Italian history and cultural studies in the curriculum and in general may determine the cultural arbitraries for the community. The only practices and traditions that the more centralized jurisdictions can legitimately impose on local communities are matters of social justice embodied in law. For example a particular culture may practise human sacrifice which would be illegal in an authentic democracy. Hence centralized jurisdictions may pass laws prohibiting teaching or instruction supportive of human sacrifice. On a similar basis racist and sexist practices and instruction would be forbidden. Moreover schools should be required to provide positive information about the operation of the TAG Network and other features of social

life as part of a law requiring publication of information concerning the laws and institutions of society. What I want to rule out is the imposition of cultural arbitraries on local communities. By leaving the control of decisions regarding cultural arbitraries in the hands of local political jurisdictions we respect the autonomy, self-esteem and ethnic origins of all citizens; citizens freely choose their own cultural arbitraries rather than have them imposed by experts or majorities of large but diverse populations.³³

PRECISE: If parents are to have such extensive control over the education of their children why are they compelled to enrol them in a public school? Inasmuch as general control over matters such as human rights and social justice can be built into market sector franchises why should general citizenship education not be in the market rather than the public sector?

SCHOLAR: Actually there are a number of reasons for insisting on the enrolment of children in a public school. Political control over cultural reproduction cannot be achieved in the market sector. By insisting that the general citizenship stage of education be conducted in a publicly funded, publicly controlled school we minimize or prevent differences in parental wealth or educational achievement being converted into differences in educational opportunities for children.

Even more importantly our student on her way to becoming an autonomous citizen must find her authentic project which is to be the basis of her education. This she cannot do without a vision of her future society but this vision is inconceivable without an understanding of the intended praxis of the student, her schoolmates, her community and members of the wider society. Because the student

is in a public school, the members of her community have had to take their position on this future vision in formulating the evaluative criteria for the school franchise. Assisted by her professional teachers, the student is in a position to assess this vision and her place in it.

It would be inconsistent with our conception of the market sector to make this stage of education a market service and at the same time insist that parents enrol their children in some school; in a true market situation the buyer can refuse the sale. Nor does it make sense to have a mixture of public and market schools. Either children must be enrolled in school, in which case the public school is required, or it is a matter of parental choice and market schools are appropriate.

Education is a crucial activity in the transformation of society; to treat it as a market commodity is to undermine democratic social transformation. The fraternity, social solidarity and communal critical reflexion of a public school is potentially a far superior preparation for future political participation within the TAG Network than a deschooled or market schooled experience. Whereas the normative and political implications of education in a public school within the TAG Network will be transparent to the members of the community through their political deliberations and evaluative responsibilities these implications will tend to be concealed - but not absent - in a market approach. Provided the educational process in the public school makes its own cultural and political commitments increasingly transparent to students as they advance through their studies, and it must do this to respect the authentic project of each student, public school students will be well prepared for political participation.

LIBERAL: So the school has a particular stance toward social transformation and cultural reproduction which is "up front" and transparent to the students. Or is it a highly rational approach to indoctrination? This seems to turn on the autonomy of teachers and students to distance themselves from the values and commitments of their own community, to engage in critical reflexion concerning them and perhaps to take a different position. With political control so firmly in the hands of the local jurisdiction there may be a conflict of interest with the teacher acting in accordance with the authentic projects of her students but offending the local political jurisdiction by failing to support some of their values or commitments, or vice versa. Yet this problem is not to be overcome by simply shifting the political control to a more centralized level, where it could still occur.

While we can count on a certain amount of good will from the political jurisdictions in encouraging critical reflexion on the practices and commitments of the community I want to see some appropriate institutional provisions. In this respect we can also address our earlier dilemma about the tension between local determination of cultural arbitraries and student interests in a wider, more cosmopolitan perspective. Specifically, during the period of general citizenship education, there should be safeguards to protect teachers against an excessively parochial control by local jurisdictions. Students have a right to information on the workings of the wider society and on cultural traditions other than their own. While we can support the right of the local jurisdiction to establish criteria for the positive achievements they seek regarding cultural reproduction they should not have the authority to forbid teachers to expose children

to other cultures, traditions, perspectives and ideas. Moreover no teacher can be compelled to mislead a student, distort the truth, carry out instruction contrary to a student's interest or refrain from instruction in a student's interest - whatever the impact on cultural reproduction. How are these rights and protections to be guaranteed? The more centralized jurisdictions need to make laws to this effect; the teachers' professional association should have the authority to monitor schools in this respect and to represent teachers who may be placed under pressure to act contrary to the interests of their students; finally the courts should adjudicate disputes over such matters between the local political jurisdiction and the teachers' professional association or co-operative.

On a related matter, is it appropriate for the student to go straight from an immature not yet citizen whose general education is controlled by parents and political jurisdictions to a professional-in-training? We should consider giving the student an entitlement of about three to four years of general citizenship education after she has been released from parent trusteeship. Before proceeding to professional education and work she should have a period of education under her own agency in which the emphasis is on a broad, cosmopolitan experience and critical reflexion on cultural, social and political life from self-chosen perspectives. Ideally, she should leave her own community, do some travelling, and study in educational institutions which open up new vistas, visions and possibilities.

PRECISE: Do you mean a type of liberal arts college or university?

LIBERAL: Yes, the function of a liberal arts college is similar to what I propose.

How should these colleges be controlled? Political jurisdictions at a number of levels can offer franchises to be filled by teachers' co-operatives. The franchises should establish only the most general procedural regulations with the more specific evaluative criteria to be determined by mutual agreement of the teachers' co-operative and the students' union, a body which students join on being admitted to the college. Hence a function similar to that of the local political jurisdiction during the trusteeship stage is performed by the students themselves, through their union, at this stage. How are these institutions to be financed? Through the equal entitlements to educational resources which each student carries.

However there are differences between this proposal and the present university system. We would have stricter public control of admissions policies in the interest of social justice than many universities now have. The market value of a degree, if degrees are granted, will be minimal because of the near universality of the experience. The purpose of this stage of education is not the gaining of marketable skills but the powers of critical reflexion and political and cultural participation. The more geographically extensive the TAG Network the more fully this stage of education can be cosmopolitan and transnational and yet equally accessible to all.³⁴

PRECISE: This stage of **citizenship** education could go on simultaneously with professional training, could it not?

LIBERAL: That is an option although the two forms of education must be provided by separate institutions because professional education is

to be controlled by the professional associations and the final, autonomous stage of general citizenship education by the students' union and teachers' co-operative. Also, if the two forms go on simultaneously, there is a risk that too much of the student's time may be consumed in professional studies to the neglect of the autonomous stage of her general citizenship education. Additionally, knowledge, understanding and experience gained during the autonomous stage may affect decisions concerning the student's professional career. Therefore it is generally better for professional education to follow the autonomous stage of general education.

SOLIDARITY: Scholar has justified our rejecting private schools but why not have the public schools controlled by centralized political jurisdictions with provision for consultation with the local levels?

SCHOLAR: If cultural arbitrariness are determined at the central level it becomes a winner take all lottery and this is threatening to minorities. It is better for cultural and political differences in the community to be sorted out politically rather than to impose artificial agreement through education. Centralized political deliberation in such matters undermines autonomy and authenticity by reducing citizens' sense of efficacy and power and by leaving "losers" no way out whereas local determination gives individuals more choice. If individuals cannot accept the majority view in their local community they can "vote with their feet" by moving or even organizing a new community. The more centralized the political control over culture and education the less significant this individual freedom becomes.

Additionally local control gives the greatest transparency to the political process and spares us the bureaucratic structures that go with central control.

SOLIDARITY: All right but I think Liberal's points are also valid. Do you not think we need the safeguards Liberal outlined to protect children and teachers from an overly parochial perspective?

SCHOLAR: Yes I do and I also agree with Liberal's points about an autonomous stage of general citizenship education in which the student represents her own interests.

FACILITATOR: We appear to agree with the Scholar/Liberal analysis.

29. Grading students and asymmetries in educational discourse

We join the SET during their deliberations.

FACILITATOR: In this session our main aim is to see if TAG-like relationships and communications are possible during the general citizenship stage and if so under what conditions.

We find that the teacher has a double agency although of a more complex kind than at the professional stage: she is agent for the student and for the culture of society; but because there is no single institution or jurisdiction which represents all the communities within the TAG Network and because our society is multicultural the teacher is caught between conflicting cultural ideals. We have found no resolution to this problem which would not involve consequences worse than the problem. The problem can be managed, although not abolished, if the relationships among the various cultural communities are just and fraternal, if the teachers' professional association and the courts are supportive of teachers caught in these conflicts, and if teachers are sensitive and skilled in dealing with such matters.

We recognize an asymmetry in teacher/student relationships arising from immense differences in intellectual powers, cultural

resources and social experience and these differences, which should be progressively reduced as the student advances through her studies, produce authority relationships, but the final court with respect to academic matters must be truth and reason and not formal authority.³⁵ As Liberal says we must not assume that the teacher or some other authority has a privileged access to truth and reason but conduct education as a rational and compassionate activity, respecting the interests, rights and insights of each participant just as in the TAG. Educational activity must foster the student's self-determination of what is true, good, rational and just if the student is to strengthen and develop her own powers of autonomous and authentic inquiry and reflexion.³⁶ It would be contrary to her interests and to the FPSC if teachers imposed fixed or given results and interpretations of the deliberations and inquiries of the student, for this conflicts with her autonomous application of the foregoing criteria.

If teachers, bureaucrats, political authorities or others have recourse to sanctions to force or pressure students to reach particular interpretations, judgments and conclusions then truth and reason succumb to authoritarian power and a pervasive and destructive asymmetry dominates educational relationships, an asymmetry contrary to the student's good and the ultimate interests of the community in an authentic being-among-one-another. Clearly measures must be taken to protect students from sanctions such as violence, bullying, ridicule or ostracization; sanctions which can be used to limit the expression of divergent views, judgments or interpretations. We also mentioned grading or evaluating students but this requires much more discussion. On the one hand grading and evaluation can provide feedback essential to the student's learning but on the other,

they are the weapons 'par excellence' for exercising authoritarian power over the student. Therefore we should focus on the issue of control over the evaluation and marking of the educational progress and attainment of students. Who should have the authority to control evaluation?

HEART: At the postprofessional level grading is negotiated between student and teacher; at the professional level it is controlled by the professional association. What about the general citizenship level? We have agreed to subdivide this level into two stages - let us call them 'pre-autonomous' and 'autonomous'. At the autonomous stage the student is trying to acquire powers and resources for a critical grasp of her predicament, with special emphasis on culture, society and politics. Who has the right and competence to assess her efforts in this respect? Teachers are in a position to assess progress in their subject or discipline but evaluation pertinent to this stage of education depends not only on progress in the discipline but on the relevance of the course of studies to the student's authentic project and her own history. Therefore an appropriate basis for evaluation at this stage, as at the postprofessional level, is the mutual determination of student and teacher.

At the pre-autonomous stage the most fundamental difference is that the parent represents the student's interests. While there is less emphasis on critical inquiry than at the autonomous stage, this feature is still important, and the development of responsibility and autonomy have central significance. Hence the appropriate difference in control over the evaluation of the student's progress is achieved by replacing the student by her parent trustee, so that at the pre-autonomous stage this control is shared by parent and teacher.

SOLIDARITY: How are the community's interests to be represented?

HEART: The community exercises control over the selection of curriculum and cultural resources for the student's education. If the community has any claim to evaluate the student at all, then they have the authority to determine whether the student has developed the character, dispositions, powers, knowledge, skills, attitudes, understandings, etc. for citizenship. And if they have this authority they can "fail" a student and deny her citizenship rights. Are we prepared to give the community this authority, the authority to deny an adult the right to speak in political assemblies, to vote and to work, not for any crimes, but on the basis of her school grades?

FACILITATOR: We agree that this would be a dangerous and unacceptable policy.

HEART: If we are not prepared to grant the community the authority to evaluate the student concerning the central character, powers, etc. of democratic citizenship how can we justify giving them an authority to evaluate concerning matters which are relatively peripheral to the purposes and aims of pre-autonomous education?

It is for the student to assess the value of the resources selected for her by the community and to use them in accordance with her authentic project. If the community has the authority to evaluate the student's "mastery" of the community's cultural resources there is an inversion of responsibility and the cultural arbitrariness - imposed through community sanctions and coercion - take on a fixed, reified character.

In our example of the Italian community, Maria, a student at the pre-autonomous stage, may hate Italian culture and language, may prefer English and vow to leave the Italian community as soon as

she can. She has the right to come to this assessment and her community has no right to judge her assessments under the guise of "evaluating her educational progress".

FACILITATOR: I know that some of you want to discuss external examinations and their destructive effects but we have already shown that the control over the evaluation of student progress should be shared: between student and teacher at the autonomous stage; between parent and teacher at the pre-autonomous level.

Where these conditions, in addition to the others we previously discussed, are present, general citizenship education can be carried on with TAG-like relationships and communications.

There will be an opportunity to raise the issue of external controls over student evaluation in our next session when we develop a general analysis of educational relationships and governance.

30. General evaluation of education: authentic democracy or liberal capitalism?

FACILITATOR: In this session we conduct a general evaluation of two systems for governing educational activity and relations - liberal capitalism and the TAG Network articulation of authentic democracy. There are of course many other basic types of political control that we could consider but these two are especially important to us because we live in a liberal capitalist society and the TAG Network is our mid-term goal for social transformation.

This evaluation involves a comparison of the capacity of each of the systems to provide the basic structures and categorial power relations supportive of the participants realizing the two basic aims of education for democracy. The key participants are students,

teachers, parents and citizens in the students' community.

I think it is more important for us to be comprehensive and at least touch on the main points rather than get bogged down in details.

Whereas the TAG Network is an idea, which can only be investigated conceptually, liberal capitalism is an actual system which can be studied by empirical methods. However what is really interesting about liberal capitalism, in this respect, is its necessary features, and so we should focus on conceptual analyses of liberal capitalism and related features to determine what effects on educational relationships and outcomes are necessarily associated with liberal capitalism. Nevertheless we should also be alert to consequences which, while not strictly necessary on a logical basis are probable, to be expected or can be predicted on theoretical grounds.

What are the criteria for our evaluation?

TELEOLOGIST: Our two basic aims are:

- (1) the self-development of each individual in accordance with her own authentic project;
- (2) the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship.

These two aims have been elaborated through diagrams 8 and 8.1 and Solidarity's formulation. (See pp. 198-200.) There are two key ideas we can use in applying the matrix in diagram 8.1 as a procedural guide to evaluation; these are 'transparency' and 'coherence'. We have already analysed these terms. 'Transparency' refers to the truth, accuracy and completeness of our understanding. So we will compare the two systems concerning the extent to which they foster transparent understanding and coherence. Transparency is required for authenticity.

What about coherence? Existentially, if the learner cannot achieve vertical coherence she fails to have an authentic project - because in an authentic project there is harmony and coherence between the predicament, the vision and the path (experience). Moreover there is a likely threat to the development of autonomous agency (because of the probable lack of congruence between understanding and action. Concerning the social dimension a lack of coherence means that the social relationships will fall short of the FPSC, i.e. the actual results of social transformation will "miss the mark".

We have also argued for horizontal coherence, i.e. for having existential and social dimensions in harmony.

PRECISE: Can you illustrate lack of horizontal coherence with a few examples?

TELEOLOGIST: Raymond Williams describes various relationships of individuals to society through the categories 'member', 'subject', 'servant', 'rebel', 'exile' and 'vagrant'. The meanings of these terms are reasonably self-explanatory. For example, 'member' describes an individual's positive identification with the society in which he lives whereas,

The subject, at whatever violence to himself has to accept the way of life of his society, and his own indicated place in it, because there is no other way in which he can maintain himself at all; only by this kind of obedience can he eat, sleep, shelter, or escape being destroyed by others. It is not his way of life, in any sense that matters, but he must conform to it to survive....³⁷

In our terms the member achieves horizontal coherence whereas the subject does not.

But how can I-self achieve vertical coherence without horizontal coherence? This is not a rhetorical question but a genuine query.

Individuals can and do make some accommodations and adjustments to their own self-definition when they cannot achieve horizontal coherence and these may be as authentic as circumstances allow. For example Williams' 'rebel' captures the individual who retains a strong personal commitment to a certain scheme of social co-operation which places him in rebellion to his actual society.³⁸ Nevertheless the only totally satisfactory result is both vertical and horizontal coherence.

Now to the actual evaluation: diagram 8.1 indicates the kinds of "data" that are needed to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the quality of education for a particular learner, a classroom, a school or an educational system.

COMMENTARY: In fact the SET conducted interviews and discussions with students, teachers, parents and other members of the community and they found the matrices and the discussion of basic aims and educational relationships useful in guiding their data collection and in interpreting their findings. However their specific findings have little or no general interest. The issue of great interest, which is pursued in this inquiry, is, "What educational relations and outcomes occur because an educational system is under liberal capitalist political control?

SCHOLAR: For our present purposes there are three key conceptual features of liberal capitalism that bear on our evaluation:³⁹

- (1) the existence of social classes;
- (2) the employer/employee relationship;
- (3) a meritocratic sector.

The employer/employee relationship is a necessary consequence of the capitalist/worker nexus. Classes are also conceptually linked to capitalism. While one can conceive of a capitalist state

without a meritocratic basis for education I believe that the connection with meritocracy is conceptual for liberal capitalism. The liberal's commitment to social freedoms and equality before the law is incompatible with private ownership of state offices and positions. The liberal also rejects - even if only on feasibility grounds - an authentic democracy based on full citizen participation. Therefore, within the government sphere at least, liberals will tend to support a meritocracy. A second factor is that capitalism may require the idea of meritocracy to justify asymmetries in power and resources, i.e. these asymmetries are required to maintain capitalist property relations. But how are they to be justified in the face of the prima facie presupposition of equality of consideration? It seems that some notion of justice or desert is needed to provide "justification" for asymmetrical power relations and unequal access to the society's "goods". The rights of private property ownership are in themselves insufficient justification because the liberal capitalist state is constantly put in the position of making political decisions that affect income flows to individuals, groups, sectors and regions. Therefore liberal capitalism is conceptually, i.e. unavoidably, associated with social classes, employer/employee relations and meritocracy.

Let us consider the educational consequences of these inescapable commitments of liberal capitalism. The existence of social classes, for all practical purposes, forecloses the possibility of common aims for social transformation. For example capitalists and workers will tend to have different views about the abolition of employer/employee relations and social classes, the upper middle class will tend to be more committed to meritocracy and so on. But if this is

so there is no possibility of agreement, at least at a reasonably detailed level, on the elaboration of the basic social aim and, with respect to the social dimension, vertical coherence in educational aims cannot be achieved. Moreover we should expect the various participants to disagree on fundamental features of their common predicament and on their future vision.

Tracing the full consequences of employer/employee relations on education is too complex to be pursued here. However, if teachers have an employee status this creates a conflict of agency making appropriate relationships with students and parents much more difficult. Moreover because the employee role is incompatible with professional status the benefits which a professional approach to teacher certification, the development of educational theory and the supervision of teaching practice, can offer, are lost. Consequently the quality of teaching will tend to be much poorer than under a system providing for professional rather than employee status.

PRECISE: But surely a liberal capitalist society is under no requirement that its teachers be employees rather than professionals. This would only be true if we defined 'liberal capitalism' as a society containing only employers or employees but this is contrary to our everyday understanding.

FACILITATOR: The part of Scholar's argument concerning the employer/employee relation has to be put hypothetically - if the status of teachers is as employees, then the quality of teaching effectiveness will be impaired. But what are the consequences of meritocratic commitments?

SCHOLAR: Meritocracy can formulate an internally coherent vision of the social order in which agents take positions within the system of

social co-operation and receive rewards and benefits in accordance with their "merit". (It is another matter whether those individuals defined as "unworthy" can achieve both vertical and horizontal coherence. How can they work out an authentic personal project and accept and identify with their social position and relations?) In order to support the meritocratic vision education must serve a selective function, i.e. systematic, frequent, "fair" and impartial grading and evaluation of students. But this vision is incompatible with the FPSC.

Nevertheless liberals are not entirely opposed to *égalité* values; they support the principle of equal consideration within the citizenship sphere and try to restrict the meritocratic principle to the division of labour. While this may seem feasible in the economic and political spheres, what are its implications for education? Can education recognize a fundamental split between economic man and the citizen? Particularly during the general citizenship stage, educational activity cannot coherently recognize such a split. The student cannot authentically divide her project into two spheres, i.e., education for citizenship in accordance with the FPSC, and education for work in conformity with meritocratic values, because these imply contradictory self-definitions and perceptions. This conclusion follows at least for those students who are stamped as "unworthy" for high status within the division of labour.⁴⁰ Either the educational activity is directed toward our two democratic aims or it is orientated toward some different principle such as meritocratic selection or it is simply incoherent. Because liberal capitalism is committed to conflicting principles for citizenship and work it cannot provide a coherent basis for the elaboration of educational aims.

FACILITATOR: This does not mean that it is impossible for the participants in an educational system to elaborate the two basic aims of education for democracy into more specific objectives and activities, in a coherent way, simply because they live in a liberal capitalist society. However the social outcomes they seek will be opposed to liberal capitalism. For example the graduates of their schools will not enter the work force prepared to accept employee status; they will not tolerate the limited participation in civic life that pertains to most citizens in a constitutional democracy. In brief these young citizens who have been educated for democracy will be committed to the abolition of capitalist relations and the organization of an authentic democratic society.

SOLIDARITY: Therefore people who are committed to the maintenance of liberal capitalism will try to prevent schools and educational systems from offering educational programmes based on a coherent elaboration of the existential and social aims of education for democracy.

Whereas Scholar noted social classes, employer/employee relations and meritocratic commitments as being conceptually connected to liberal capitalism I want to identify three somewhat weaker affinities. Liberal capitalism is:

- (1) "congenial" to authoritarian evaluation of students because such evaluation supports its meritocratic commitments;
- (2) "antipathetic" to communal critical reflexion directed toward shared understandings and common visions for social transformation, indeed the language of "communal critical reflexion..." sounds subversive, radical and objectionable within the ethos of liberal capitalism; and this is because it suggests the abolition of the capitalist and meritocratic features of liberal capitalism;

(3) antipathetic to teacher professionalism.

PRECISE: Why should liberal capitalism be antipathetic to teacher professionalism? And what does antipathetic mean in this context?

SOLIDARITY: By 'antipathetic' I mean that while there is no logically necessary denial of professionalism, it is "natural" and "expected". Teacher professionalism would likely support critical inquiry within schools because the power of politicians and special interest groups to restrict free inquiry would be greatly reduced. But unrestrained critical reflexion within the public schools threatens to expose the inadequacies of liberal capitalism and foster democratic social transformation. Therefore we expect that proponents of liberal capitalism will oppose teacher professionalism. In this regard there is an interesting empirical fact that supports this analysis: it is nearly always the case that the political and bureaucratic control over teachers is greatest within the secondary level of general citizenship education and least at the university post-graduate level. This effectively constrains free inquiry in the educational system until after the basic selection for the division of labour has been completed and restricts this inquiry to a tiny minority, generally engaged in specialized studies. This is precisely what one would expect if those controlling education want to prevent or at least discourage communal critical reflexion on liberal capitalism as a system of social co-operation.

Similarly by speaking of the "congeniality" of liberal capitalism toward authoritarian evaluation of school children and other students I mean that this is the policy one would expect of persons committed to liberal capitalist values - it is sound policy for them.

Now the congeniality toward authoritarian evaluation arises

both from the commitment to meritocratic selection and the antipathy to communal critical reflexion. Obviously the processes for determining the general criteria of evaluation by local community jurisdictions and the specific criteria for evaluating particular students by agreements reached between teachers and students or teachers and parents makes the whole educational process more transparent and fosters responsibility and autonomy in the participants. All this expedites communal critical reflexion.

LIBERAL: But it can be argued, plausibly if not validly, that the objection to communal critical reflexion is based on protecting children from indoctrination and manipulation.

SOLIDARITY: However if advocates for liberal capitalism are genuinely opposed to indoctrination and manipulation they should be totally opposed to authoritarian evaluation of students, which is a way of coercively imposing concealed valuations and agendas.

Within actual liberal capitalist societies using state power and regulation to prevent communal critical reflexion, the argument about protecting students from indoctrination and manipulation can be shown to be ideological because this same state power imposes authoritarian evaluation schemes on the public educational systems.⁴¹ Contrary to its liberal rhetoric about individual "value autonomy" the liberal capitalist state imposes authoritarian values through its authoritarian control over the basis of evaluations. Let me stress this is categorical control that the state exercises; it need not instruct its bureaucratic officials or teachers concerning the details but need only impose certain general distributions of relative success and failure on the student body.⁴²

FACILITATOR: Liberal capitalism cannot provide a coherent basis for elaborating democratic aims for education and is antipathetic to good education in a number of respects. What about the TAG Network? Can it be shown that the TAG Network can provide a better quality of education?

TELEOLOGIST: The TAG Network proclaims its commitment to democratic social transformation and establishes structures and processes fostering communal critical^a reflexion, indeed does so at a number of different levels. Hence common interests are worked out at each level of the TAG Network and the conflicts are reconciled through continued deliberation in the various branches, so that each individual is able to achieve a substantial degree of harmony between her individual interests and the common interests of the various communities within the TAG Network to which she belongs. Moreover, at each level and in each sphere, the internal democracy of the TAGs supports a reconciliation of existential and social considerations. In general the categorial control imposed over education by a TAG Network promotes communal critical reflexion, transparency and the capability of the participants to develop a coherent elaboration of the two basic aims of education for democracy.

SCHOLAR: And additionally the TAG Network: provides a satisfactory approach to cultural arbitrariness; establishes professional organization of teaching which tends to improve the quality of teaching practice; incorporates appropriate agency relationships between teachers, students, parents and others; presents teachers to children as models of autonomous citizens rather than heteronomous functionaries; removes the authoritarian imposition of grading, examinations and evaluations; and establishes the categorial

conditions for teachers to connect their instructional activity to the personal meanings and authentic projects of their students.

FACILITATOR: Very clearly the quality of education would be much improved if we can establish TAG Network rather than liberal capitalist control over the educational system. But this seems like an immensely difficult task.

SOLIDARITY: It looks like good education will have to await a social revolution that abolishes capitalism.

TELEOLOGIST: Not at all! The constitutional democratic features of liberal capitalism provide the possibilities for organizing a TAG Network control over education. Despite the antipathies of liberal capitalism towards local community control over the cultural arbitraries used as educational resources, towards professional status for teachers and towards co-operative franchises the possibility remains of organizing a mini-TAG Network controlling the educational system within liberal capitalism. Now if this programme eventually leads to the social transformation from liberal capitalism to authentic democracy, so much the better!

COMMENTARY: The SET picks up on Teleologist's idea of organizing a "mini-TAG Network" controlling educational activity within liberal capitalism and they call this structure "the educational commonwealth". The educational commonwealth consists of the TPA, the local community jurisdictions exercising local political control over educational franchises, the teachers' co-operatives linked to the local community jurisdictions through the franchises, and the nation-state to the extent that it can be organized to provide legislative, judicial and financial support, i.e. to create broad categorial conditions supportive of the educational commonwealth, guarantees of social justice and appropriate social freedoms and resources.

Regarding their original task of evaluating their school the SET have articulated the two basic aims of education for democracy and the matrix for elaborating these aims (diagrams 8 and 8.1). Moreover the analysis and critique of liberal capitalism and the TAG Network as alternative approaches to the categorial control of education, reported in this section, provides a general evaluation which is pertinent at a fundamental level to all more specific evaluations of schools and educational systems in liberal capitalist societies.

Some of the assertions made in this chapter, especially concerning the virtues of a TAG Network control of education may appear unconvincing or insufficiently justified. In Chapter VI the thesis analyses an educational commonwealth based on the principles of the TAG Network and in doing so puts many of the assertions made in this chapter on a more justifiable foundation. I specifically argue for the educational commonwealth as the appropriate approach to the categorial control over education.

C H A P T E R V I

TEACHER PROFESSIONALISM AND THE EDUCATIONAL COMMONWEALTH

COMMENTARY: In Chapter IV the dialogues make the case for a TAG Network organization of the basic structure of society, including pyramidal political jurisdictions, workers' co-operatives and professional associations. Then, in Chapter V, it is argued that liberal capitalism cannot provide a satisfactory basis for the political control over education. However, the possibility was raised of organizing an "educational commonwealth", based on TAG Network principles within an existing liberal capitalist society. In Chapter VI the principles and findings developed in earlier chapters are applied to the problem of organizing, developing and maintaining an educational commonwealth that can provide a coherent elaboration of the basic aims of education for democracy. However this chapter does more than apply the earlier principles and findings - it raises and explores important issues for the philosophy of education, especially concerning educational theory and canonical research; and the analysis of collective bargaining alternatives is important for the policies of education.

The dialogues discuss: why a teachers' association with a strong professional capability should be organized prior to implementing certain other key transformations; the major functions of teachers' professional associations; how collective bargaining can be used to accomplish community political control, educational franchises and teachers' co-operatives; internal democracy within the teachers' professional association;

communications and co-ordination within the educational commonwealth; relations between the educational commonwealth and the nation-state.

However there are some preliminary comments to be made concerning the type of inquiry this chapter pursues. Because I discuss strategies and the structure of institutions within an educational commonwealth it may be assumed that this is merely the application of the previously developed principles. However once it is appreciated that static principles for the political control over education are fundamentally incompatible with the transformation from liberal capitalism to authentic democracy then it becomes reasonable to conceive principles for educational governance and control as strategies.

Nevertheless this chapter focuses on a number of matters in a more detailed way than the earlier chapters - it is more concerned with the immediate future and it stresses those institutions that are most crucial in the immediate future. Nevertheless its method is basically philosophical, just as conceptual analysis does not cease to become philosophical when it narrows its breadth and scope to focus on specific concepts within education.

31. The teachers' professional association

ACTION-MAN: Our present concern is the organization of an educational commonwealth embodying democratic community control, educational franchises, teachers' co-operatives and teachers' professional associations within our liberal capitalist society. While the organization of this commonwealth can go on simultaneously with other forms of social action in different spheres of social activity within this one objective there are certain stages which should have priority, specifically the teachers' professional association should

be organized first. Assuming, as we realistically should, that an educational commonwealth will be organized "from below" rather than mandated by the nation-state, the sequence is to: transform existing teachers' unions and organizations into professional associations with fully developed professional programmes; combine local community organization and a new approach to collective bargaining between teachers' associations and local educational authorities to convert the employer/employee relation pertaining to education into a franchise/workers' co-operative relationship.

PRECISE: Will you explain why we need to start with the transformation of teachers' organizations into professional associations?

ACTION-MAN: While there are often many different paths to the same goal there are several grounds for starting with the professionalization of a teachers' association, which has the capacity to: develop the powers and dispositions of teachers for autonomous practice even while their conditions of employment are inimical to autonomy; provide a certification function respecting teachers' qualifications and other facilitative services to support the transition from employer/employee to franchise/co-operative organization.

Teachers whose work status has been as heteronomous functionaries will often be reluctant to accept or even totally opposed to bearing the responsibilities of personal and collective responsibility for the whole educational programme unless they have some sort of sanctuary or "psychosocial moratorium" wherein they can develop the shared vision, powers, self-esteem and confidence for professional autonomy.¹ C. A. Bowers rightly advocates a psychosocial moratorium on social and psychological forms of punishment often used by teachers to control students' behaviour and thought. However, it

is also vital for teachers to have a protected sanctuary where they can conduct inquiries into teaching practice and explore new methods and purposes of instruction free from threats or punishments by the political/bureaucratic hierarchy "supervising" them or the pressures arising from the existing relations and structuration of the school system. The teachers' professional association can provide a different set of social relations and cultural and educational resources to foster the development of dispositions, knowledge, skills and understandings for participation within an educational commonwealth which is being formed; it can offer moral and emotional support to teachers under stress during the lengthy transition period.

If, for example, we try to institute franchises and teachers' co-operatives before developing the professional capabilities and functions of the teachers' association there are serious problems in addition to the likely resistance or limited commitment of teachers. How is the community to exercise political accountability concerning its schools? Lacking professional capabilities the teachers are unable to monitor teaching practice and to discipline themselves for breaches of ethics or professional competence. However, the community political jurisdiction cannot itself supervise teachers' professional performance without becoming the employer and stripping the teachers' co-operative of its responsibility, in conjunction with the professional association, for supervising the performance of its own members.

FACILITATOR: Clearly the professional association has a crucial role in the educational commonwealth and this suggests devoting several sessions to an analysis of its main functions.

TELEOLOGIST: Presumably the analysis we have already done on the political control of work and professional organization within the TAG Network will be generally applicable to the teachers' professional association. Accordingly the key functions are certification and monitoring practice, pre-service education, in-service education, educational theory and research, policy development and legislative action.

FACILITATOR: Yes, those are key functions but we are not simply applying the general analysis developed in sections 21 and 22 to education. We are also concerned with a transition strategy and so I suggest that we consider collective bargaining as part of this strategy after we have addressed the other key functions.

32. Certification and teaching practice

COMMENTARY: The SET makes extensive use of the analyses in section 22, particularly the finding that professional associations of practitioners should have the sole authority to certify the qualifications of professionals.² In the following dialogues the SET considers and rejects the possibility that education may be an exception to the general principles for the political control of work articulated in Chapter IV.

SCHOLAR: Teaching is different from many types of work in that the workers do not produce goods or services (in the usual sense) but guide and facilitate the learning of other human beings. However, this difference only strengthens the case for professional status for teachers, client rights and protections for students and their parent trustees, and the type of community political control proposed in Chapter IV, because in educational activity human relationships are of the greatest importance. The social and political relationships within schools and classrooms provide an implicit form of

moral and political education: they set before students actual models of work, decision-making and human interaction and take an evaluative stance toward them, e.g. they express positions on what constitutes legitimate authority, how disagreements are settled, how interests are decided and pursued, how justice is to be interpreted, etc.; because these relationships are part of the social structure encountered by students, they have a formative effect on character, dispositions, powers and understandings. While a great deal more analysis is needed in this area it is plausible that teachers who have professional autonomy and such powers, dispositions and understandings as are compatible with and appropriate to it, will be more suitable models and more capable of fostering authenticity and autonomy in their students than heteronomous functionaries. Practitioner control over certification plays an important part in the teacher's development of professional autonomy and in bringing about social structures and relationships within education that advance the self-development of students.

PRECISE: A case is being made for practitioner control over certification but we have been awfully vague about the definition of 'practitioner'. Given that there is now an extensive functional differentiation of labour within the educational system, e.g. on the basis of the age of the student, subject or discipline, type of responsibility,... and assuming that only a small, representative body will actually exercise judgment concerning the certification of individual teachers do we not need to be much more specific concerning who is and who is not a practitioner? Are principals or heads practitioners? Superintendents? Curriculum consultants? University teachers of educational theory and practice? Educational researchers? Does

practitioner control over certification rule out extreme functional differentiation and demand that all practitioners within a particular profession carry out similar functions? We need greater clarity on these sorts of questions to understand what "practitioner control over certification" actually involves.

HEART: These are very fundamental and difficult questions. Please leave the question of functional differentiation on one side for now and bear with me while I develop my argument from an initially fuzzy definition of 'practitioner'. Assume that we already have a community of teachers and the problem is to decide whether a particular candidate, X, is or is not a teacher. How do we go about answering this sort of question? For our purposes it will not do to answer in terms of an "objective" or essentialist analysis of X's functions because the question of which different functions "belong together" is precisely what is at issue. Conceptual analysis of the terms 'teacher' or 'teaching' is also unsatisfactory because we are concerned with a matter of social, political and educational policy and not mere linguistic usage. Indeed it would be surprising if there was any unique solution to the categorization of functions comprising a particular profession to be derived from essentialist approaches.³ In fact, actual divisions of labour and actual classification of professions in legal and organizational terms have a history and generally a history that could have been "otherwise".

Perhaps we can find some success by approaching the issue normatively. Why do we want practitioner control and what social principles and ideals underlie this objective? Our basic principle is the fundamental principle for social co-operation; more specifically we seek democratic self-governance of work and other

aspects of social interaction. In whatever way we may eventually define the boundaries of the teaching profession, or any other profession, and I am not suggesting that this definition is inconsequential, it must be compatible with and supportive of democratic self-governance.

The principle of democratic self-governance has implications for the ways in which decisions about the membership of a profession are determined. From this principle we can derive three "theorems" that may assist us in clarifying the definition of practitioners.⁴

Theorem 1

If X has the authority to make judgments about competent or ethical teaching practice, either in the form of general policies and regulations or of rulings and interpretations in particular cases, that are binding on other practitioners then X should be classified as a practitioner.

Theorem 2

If X is a practitioner then X should belong to the teachers' professional association and have an equal right with all other practitioners to: participate in deliberations about and to decide upon standards for good teaching practice, ethical conduct and the criteria for certification of teachers; decide which persons will have the authority to make judgments and rulings concerning specific cases.

Theorem 3

Decisions concerning the broad principles for the division of labour and other social actions within the teaching profession should be determined by a consensus (if possible) or by majority decision (if necessary) of the teachers' professional association.⁵

Taken together these three theorems define legitimate authority concerning judgments about teaching practice in relational terms, which is consistent with our findings in Chapters III, IV and V concerning rational decision processes. For example, X's authority cannot be grounded, ultimately, in his knowledge because this would be circular when pushed to its limits. Who certifies that X really has the sort of knowledge justifying his authority? Also, if it is argued that X's authority in these matters arises from his position within a particular hierarchy of control this begs the question because what sort of justification would show that X ought to have that position?

To illustrate these theorems consider the following cases: A is an official who has the authority to write reports regarding the competence and ethical conduct of teachers (the reports may be used in proceedings to decide certification, decertification or disciplinary action); B is an official who sits on a board which conducts inquiries into the practices and professional conduct of teachers and has the authority to make rulings concerning certification and professional discipline; C is a person who participates in deliberations which determine policies, rules and regulations with respect to certification and professional discipline; D is a person who is not subject to the discipline of the professional teachers' association. According to theorems 1 and 2, A, B and C should belong to the teachers' professional association and D should not belong and should not have the right to exercise the types of authority that A, B and C do. D, who might be any member of the community except one who belongs to the teachers' professional association, has the right to express his views, make proposals and so on,

concerning education. Like every other citizen he has the right to participate, on an equal basis, in the determination of aims, objectives, cultural resources and evaluative criteria for the schools in his community. As a citizen he participates in a collective right to approve or reject the educational franchise and to decide whether the teachers' co-operative has satisfactorily achieved the evaluative criteria. So D has the right to a significant say in educational policy but no right to participate in decisions defining good practice and ethical conduct within and peculiar to the profession.⁶

PRECISE: But what is the justification for the theorems?

HEART: The theorems follow from the FPSC, the principle of democratic self-governance and our commitment to autonomous agency. If A, B and C do not belong to the professional association then the principle of self-governance is violated and A, B and C stand in asymmetrical relations of categorial power to the other teachers. Likewise if D could have the right to participate in the internal operations of the profession without himself being subject to professional discipline this would be subject to the same criticism.

PRECISE: It seems that even if they do belong to the teachers' professional association A and B have an asymmetrical power relationship with other teachers who lack their authority.

HEART: Theorems 2 and 3 are relevant here. The professional teachers' association may create certain offices with special powers and authority and assign individuals to them; in doing so they establish asymmetries in certain specific forms of authority but this is not necessarily contrary to the FPSC because categorial power within the sphere of professional practice will be equal if every member has an equal say regarding the broad principles for the division of social

actions within the association, including the formation and filling of these special offices and positions. If any person with a position of special responsibility, such as A or B, has his special authority concerning teaching practice decided democratically by the whole association through processes characterized by mutual respect and affection, open and undistorted communications and symmetrical power relations then we have an appropriate practitioner control over certification; whereas if such persons receive their authority from outside this democratic community of practitioners, e.g. from a state legislature or an employer it is not practitioner control but state or employer control.

ACTION-MAN: A longstanding dispute in many teachers' organizations is whether principals (heads), inspectors, supervisors, superintendents and others who have authority with respect to competence and good practice should be admitted to membership in the same association as classroom teachers. It follows from this analysis that they definitely should - although their particular job descriptions may be radically altered and some of the incumbents replaced.⁷ By maintaining such officers in, or initiating them into, the teachers' professional association, teachers achieve one condition for professional control over certification and practice. On the other hand the policy of barring persons in such positions from membership reinforces the strategy of industrial unionism and undermines the prospects for practitioners taking control of certification and teaching practice.⁸

FACILITATOR: Basically the system through which decisions about certification, decertification and professional discipline are to be made should be controlled by a professional association which has internal democracy.

ACTION-MAN: We should stress that the teachers' professional association should have sole authority concerning the control of certification and teaching practice. Shared responsibility, e.g. among school teachers, university teachers or administrators and state officials is an ill-conceived policy. Such schemes, being contrary to our three theorems, do not provide practitioner control. In addition, lines of responsibility and accountability are unclear; in practice they entail a state bureaucracy involved in teacher certification; in view of the confused lines of responsibility it is difficult to see how citizens can exercise political control over their state officials in this sphere; and there is the persistent danger of a misuse of state political authority.

The interesting question is why teachers have been so prone to accept or even seek this type of shared responsibility.

TELEOLOGIST: Yes, there is a long history of teachers seeking professional control over certification but they have had no success in any jurisdiction so far as I know.⁹ The basic approach which teachers have used is legislative proposals, backed by lobbying and other forms of political action, which aim for a change in the legal status of the teaching occupation mandated by parliament or other legislative bodies.

SOLIDARITY: Not only has this approach been singularly unsuccessful but the teachers have also been remarkably long suffering and good tempered with the legislative bodies that have frustrated their efforts. They have not organized and struggled to achieve these professional rights with the same intensity and determination which they apply to the pursuit of economic welfare benefits. They have not applied sanctions to punish legislatures which have prevented

them from gaining control over certification or mounted serious programmes of political action to elect only those candidates who support professional status. The main reason for this is that teachers have not appreciated the significance of practitioner control over professional practice or understood the pressures and sanctions needed to achieve it. For example, until very recently I was opposed to professionalism myself. We must help teachers to appreciate how crucial professional control over certification is and so generate the commitment and determination to win this objective.

TELEOLOGIST: While commitment and determination are very important, Solidarity's analysis is too superficial in that it suggests that some "consciousness raising" and "rah! rah!" are sufficient. Teachers on her account have a much clearer understanding of their welfare than their professional interests. Why should this be so? I believe that a very big part of the problem arises from structural features within teachers' organizations, namely the lack of an infrastructure to administer a programme of initial certification and ongoing monitoring of practice; the inadequate development within these associations of a psychosocial moratorium supporting and nurturing the personal and professional transformation of teachers so that they can at least cope with a lengthy and otherwise traumatic revolution in working relationships.

ACTION-MAN: What is to be done?

TELEOLOGIST: We need to develop the professional infrastructure of the teachers' association before practitioners are granted legal authority to control certification and practice, that is: offer in-service education, research and theory programmes according to the principle of a psychosocial moratorium for teachers; establish an "unofficial",

i.e. not mandatory, system of certification and procedures for monitoring practice; when this system is in operation challenge and confront the legally mandated system whenever it is at odds with the professional system.¹⁰

FACILITATOR: Those are valuable ideas. Do you think it is time to address pre-service education?

ACTION-MAN: Much of our general strategy for gaining professional control over certification and practice should apply to pre-service education; the main difference is that for the former our key protagonist is the political state whereas for the latter it is the universities and teacher training colleges. However professional control over pre-service education will probably be easier to achieve than over certification and practice, particularly if we accomplish the latter first. Our strategy should not be directed to having teachers' unions take over pre-service education from universities and teacher training colleges because this would entail a violation of equal consideration of the interests of some practitioners, produce destructive conflict and, if successful, represent a terrible waste of existing resources; rather we should seek to bring all who participate in the control of the pre-service education of teachers within a united teaching profession. Because persons authorized to participate in the control of pre-service education must be capable of, and authorized to make, judgments about competent and ethical teaching practice we can justify our position through Heart's theorems.

If we present our case to the teachers of teachers working in universities and colleges we can probably convince many of them and win their agreement and commitment. Those who refuse to participate in our justified programme of democratic professionalization can be

isolated and subjected to various sanctions. Once professionals gain legal control over certification one of these sanctions can be the refusal to accept the "professional" judgments of teachers or administrators who are not part of the professional community; this would seriously undermine their ability to attract teachers-in-training.

FACILITATOR: The strategy for gaining control over pre-service education is quite similar to that over certification and teaching practice although the latter is the more urgent priority. In analysing the strategic failures of teachers in the pursuit of control over certification and practice, Teleologist stressed the need for an adequate development of the infrastructure prior to gaining legal control over these matters. Perhaps we can address research and theory development, as part of this infrastructure, in our next session.

COMMENTARY: Solidarity's explanation of teachers' lack of commitment to professionalism is too superficial whereas Teleologist's argument is more adequate. The reason is not primarily lack of professional concern but an inadequate support system and professional infrastructure. There is a type of dialectical relation at work here: the more the infrastructure is developed the more teachers will tend to take professional responsibility; the more they take professional responsibility the more they will develop the infrastructure.

33. Educational theory and canonical research

COMMENTARY: I will summarize most of the discussion concerning educational theory and research. Teleologist observes that one way of classifying educational research is with respect to its purpose. Two main purposes are relevant to our inquiry: research to assist the community in exercising its political accountability regarding aims, cultural arbitrariness and evaluative criteria; research directed to the improvement of teaching practice and learning conditions. Solidarity expresses doubt over the possibility of making a sharp distinction between political and professional purposes for educational research. Liberal argues that while no sharp line can be drawn there is a distinction in emphasis and degree of generality. The political concern is primarily with what happens to its children whereas the professional emphasis is much more on how it is to be accomplished; which is not to say that the professional should be unconcerned with decisions about appropriate outcomes. Indeed professionals should participate in discussions within the community concerning aims and evaluative criteria. Moreover, in making professional decisions, teachers take positions with respect to moral, social and political ideals, and thereby exercise a restricted form of delegated political authority; but this does not deny the differences in emphasis and detail between professional and political purposes for research.

The community can, on a franchise basis, engage researchers to assist it in evaluating the general educational outcomes in its schools, provided that the authority and activity of these researchers do not transgress the principles we are about to articulate for professional research.

Because the topic of educational theory and research arises in connection with the infrastructure of the teachers' professional association

the SET focuses on professional research.

Teleologist argues that the teachers' professional association requires a canonical theory concerning pedagogy, ethical and competent practice, and learning conditions. By 'canonical theory' she means a set of ideas, principles and standards that constitute a theoretical view about good practices in education, which is endorsed by the professional association. Professionals require canonical theory to make non-arbitrary, justifiable and fair judgments about professional education, certification, supervision of practice and professional discipline. Hence the principle of professional control over certification and practice commits us to the development of canonical theory. Other approaches to the political control of teaching, as long as they are also concerned with the good and interests of students, also require sound theory; but one of the great advantages of professional control rather than other approaches, such as bureaucratic supervision, for example, is the superior development of canonical theory.

Nevertheless there are a number of fundamental difficulties facing the TPA (teachers' professional association). The ultimate grounding of educational theory is man's good and therefore those who pursue this inquiry should be committed to both truth and goodness. However, these commitments, even when elaborated or augmented in terms of some principles for rational deliberation, are not formulas that produce unique solutions to the search for canonical theory. This is true whether or not one takes a sceptical position regarding the ultimate possibilities for human knowledge of factual and normative matters - because, whatever our ultimate possibilities, we have only a limited time for investigation and deliberation. For the foreseeable future man's knowledge and understanding will remain radically incomplete; it follows that any educational theory actually articulated will be incomplete and incorrect in some respects.

Moreover, because practitioners will bring different experiences and patterns of knowledge into their deliberations, so that the various respects in which they are "in error" with respect to some "more correct" theory (as subsequently or "finally" determined) are different, there is the likelihood, if not certainty, of disagreements among practitioners who follow "rational" decision procedures and are genuinely committed to truth, goodness and rationality.

Liberal stresses the need for a substantial degree of scepticism about the possibilities of developing "true" or "valid" educational theory and for tolerance concerning different interpretations. The SET agrees with toleration and scepticism within certain limits. While any actual theory will be corrigible in the light of further experience or more deliberation, one theory is not generally as adequate as another. From our research activity we seek good grounds for making decisions and choices among competing theories to maximize our chances for improving practice - not certainty or infallibility.


By 'canonical research' the SET means any systematic inquiry designed to throw light on canonical educational theory. 'Research' in this context does not necessarily refer to scientific or positivistic methods but to any approaches that might illuminate our understanding of educational theory.¹¹

As was discussed in section 25 a procedural conception of rationality can take us a certain distance in the resolution of disputes about educational theory. By 'procedural conception of rationality' we mean not only a commitment to truth, consistency, impartiality and man's good, but also to undistorted communications, mutual respect and affection, symmetrical power relations, anti-authoritarianism, etc. However, given the limitations discussed above, we are caught between conflicting forces:

on the one hand, to establish at least a core of canonical theory that will be the basis for collective control over professional practice; and, on the other, to support free and open inquiry and research designed to modify that canonical theory. However the development of new canonical theory cannot be pursued without criticizing and attempting to discredit the existing canonical theory.¹² This means that a theory which is constantly subject to criticism and which may already be discredited in certain respects among some sections of the TPA has to serve as the basis for decisions about certification, professional discipline and decertification (as well as other matters). Teachers who may lose their rights to practise because of conduct contrary to canonical theory may complain of injustice when the theory is so subject to conflicting assessments.

I agree with Solidarity's suggestion that canonical theory be established through a consensus of practitioners and also with Liberal that a mandatory 'core' versus a non-mandatory periphery distinction needs to be drawn within canonical theory.

DIAGRAM 9 - CORE CANONICAL THEORY



In Diagram 9 the rectangle represents the whole range of competing theories about educational practice; the outer circle portrays the canonical theory, established by consensus, which is the basis for both individual practice and professional policy concerning such matters as the organization of schools, curriculum development, the division of pedagogic work among teachers, etc.; the inner circle represents the mandatory core of canonical theory, violation of which is grounds for decertification or professional discipline.

Liberal insists that 'violation of canonical theory' refers to practice and not to theoretical beliefs or assertions. Y is a teacher who disagrees with our most basic principle - that good education is good for man - and continues to assert his position in contradiction to the principle endorsed by the TPA, both within the TPA and in public. Providing Y's teaching practice does not contravene this principle, we can justify his right to verbal challenges to the principle, using, for example, arguments similar to Mill in On Liberty.¹³ Y has the right to go on trying to change the canonical theory as long as his practice does not contravene it.

We must however be careful to note that some articulations of theory are at the same time practices. The teacher who presents arguments to his class purporting to demonstrate the inherent superiority of some races in relation to others has engaged in the practice of racial discrimination. He cannot defend his action by arguing that it is simply a theoretical position. In the classroom, particularly with immature learners, it is a practice, and if the mandatory core forbids racial discrimination it is unacceptable.

Canonical theory is the basis for educational policy within the educational commonwealth but the mandatory core goes further - it bears

directly on the right to practise the profession - therefore it requires greater certainty and a more complete consensus. The boundaries between mandatory, non-mandatory and disputed territory will constantly shift. A few examples may illustrate the distinctions. In disputed territory is the idea of teaching children to read English through an "initial teaching alphabet".¹⁴ Research may eventually vindicate, discredit or modify this idea but at this stage it is insufficiently established to be either the basis for curriculum design or grounds for professional discipline one way or another. For our SET the principle that good education must connect to the authentic project of the student belongs to the mandatory core. Practice contrary to this principle is justifiably subject to professional discipline, including decertification if the teacher is unwilling or unable to respect it. Contrast this with the idea that discovery methods of learning are generally preferable to didactic instruction; this is a less fundamental and less certain principle, the validity of which is likely to vary with circumstances. It may occur that the discovery learning principle or some modification of it is endorsed as non-mandatory canonical theory. This suggests that it would have a policy function affecting, perhaps, the architecture of schools, curriculum planning, learning materials, school journeys and the like but would not be a basis for "hard" decisions concerning teaching practice. If there is a reasonable likelihood that good education can occur with little or no use of discovery methods then it is unjustifiable to use violation of the discovery learning principle as grounds for professional discipline.

As Liberal points out it is desirable to have a range of competing theories and practices and a free approach to communal critical reflexion concerning them. While certain practices must be forbidden in the interests

of students and the public the profession must establish that there is a reasonable probability that such practices violate fundamental principles. We can go wrong by being either too lenient or too harsh and in either case there is injustice. However, as Heart says, even the core of canonical theory need not pass tests of the same stringency as are required in a court of criminal law. Indeed legal justice is an inappropriate model for the control over teaching practice. There is a large gap between "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that a teacher's practices are below standard and the "reasonable probability" that the interests of students are undermined by them; it is the latter position, not the former, which is appropriate for control over teaching practice. If, however, the line is drawn at "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" then many poor and marginal teachers will glide safely through the gap to the detriment of students and the public interest. Nor should decertification be likened to criminal conviction because failure to meet the challenging requirements of professional teaching practice does not necessarily, or even probably, imply criminal culpability. If requiring that teachers measure up to demanding standards with respect to their students' interests and the public interest is unfair so is the requirement that tournament tennis players win their match as a condition of proceeding to the next match (or winning the trophy). Nonetheless, because matters of certification and professional discipline are so significant for the careers of practitioners, the procedures must be fair and scrupulously followed; and the mandatory canonical theory, which is the basis for deciding such matters, must have as firm a justification as possible.

How can this mandatory canonical theory be placed on a defensible foundation? I only touch on a number of points in this respect. There is the procedural principle, which has been stressed concerning a number

of different substantive issues, of symmetrical power relations, undistorted communications, and the democratic "climate" of the TPA. Clearly there must be a very strong consensus about core canonical theory because otherwise the deliberation has been inadequate or incomplete. However, a strong consensus is not sufficient, because a major allocation of time and resources to the development of canonical theory, on an ongoing basis, is also necessary. While the core will always be much less than the whole of canonical theory, it is only through a commitment to canonical research on a comprehensive basis and repeated redrawing of the boundaries between mandatory, non-mandatory and disputed spheres of educational theory that the TPA can exercise responsible control over certification and teaching practice.

A brief summary of the discussion on the division of labour between teachers and researchers follows. Because of the central significance of canonical research to professional control of certification and practice and because of our commitment to autonomous participation of practitioners in the central functions of their professional association every teacher should be involved in educational research activity. The minimum satisfactory level of involvement in research should be as much as is necessary to enable the teacher to participate effectively in debates and discussions concerning mandatory canonical theory; a teacher incapable of this is unable to take a position on acceptable versus unacceptable teaching practices - such a teacher is destined to remain a functionary. Beyond this minimum level of involvement there can be great differences in the balance between teaching practice to reflect different circumstances or variations among the practitioners in dispositions, powers and interests.

Another basic finding is that the TPA must control canonical research and this assertion can be justified along the lines used to justify professional control over certification and practice. In turn this finding

places certain limits on research specialization. Generally researchers specializing in canonical educational research should belong to the TPA. However there is also the possibility of specialist researchers, say in fields such as psychology or sociology, for example, setting up a research co-operative and conducting research through a franchise with the TPA. Both of these options ensure that researchers are responsible to the TPA and cannot exercise a dominating power over the teachers.

Theorem 4 expresses in concise form my position regarding canonical research.

Theorem 4

If X is engaged in canonical research on a continuing basis then X should either be classified as a practitioner or be engaged through a mutually agreed market franchise with the TPA.

By insisting that researchers such as X belong to the professional teaching community we establish a general symmetry of power relations, ensure that researchers and other teachers can co-operate as co-participating autonomous agents in the development and application of canonical theory. Theorem 4 is also directed to ensuring that educational theory is grounded in practice. Taken together, the four theorems suggest that the general approach to the division of labour between research and other professional teaching activities should be decided by the profession as a whole.¹⁵

Finally Action-Man raises a number of organizational issues.

ACTION-MAN: The conventional programmes of teacher education and the present organization of educational activity have tended to neglect the understandings, skills and dispositions needed for participation in canonical research. To overcome this teachers' organizations need to organize their in-service education programmes to develop these powers in their members. This task is essentially the

development of "organic intellectuals" within the TPA.

For Antonio Gramsci the distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals is essentially that the organic intellectuals are more organically connected to a fundamental social class grouping whereas the traditional intellectuals have a more detached relationship to fundamental classes.¹⁶ In this specific context I use 'organic' to refer to intellectuals who have an intimate connection to teaching practice and 'traditional' to refer to the professional scholars, scientists, artists, etc., who develop and maintain the academic disciplines and produce new cultural products. Both traditional and organic intellectuals have the capacity for significant participation in shaping community and societal ideas concerning what is possible, rational, true and good.

Within teaching, canonical research must be continually connected and reconnected to the research, cultural and intellectual activity of traditional intellectuals and this is one task for the organic intellectuals of the TPA. Organic intellectuals within the TPA can be formed either by professional intellectuals immersing themselves in the activity of the TPA or by teacher practitioners themselves becoming directly engaged in canonical research. It is the latter process which should be the main focus although the two can be mutually supportive.

Within the TPA there is a very important basis for research specialization. Many teachers' organizations now have, as sub-groups, specialist associations organized on the current division of teaching activity, i.e. by subjects, age or type of student, etc. Because they are based on the actual shared predicaments and interests of professional teachers, these associations within the TPA, are

excellent foci for research activity, curriculum development and in-service education. Where specialist associations exist they should be strengthened by additional resources and research capacities; where they do not teachers should seriously consider organizing them.¹⁷

And yet as long as specialist associations merely reflect an existing division and organization of pedagogic work and do not reflect on it with a view to taking responsibility for its transformation, crucial canonical research may be inhibited by the structure of the specialist organization. For example, the prevailing subject organization of secondary schools, if used as the basis for organizing teacher research and development, has the limitation of having already taken a position on the subjects to be taught and is therefore not well placed to address the issue of what subjects should be in the curriculum. Accordingly consideration should be given to forms of organization which integrate research and theory development across different specialties and which support teacher examination of the basic division of pedagogic work.

One approach to this is a council to which all specialist associations send representatives which can both integrate and co-ordinate research activity among specialist associations and pursue research projects which cut across or transcend the boundaries between specialist associations.

FACILITATOR: Having established the need for in-service education to develop organic intellectuals and to teach research skills to practitioners, we should, in our next session, address in-service education.

34. In-service education

COMMENTARY: In-service education is a matter of great importance to the TPA; unfortunately even a sketchy overview requires more discussion than our focus permits. Accordingly I focus on those points most relevant to the strategy for gaining TPA control over certification and practice.

I begin by merely summarizing the position taken by the SET on two in-service issues: who should deliver in-service education programmes to teachers?; should mandatory in-service, as a condition of continued certification, be required? With respect to the first, the finding of section 26 is that all voluntary education of certificated professionals is categorized as 'postprofessional' and subject to the principle of shared control between student and teacher, i.e. a freely negotiated arrangement. The prospects for freely negotiated relationships and for responsiveness to the great variety of individual perspectives and needs are enhanced by a multiplicity of different "suppliers" of in-service education. Moreover, because it is generally both difficult and undesirable to draw a sharp boundary between in-service designed to improve teaching abilities and that directed to general self-development, a wide variety of different sources and types reinforces the individual autonomy of the teacher regarding his own self-development. Also, if the TPA tries to provide all types of in-service education it will likely be too "stretched out" to focus adequately on certain forms crucial to the professionalization of teaching.

It is sometimes argued that because of changes in educational theory, school subjects and academic disciplines, teachers in service should be required, as a condition of continuing certification, to take and pass certain courses. Does our analysis of canonical theory support this view?

only superficially. Is it plausible that a teacher who has mastered the canonical theory sufficiently to meet initial certification standards can only keep abreast of current canonical theory by taking certain prescribed courses? Assuming that the TPA has a strong programme of canonical research, there are many different ways for teachers to keep informed about education, e.g. reading, discussions with colleagues, participation in research, courses, seminars, workshops, teacher exchange, travel,.... Certain teachers may neglect recent developments in theory and thus become incapable of meeting current standards of practice. Such cases should be identified by monitoring practice and where warranted mandatory in-service may be prescribed as a condition of continuing or renewed certification. But the general imposition of mandatory in-service is a violation of the professional teacher's personal responsibility for his own continuing education and a gross misuse of public and professional resources. Because the TPA should have sole responsibility for the control of certification and practice only the TPA should have the authority to decide cases in which mandatory in-service is required. Where these mandatory in-service schemes are applied by state certification boards we have a sham because state control does not result in a canonical theory to justify the mandatory courses.¹⁸

Having reviewed the TAG's position supporting multiple suppliers of in-service education and rejecting mandatory in-service courses except where directed to specific weaknesses in the practice of the teacher we now join Liberal as he articulates a position concerning the in-service priorities of the TPA.

LIBERAL: There are three related foci for in-service organization within the TPA, at least for the short to mid-term: offering a particular type of political education; developing organic intellectuals,

including teaching research methods and skills; providing a psycho-social moratorium for teachers.

(1) Political education

Many teachers lack a clear understanding of the politics of educational control, of the significance of practitioner control over certification and practice, of the case for a vast expansion of TPA resources directed to canonical theory and for their own participation in the development of this theory, etc., and of the ways in which the foregoing issues bear on their own work and experience in the classroom. If these teachers are to participate with their colleagues, as autonomous agents, in both political and educational/cultural action to transform radically the political control over, and the relationships within, education, then they need these understandings. Therefore, one emphasis for in-service education should be a form of political education which aims to foster an understanding of education in a social, cultural and political context and which is connected to educational practice, social praxis and political action.

(2) Developing organic intellectuals; teaching research methods and skills

Because the development of organic intellectuals and the pursuit of canonical theory have been so little understood and so long neglected it may take some time to learn how to go about them and much longer still before the TPA's professional infrastructure will be ready to exercise legal control over certification and practice. I do not pretend to know, in detail, how to proceed but some general points are worth noting. How are teachers to find the time and energy for canonical research and in-service education in addition to the demanding tasks of classroom teaching? Obvious as the problem of time is, it has been generally neglected or under-emphasized by

teachers' organizations. Systematic and determined efforts are required to secure release time and to organize in-service activities so that contributing teachers receive personal satisfaction from them.

Teachers involved in research, criticism and policy require access to intellectual resources, e.g. professional libraries, contacts with traditional intellectuals and opportunities to share ideas and experiences with other organic intellectuals. The TPA should consider organizing workshops in which volunteer teacher practitioners work on projects related to the development of canonical theory. Traditional intellectuals can be invited as resource persons to assist in teaching research methods and skills. Eventually the TPA should have its own cadre of teachers of research methods and skills and possibly new conceptions of methodology will arise from their work. Another important organizational and motivational consideration is that teachers engaged in research need vehicles of expression, i.e. means for disseminating their findings to colleagues, e.g. through papers, journals, books, videotapes, slide/tape shows, movies, etc.

(3) Providing a psychosocial moratorium

We have already discussed the need for a psychosocial moratorium, or sanctuary, for teachers who are developing new powers and dispositions for participation in the transformed relationships and governance of the educational commonwealth. This suggests that the setting, organization and methodology of TPA research and in-service programmes should give due attention to affective and emotional as well as normative, cognitive and technical considerations. We must not assume a stereotypical view of teachers as fully "mature" persons whose only self-developmental needs are cognitive and technical. On the contrary, teachers wrestling with conflicting conceptions

of the aims and processes of education, of appropriate relationships with students, parents, colleagues and others, and of canonical theory are often vulnerable in terms of character and personality, subject to severe stress; in short they may be faced with a crisis of personality. To the extent that in-service programmes provide an empathetic, non-threatening and supportive environment many teachers can pass through the period of personality crisis with greater transparency, enhanced powers and increased confidence, which together prepare them for autonomy and professional responsibility.

There is a moral point here too. The programmes of political education and educational research will have the effect of opening up discrepancies between theory and practice, between ideal and actual, or, in the language of section 7, of intensifying the homeostatic tension between understanding and action. How is the teacher to respond authentically to his own more transparent understanding stimulated by TPA political education and research programmes? The answer, according to our analysis in section 7, is that the chances of authentic response are enhanced when there is the capacity and willingness to meet the special, urgent, personal needs for empathetic understanding, support, and specific new powers. If this element of sanctuary is lacking there will be serious "casualties" - teachers who are psychically defeated, made ill or disabled by the tensions and stresses confronting them.

PRECISE: The psychological moratorium feature serves teachers' interests but is there not a problem with the TPA providing this sort of in-service? It is argued that the TPA should monitor practice and also operate in-service programmes that are non-threatening, supportive, etc. However if a teacher is under severe stress, having difficulties coping, etc., will he not be extremely reluctant to seek

assistance from the TPA if the information the TPA gains from its intervention can be used against him in professional discipline or decertification proceedings?

LIBERAL: Yes, and your astute observation shows that the administrative and information systems for in-service and the supervision of teaching practice should be entirely separate. The teacher must have absolute security that information he provides or professional inadequacies he may reveal during in-service programmes will be unavailable to persons monitoring teaching practice. However the TPA can manage both functions provided they are administered through separate and distinct branches honouring the confidentiality of in-service information.

PRECISE: Fine. On another matter, is there not a fourth type of in-service that is extremely important, namely the dissemination of ideas, techniques and skills to improve classroom instruction?

TELEOLOGIST: There has always been a heavy demand for "nuts and bolts for Monday morning" and skills and techniques are very important but we surely do not want to teach skills and techniques as merely technical matters. The dissemination of technical expertise detached from the kind of existential and social considerations we have explored in our inquiry is unacceptable because it reinforces the conception of the teacher as a functionary and the student as ready-to-hand "stuff". So there is no justification for this fourth type of in-service if it refers to a merely technical approach but if it means skills and techniques that can be justified it is covered under the canonical research focus.

FACILITATOR: We appear to agree on the three foci for in-service education and this completes our discussion of the infrastructure of the TPA.

In our next session we address some crucial relations between teachers and local communities.

COMMENTARY: I will skip the legislative action programme because the discussion in section 32 showed this to be of little immediate importance. However there was one important point made by Solidarity and that is that when the time for legislative action to grant professional status comes the argument can and should be put as a general social ideal rather than as a special case or a demand for privileged occupational status.

35. Bargaining and community relations

COMMENTARY: I will summarize the first part of the discussion on this topic. There was some re-consideration of the objective of abolishing the employer/employee relation and replacing it with franchise/co-operative relations. This reconsideration was stimulated by concerns over the opposition such a programme would encounter from persons committed to capitalism and/or centralized control of education, and by anticipated organizational difficulties. We join Scholar in his response to these concerns.

SCHOLAR: Yes, there are difficulties on both sides of the negotiating table. Many members of the community consider the business corporation to be the model for the school system and for many the "hard-nosed" bargaining strategies of the industrial unions are the ideal basis for organizational and negotiating activity.

We should not make light of these problems. Precise has suggested that we reconsider the case for abolishing the employer/employee relationship in view of the strength of opposition, the organizational difficulties and the costs of the programme. I want to respond to this request not by some sort of cost/benefit analysis -

the opposition in some quarters will be fierce, the organizational difficulties formidable, and the costs in time, energy and resources, heavy - but by considering the alternative scenario, i.e. leaving employer/employee relations unchanged. I propose to do this by exploring four ideas and their interconnections: the industrial model of schooling; technological consciousness; the strategy of industrial unionism; and excellent teaching.

(1) The industrial model of schooling

Teleologist mentioned the period in the mid to late nineteenth century when the legislative programme of British teachers to gain practitioner control over certification was pursued and eventually failed. Throughout western Europe, North America and certain other jurisdictions this was also a period of development and expansion of public schooling.²⁰ Public schooling developed according to a particular model, based on the industrial factories, and, with the failure of the professional alternative to receive legal status, this particular model became elaborated and more and more dominant. The blueprints for this model were supplied by educational administrators, industrial management experts and educational researchers.²¹ The great strength of the industrial model was that it offered a way of bringing about widespread literacy and an improvement in the general level of education through management, systematic curriculum development, "scientific" research, pedagogical theory, comprehensive "objective" evaluation and supervision according to the latest theories of industrial, corporate or office management. What about the teachers? They are to serve as skilled functionaries. In this approach there is no question of taking the time to develop a teaching force stamped by greatness or excellence; better to stick to a more modest, predictable and controllable objective.

(2) Technological consciousness

By 'technological consciousness' I mean a mode of thinking in which aims are either taken as settled or as free value choices, meanings as unproblematic, existential questions and spiritual matters of no account; a mode of "rational problem-solving" of "common-sense" problems in a context-free, a-historical manner. Technological consciousness is closely related to the rational and scientific traditions. Much within this tradition is admirable, useful and unexceptionable. What is of concern is a total conceptual scheme which rules out as 'primitive', 'superstitious', 'irrational', 'old-fashioned' or 'meaningless' other important ways of thinking, being and relating. Here I focus on technological consciousness as a pervasive mode of thinking which has no place for wonder, deep reflexion on origins, aims, purposes, values and commitments; which reduces dialogue and conversation to the communication of information, i.e. omitting the probing and celebrating of existence.

For C. A. Bowers technological consciousness serves as an ideology, i.e. as a frame of reference for understanding the world and which, in this case, conceals from the agent his "own constitutive role as a coproducer of reality". Moreover technological consciousness assumes a subject/object dichotomy that we reject.²²

Huston Smith has many criticisms of what he calls "the modern western mind set" which are similar to Bowers'; Smith gives a good deal of attention to 'scientism', a programme designed to erode confidence in realities other than those science can handle.²³

While in no way denying the power and utility of science he argues that science cannot deal with intrinsic and normative values, purposes, global and existential meanings, and quality, i.e. in the

sense of subjective experience.²⁴ The terms 'modern', 'secular' and 'scientific' point to what the modern western mind set emphasizes and 'traditional', 'religious' and 'humanistic' to what it neglects, rejects or ignores.²⁵

How are the industrial model of schooling and technological consciousness related? Is technological consciousness a product of industrial society? Or is technological consciousness a force in the emergence of industrialism? Bowers, Smith and Heidegger are each able to trace features of this conceptual scheme back to classical Greece and there is a very strong development in this direction by the Enlightenment - a term which itself presupposes this type of thought. I can only respond to this question superficially - it is obvious that industrial schooling is compatible with technological consciousness in at least two senses: some version of industrial school is what one expects from planners and technocrats entangled in technological consciousness; for teachers and students who conduct their educational activity within industrial schools, the social structure of the school tends to establish technological consciousness as a lens through which the world is viewed - they will have difficulty in seeing technological consciousness as a particular way of looking at the world, but rather will interpret their particular world view, in which 'industrial schooling' is equated to 'education', as "everyday reality" and "common sense". As long as the thought of social agents is bound within the limits of technological consciousness it can formulate no adequately profound critique of industrial schooling. Hence the liberation of children and teachers from the stultifying effects of industrial schooling can be advanced through the critique of technological consciousness.

FACILITATOR: I am intrigued about how you plan to relate this discussion of industrial schooling and technological consciousness to industrial unionism and teaching excellence.

SCHOLAR: From the very beginning industrialism has been associated with extremely damaging consequences and side effects, especially for workers.²⁶ Many different prescriptions for solving the problem, which is indeed articulated in divergent ways, have been debated. How can we have the advantages of technological development, scientific innovation and a highly specialized and complex division of labour without paying a price of excessive disruption, human suffering, poverty, worker alienation, ecological damage, destruction of traditional culture, forms of social interaction and support, etc.? Among all the competing programmes for addressing the workers' predicament in industrial capitalism I want to focus on one:

(3) The strategy of industrial unionism

Let me say at the outset that I am using 'industrial unionism' as a technical term; 'industrial' in my usage here identifies a particular approach to union activity. I am "tightening up" on current usage although in a way consistent with the actual history of work relations.

The 'strategy of industrial unionism' is defined as an accommodatory and regulatory stance toward the political control of work; it does not challenge capitalist property relations or the employer/employee relation but seeks to regulate and control industrial relations in the interest of the worker's health, safety and economic welfare. Its principal tactic is collective bargaining backed with industrial sanctions such as strike, slow down and work to rule. On the positive side this strategy has produced improvements

in the conditions of work and the economic benefits from labour.

It is plausible that without the regulation achieved by industrial unions, i.e. leaving workers to face the capitalist labour market as individuals, workers would not be as materially well off as they now are. Clearly some form of collective union activity was and is called for. But this strategy fails to meet the workers' needs for self-development and self-realization.

The salient features of the strategy of industrial unionism are:

- (i) the presupposition of continuing the employer/employee nexus indefinitely;
- (ii) posing the problem of the workers' interests entirely in economic terms;
- (iii) pursuing workers' interests almost exclusively through the regulation of industrial relations;
- (iv) ignoring the development of personal powers and individual autonomy and placing an excessive reliance on collective actions in which the general membership is 'mobilized' and organized heteronomously;
- (v) pursuing standardization of the methods and conditions of work.

This standardization of work undermines the worker's professional autonomy and generally fails to produce job satisfaction.

PRECISE: Then why do unions pursue standardization?

SCHOLAR: Given their overall stance of accommodation they have little choice. Because this strategy merely aims at the quasi-legal regulation of the employer's prerogatives then a precise articulation of terms and conditions is required to limit effectively the employer's discretion and freedom of action but this precise

articulation reduces or eliminates the range of alternative ways of both organizing and performing work, i.e. it produces standardization. The only other course open to the union, as long as it leaves the employer/employee relation alone, is a consultative relation, i.e. leaving the employer his prerogative in the interests of flexibility and trying to persuade him to use it in the workers' interests. Which of these two approaches or which balance between them is preferable depends upon circumstances. However no variation or combination provides secure rights of professional practice.

SOLIDARITY: But many unions following something pretty close to this strategy are extremely militant in support of their members' interests. In what sense are they taking an accommodatory stance?

SCHOLAR: In the sense that they do not challenge the employer/employee relationship or capitalist property. Greed and militancy are not to be equated with a commitment to democratic social transformation and a radical reform of the political control of work.

Moreover the strategy of industrial unionism, when applied to education, does not and cannot foster teaching excellence. At best it may protect teachers from the imposition, by employers, of conditions inimical to teaching excellence. Even this task it cannot perform as simply and effectively as the franchise/co-op.

FACILITATOR: If you can tell us what you mean by 'teaching excellence' it may help us concerning our task of evaluating the school.

(4) Excellent teaching

SCHOLAR: I am not even going to try to define 'excellent teaching' in a comprehensive way here but only to make three points about it. Before I do I would like you to stop and consider your own experience; are there any teachers who stand out in your mind as excellent or

outstanding?²⁷ I tried a little "experiment" thinking about teachers I have had whom I consider excellent and I have compared notes with friends and colleagues. There were some common features such as caring about their students, being fair and having a concern for standards but the three points I want to focus on here are these:

(i) Excellent teachers are far superior to ordinary "run of the mill" teachers in stimulating learning and self-understanding.²⁸ I am primarily concerned not with a quantitative measure but with a qualitatively different order experienced by the student.²⁹

(ii) Excellent teachers connect to the authentic projects or meaning systems of their students. Generally as a student I have a vivid image of the excellent teacher; I experience the educational process with this teacher personally: the instruction connects to my meanings, my commitments; I feel "in touch" with my own project.

(iii) This connection to my personal meanings is accomplished through the character and personality of the teacher, who may be exciting and flamboyant or calm and collected or whatever. In stressing character and personality I am not positing an ideal personality type for a teacher. In my experience excellent teachers can have many different character and personality traits but they all make use of their own character and personality as a basic part of their teaching relationship with students.

If I may burden the group with another principle I propose the following principle of teaching excellence (PTE):

The excellent teacher connects his instruction to the authentic projects and personal meaning systems of his students; and does so through an authentic expression of his own character and personality. ³⁰

I also want to stress that this is not all there is to teaching; the PTE is not the principle but a principle. There is, for example, the teacher's function in organizing the "natural" environment of his students so they can learn through direct encounters with their environment.³¹ I believe that excellent teaching requires that the connection to personality be made through personality.

However industrial schooling does not recognize this principle, and this is not a contingent fact or a merely empirical finding.

PRECISE: May I interrupt? How are you applying the PTE? Does it apply to any teacher, e.g., the good ski instructor or driving instructor? Why does all good teaching have to have the powerful existential impact suggested by the PTE?

TELEOLOGIST: If we think of education along a continuum from more or less mechanical facts and skills at one end to character formation at the other, Scholar is really addressing the "character" end.

SCHOLAR: You can think of education in that way and I suppose there is a place for mechanical learning of some things but the PTE has a much wider application than Teleologist suggests. The ski instructor, in so far as he is an excellent teacher does connect with his students' personal meanings, etc. This principle is not restricted to the formation of character but applies wherever significant engagement, effort and application are called for from the student. In many cases the teaching may be excellent without the teacher making an effort to understand the personal projects of his students. For example when learners volunteer to study a particular field because it fits within their own projective understanding it makes the task of providing excellent teaching easier than otherwise.

Nevertheless my major concern with excellent teaching is with

the general citizenship and professional stages of education.

The justification for teaching excellence should be obvious - it achieves the existential aim of education for democracy.

FACILITATOR: You were at the point of relating industrial schooling to teaching excellence.

SCHOLAR: Yes. Bowers describes technological consciousness as the ideology of the New Class.³² Within the sphere of educational theory, technological consciousness is the ideology of industrial schooling, and this is still true when the metaphor shifts from the assembly line to the more current "soft" models of humane and "democratic" personnel management. As long as the problem is posed in terms of organizing, motivating and supervising a workforce, a community or a body of students to achieve the goals and objectives of central planners and managers we are still within the ideology of technological consciousness. Technological consciousness cannot recognize the PTE because neither the student's authentic project nor the teacher's character and personality can be present as components in the deliberations of central planners and technocrats. To speak in terms of 'authentic projects', 'personal meaning systems', 'character' and 'personality', from our perspective, is to imply outcomes that are unspecifiable in advance and uncontrollable by the technocrats. In so far as teaching excellence involves a capacity to establish authentic interpersonal relationships with students, to connect to the authentic projects of the students, and to do so through an authentic expression of the teacher's character and personality, it cannot be comprehended by technological consciousness which sees such ideas as quaint, fuzzy, irrational or meaningless and offers in their place "rational", "scientific" and

systematic schemas such as behavioural or performance objectives.

The strategy of industrial unionism in its drive to standardize and control through specific and minute regulation extends the industrialization of the school and reduces the scope for free and creative expression of the teacher's character and personality; not that it can ever eliminate the personal dimension which manages to carry on some form of resistance to "the system" and to assert values, meanings and commitments that transcend technological consciousness.

My discussion of excellence in teaching is not to reinforce elitism or to suggest that excellent teaching must, in the nature of the matter, continue to be rare. I agree with Solidarity that changes in the education of teachers, the conditions in which they work and the governance of the profession can greatly improve the general level of teaching excellence. But all this depends upon the transformation of the system of industrial schooling into an educational commonwealth featuring the teachers' professional association and local franchise/co-ops embedded within a democratic TAG Network. The strategy of industrial unionism not only fails to advance this goal but it moves us in the wrong direction. Accordingly the strategy of industrial unionism is contrary to the common interests of students, teachers and the community.³³

SOLIDARITY: I find it hard to believe that union activity is so contrary to the interests of workers.

SCHOLAR: It is not union activity per se but the strategy of industrial unionism. We got into this discussion when we began a debate concerning a different strategy, that of pursuing the abolition of employer/employee relations and their replacement by franchises and

teachers' co-operatives. This is a type of union activity I endorse. It is because Precise raises concerns about the difficulties and costs of the professionalization strategy that I have tried to show the unacceptable costs of sticking to the apparently less risky, more conservative strategy of industrial unionism.

PRECISE: Is there not something still to be said on the other side?

Unions can be watchful about not overdoing standardization and can concentrate on getting more resources and improved conditions such as smaller classes, more preparation time, larger budgets for books, materials and equipment. They can even bargain for teacher autonomy concerning curriculum and pedagogy.

SCHOLAR: You are pointing out that the general strategy of industrial unionism can be pursued with sensitivity and discretion and can result in improved teaching and learning conditions. I agree that a great deal can be said for such a course - but ultimately it fails.

If teachers use bargaining to achieve the franchise/co-op they are not following the strategy of industrial unionism and if they pursue the strategy of industrial unionism they will fail to achieve the rights of professional practice.³⁴ What Precise is now asking is whether nevertheless teachers are better served to forego the rights of professional practice in favour of a "deal" providing improved economic welfare and working conditions benefits. I doubt this very much. There are no plausible grounds for believing that teachers in a franchise/co-op arrangement would have inferior status with respect to economic welfare and working conditions than those who remain as employees. However, in so far as rights of autonomous, professional practice are part of the working conditions of teachers and the learning conditions of students, the advantage is

all on the side of the professional strategy.

HEART: I am pleased that Scholar raised the matter of teaching excellence.

This is very important to the self-realization of the teacher, not in a comparative sense, but in the sense that he measures up to his own standards. The dimension of self-realization cannot be collapsed into welfare; small classes, lots of preparation time and excellent materials do not translate directly into teaching excellence, and the teacher cannot be compensated for his failure to realize his own standards by an improvement in his wages and working conditions. He may accept such a "deal" but he, you and I know that it is a sell-out.

ACTION-MAN: I also reject the strategy of industrial unionism but I would appreciate greater clarity concerning the goal and general approach of the professional strategy.

SCHOLAR: Assuming that the TPA has been organized with a strong professional infrastructure the objectives in the negotiations are straightforward: to have the local trustees or stewards become the representatives of a local political jurisdiction (in an eventual TAG Network); to eliminate the bureaucratic and supervisory hierarchy; to achieve a mutually acceptable articulation of an educational franchise; to fill the franchise with a teachers' co-operative formed from teachers, administrators and supervisors who have been employed in the jurisdiction. In the franchise the local jurisdiction establishes its criteria for evaluation, i.e. its general standards for the educational programmes in its schools. Finalizing the franchise through negotiation provides for both political and professional considerations to be reconciled.

An obvious problem is the concerns for security of supervisory,

administrative and teaching employees. Beware of vendettas against individuals! Even people of exceptional commitment to social justice at the societal level can be incredibly petty or even vicious at the personal level. As a general rule there should be no terminations but on the contrary an assurance of a position, at least initially, within the teachers' co-op. Any terminations or demotions should be postponed until after the new system is in place and then only within scrupulously followed procedures of professional supervision.

While negotiations between the representatives of the teachers' union and those of the local community are proceeding it is also important for teachers to conduct discussions throughout the community because every community member has a great stake in the system of direct democratic participation we are seeking.

COMMENTARY: While in particular circumstances industrial unionism may appear to be a better short-term tactic than the professional negotiations approach, in the long run the professional strategy is better. The advantages of the educational commonwealth that can be achieved with this strategy are worth the costs and the sacrifices.

36. Democracy within the teachers' professional association

FACILITATOR: As we near the end of this inquiry I think it is important to note that we have become committed to radical and comprehensive transformations of social relations and structures, i.e. of a revolution. Accordingly there are dangers of abuse from revolutionaries as well as problems and difficulties arising from oppositional groups. In Chapter III we found that no democratic transformation of society will be achieved through the social and political action of an undemocratic vanguard. Because our analysis in this chapter has

pointed to the teachers' professional association as a crucial institution in the process of organizing an educational commonwealth, the question of the internal democracy of the TPA takes on the greatest importance.

Our mid-term goal is to establish an internally democratic TPA within an emerging educational commonwealth. In general, because the findings of Chapter III apply to the TPA, we need only highlight the key findings and then explore a few specific concerns. This limited treatment here does not imply that the issue of internal democracy is a minor matter. Our key principles are:

- (1) all members are accorded equal consideration and respect;³⁵
- (2) policy discussions are conducted on the basis of symmetrical relations of social power and are aimed to achieve the common interests of the group;³⁶
- (3) membership interactions are characterized by openness, honesty, mutual regard and trust;³⁷
- (4) the organization has rules and sanctions to prevent or punish the members' use of strategic action against one another, e.g. factions or caucases which precommit themselves to particular courses of action with respect to other members;³⁸
- (5) disciplinary matters within the group are conducted through well defined processes of procedural justice;³⁹
- (6) the organization respects the selfidual sphere of its members and in its manner of conducting programmes and activities fosters their sense of self-esteem and the development of their personal powers.⁴⁰

LIBERAL: While we agree with these findings for the TAG should we assume that they apply to the TPA? The necessity for internal democracy

within the TAG arises from the TAG's commitment to democratic social transformation but teachers' organizations are generally committed to a much more limited programme to improve economic welfare, working conditions and aspects of professional practice. Granted that a teachers' organization may redefine itself as a TAG we have not shown that it ought to. Indeed, for an individual teacher committed to democratic transformation, it may well be that political action in other spheres than his teachers' organization may be more efficacious. In their historical development teachers' unions have not been committed to either of the two basic tasks of a TAG.⁴¹ In their practices many have long traditions of factional strife and strategic action which the participants consider to be part of "the game". Therefore the debate over these principles for internal democracy is not likely to be over whether they are necessary to achieve the missions of a TAG but rather why a teachers' organization should be committed to such tasks.

SCHOLAR: If members of teachers' organizations want to work within a system of educational governance and relationships that fosters professional autonomy and teaching excellence then they have an interest, as teachers, in the internally democratic TPA. Without a TPA they lack the rights of professional practice; without internal democracy the TPA cannot justify its right to control certification and teaching practices, and is incapable of creating conditions supportive of teaching excellence.

LIBERAL: One of the principles we affirm for the TAG is membership by consent. Does it follow that in organizing an internally democratic TPA we must reject the principles of the closed or union shop? It can be argued that the union shop provision is supportive of the

economic interests of workers in the here and now.⁴²

ACTION-MAN: Within the TAG Network the worker chooses a particular profession and when he applies for certification he expresses his consent to join the professional community. If he says he wants to practise a profession without belonging to the professional association then he is either seeking a social right whilst attempting to escape the provisions for public accountability, if his argument is couched as a general right to practise, without supervision, or he is challenging the authority of the professional association to supervise his practice. If the professional association is in other respects internally democratic then the requirement of membership in the professional association as a condition of practice is justified. The consent condition would be violated, however, if workers were compelled to practise a certain profession.

However in liberal capitalism when workers or others (usually others) call for the "right to work", without joining the union, they are not usually seeking the right to work without supervision but arguing that the employer should have the sole authority to supervise work. Nevertheless being compelled to belong to a union which lacks internal democracy can give the worker a sense of tyrannic subjection. Provided that the teachers' union is internally democratic the closed shop (ideally) or the union shop (second best) is in both the members' and the community's interests.

FACILITATOR: We appear to have reached agreement on the necessity for internal democracy within the TPA. If we are satisfied to leave this discussion we may discuss the educational commonwealth's relations with the state next.

COMMENTARY: I will skip most of the rest of the discussion except for the following brief comments. One important point is that the form of networking and representation within the TPA should apply both geographical and functional principles; the geographic is needed for the programme of professional negotiations whereas the functional principle is important for certain types of canonical research. Secondly the rights of free expression and dissent are crucial for the rational development of canonical theory. This should go without saying but in the antagonistic relations of liberal capitalism there are sometimes pressures to limit the public expression of dissent by members of the TPA. In general this should be opposed and there must be no exceptions regarding the issues of canonical theory.

37. The educational commonwealth and the state

COMMENTARY: So far our discussion has rather neglected the role of the state. Having granted the local community a degree of political control over education through the local school franchise, how do we protect the teacher from excessive community control? By establishing an institution to institution rather than institution to individual relation of control with respect to the local jurisdiction, the teachers' co-operative makes the individual teacher less vulnerable. The TPA, by its authority to control the definition and interpretation of ethical and competent practice, is able to protect teachers from attempts by local jurisdictions, under the guise of rooting out misconduct and incompetence, to dismiss teachers for carrying out their professional duties with respect to critical reflexion and cosmopolitan culture. The state, through its legislative and judicial system, can represent the core values of the society as a whole in terms of social justice, civil and political rights,

social security, health, safety, etc.

If this general division of social powers and responsibilities is to advance good education the state must not only carry out its vital tasks regarding the legal regulation of the overall system of social justice but it must also butt out of those areas which are the responsibility of the community, the TPA and the teachers' co-operative. Specifically the state must not be in the business of certifying teachers, supervising teaching practice or controlling educational research. The state's involvement in the purposes and aims of education should be restricted to those which are fundamental to the core values of a democratic society. If the state attempts to determine cultural arbitraries, particular conceptions of the good or manpower targets for its economic plans and implement these programmes through state political control over education, it forfeits its moral authority to act as arbitrator or "referee" in disputes between the community and the co-operative or the community and the TPA. Indeed once it uses majoritarian power to impose values other than the core values of the FPSC it forsakes its central task of promoting and enforcing the core values of social justice and pluralistic democracy.

There is another task which is implied in the idea of a TAG Network, namely co-ordination and communications among the TPA, community organizations, labour unions and certain state agencies. Therefore it is necessary to establish co-ordinating structures that facilitate the emergence and the development of an educational commonwealth within a liberal capitalist society being transformed into an authentic democracy. A comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in the organization of the educational commonwealth, of the relations among its constituent institutions and of its protection from the action of hostile groups form an agenda for a

different study which I do not pursue here.

This chapter has argued for the organization of a TPA with a strong professional capability and has elaborated on the basic functions of a TPA of providing a psychosocial moratorium for teachers, supporting canonical research, offering in-service education and supervising teaching practice. I advocate that teachers and local communities abandon the strategy of industrial unionism and instead pursue the establishment of franchise/co-operative relations through collective negotiations. I have stressed that the proper concern of the nation-state or other central political jurisdictions regarding the governance of education is to ensure social justice and democracy.

The goal of the educational commonwealth is predicated on the vision of a better man - but not an angel. There is no assumption that man is innately or "naturally" good, or that he is infinitely malleable or infinitely perfectible. These romantic or totalitarian assumptions are too fragile and unrealistic to serve as foundations for educational and social theory. Therefore the educational commonwealth and the authentic democratic social order it presupposes provide checks and balances among parents, teachers, local communities, teachers' co-operatives, the teachers' professional associations and the central political jurisdictions. The resulting system of political control over education will foster the improvement of human character and the development of man's social and personal powers in accordance with his authentic project. The vision of an educational commonwealth is realistic and yet inspiring.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

In drawing this study to a close I highlight the main findings and comment on their significance for educational practice, educational theory and the philosophy of education. Most of the findings have some bearing on the programmes and methodologies of educational theory and the philosophy of education but I have drawn special attention to a number of them in this regard. In highlighting the findings I do not repeat the qualifications and considerations in the text but they remain important for an accurate understanding of the thesis.

(A) Foundations for Educational Evaluation

The task set at the beginning of the thesis is to develop principles and a general approach to school evaluation, i.e., to understand the basic considerations involved in educational evaluation.

It is argued that educational evaluation should be grounded in an explicit conception of man's good; these arguments not only direct the subsequent exposition of the thesis but also serve as criticisms of the vast body of literature about educational testing and evaluation which lacks this normative feature.

'I-self', a concept of human agency derived from Heidegger's 'Dasein' is used to articulate the existential dimensions of man's good. The analysis of I-self reveals man's existential nature, i.e. the project structure of his caring relationship to the world, his active agency, etc. It is argued that any adequate educational or social theory must recognize the existential aspect.

The criteria for I-self's good provide the basis for the existential

aim of education advocated. The justification for I-self's good is based on the kinds of judgments and assessments that are rational for persons to make when they reflect deeply and transparently on their circumstances. The concept of I-self's good is used throughout the thesis, in articulating principles for both social co-operation and educational evaluation.

Because a merely individual articulation of man's good is insufficient the inquiry addresses social co-operation. I-self's good is coherently connected to the fundamental principle for social co-operation (FPSC) advocated. Rather than a mere summing of separate considerations there is an integration of ideas concerning the individual, society and educational policy at a fundamental level.

The FPSC fills in the social "gap" left by the preliminary formulation of man's good in individual, existential terms. Given that human beings engage in critical reflexion together to find a mutually agreeable, mutually beneficial principle for social co-operation, i.e. openly, honestly, authentically, rationally, etc., the FPSC is that principle. Between them 'I-self's good' and 'the FPSC' provide the foundations for the two basic aims of education:

1. the self-development of each individual in accordance with his own authentic project;
2. the formation of the character, dispositions, virtues, powers, knowledge, understandings and skills for democratic citizenship.

Moreover, 'the FPSC' is used repeatedly in subsequent analyses of social co-operation, work, education and the basic approaches to the political control over education.

Educational evaluation procedures should adhere to certain principles regarding the relationships between and among the participants. Among these is the requirement that the normative commitments and presuppositions

of the evaluation be transparent and explicit. However it is noted that within liberal capitalist societies the ethical and political valuations underlying evaluation practices tend to be concealed.¹

(B) Social Transformation

Because the possibilities which human beings can actually choose and implement are always limited by their circumstances and the pervasive effects of the basic structure of their society, I-self's good, the FPSC, and the basic educational aims derived from them would tend to express a utopian character, in the sense of being unrealistic or disconnected from current possibilities, unless the inquiry addresses the issues of existing possibilities, facticity and social structuration. It is the concept of social transformation which brings the visionary and the practical into coherent connection. However it also prompts a disagreement with John Rawls' programme for social justice based on idealized agents in an "original position" establishing a basic social structure in perpetuity. Accordingly I argue for a conception of social justice which includes the equal distribution of categorial power among all actual citizens, i.e., of the power to shape the basic structure of society through an ongoing series of social transformations, generation after generation.

The distinction between 'categorial power' and other forms of power such as 'authority' and 'social freedom' is a fundamental idea, which, although articulated in a different way, has been stimulated by Basil Bernstein's work.² The idea of categorial power allows the thesis to deal with principles for the basic structure of society using actual agents in the here and now rather than Rawls' imaginary agents in the original position; however it does not offer a programme for realizing social justice in a generation or two but rather a test for how close a

society is to the realization of a just basic structure. The thesis argues that any organization of the basic structure of society that actual human agents who have equal categorial power actually agree to, under conditions of open, undistorted and rational deliberation, etc., is just.

Having established that social justice is to be accomplished through ongoing social transformations, it is necessary to assess, at least in general terms, the current situation and this is done for liberal capitalist societies. The most important finding is that liberal capitalism provides certain vital democratic rights and freedoms but because it conceptually implies employer/employee relations, social classes and meritocracy it cannot realize a fully authentic democracy.

However the goal of good education for everyone can only be reached within a society with a just basic structure, i.e., which is democratic and classless. The commitment to good education generates a prima facie case for the transformation of liberal capitalist societies into authentic democracies.

The vehicle for accomplishing this transformation is the transformative action group (TAG). A TAG is an actual organization of actual human beings and it is guided by two basic tasks:

- (1) to transform categorial power relations in the wider society in accordance with the FPSC:
- (2) to foster the good of each member of the TAG in the here and now.

The TAG serves as a defensible form of institution for dealing with power relations in society. Power relations are inescapable and institutions are the forms through which the basic structure of a society manifests its limits and constraints on the power relations experienced by individuals and groups. Within the thesis the term 'TAG' serves two main functions: as an institutional device for bringing about a just and democratic society;

and as a shorthand way to refer to a set of principles for democratic and just relations among persons within an actual face-to-face organization. These principles are elaborated in terms of the interpersonal relations, communication processes and power relations of the members.

(C) Democracy

Chapter III is primarily concerned with the issue of internal democracy within a TAG although its first significant finding relates to both of its basic tasks. In the pursuit of democratic ends agents must use democratic means. It is argued that democratic social transformation is not to be effected through the undemocratic imposition of a new social order. This finding involves the rejection of both the dictatorship of a "revolutionary vanguard" and "benevolent" state paternalism - even by a parliamentary or congressional majority.

In an authentic democracy citizens are able to pursue their individual and common interests authentically, at a number of levels, with their co-citizens. However our analysis of 'interests' argues that interests are not simply "out there" but are constructed and apprehended through deliberation. Furthermore groups only find their common interests when their deliberations are characterized by open and undistorted communications, symmetrical power relations, fraternal interactions, trust, mutual respect and a commitment to the search for truth and goodness through rational procedures. To create and maintain these conditions for internal democracy TAGs must exercise collective discipline backed by coercive sanctions.

Within the wider society, certain conditions supportive of internal democracy for TAGs are: basic social freedoms concerning speech, the press, association, etc.; guarantees for a selfidual sphere in which individuals have substantial personal autonomy concerning significant

aspects of their life projects; an educational system that fosters autonomous agency and communal critical reflexion.

(D) The TAG Network

Chapter IV articulates a mid-term goal for the basic structure of society to improve the categorial conditions for human participation in and enjoyment of citizenship, work and culture. Constraining the formulation of this goal are twelve specific principles including support for cultural pluralism and for individuals participating in the determination of the policies affecting them as citizens, workers and members of particular cultural communities, and rejection of social classes, meritocracy and employer/employee relations.

Just as the TAG stands for both the institutional embodiment of internal democracy and the principles for conducting the affairs of face-to-face organizations, the TAG Network represents both the institution for realizing the mid-term goal for the basic structure of society and the particular principles which should guide social transformation. The main features of the TAG Network are: a pyramidal approach to political representation along three tracks - citizenship, work and culture; legislative authority exercised directly by citizens aided by a telecommunications system; franchises, workers' co-operatives and professional associations.

The basic problem which the TAG Network addresses is the reconciliation of popular political accountability, worker autonomy and cultural pluralism. Each of these values is vital. However the capitalist/worker nexus, which is a particular manifestation of employer/employee relations, imposes undesirable limits on worker autonomy. Additionally the liberal capitalist approach is inconsistent with popular control over legislation. Our analysis shows that there is no satisfactory solution to the problem

of reconciling these three values in a social system organized on liberal capitalist principles. This has several implications for researchers in the field of educational governance, i.e. the political control of education and in areas within this field such as teacher accountability. Does the researcher take cognizance of each of the three values? What assumptions or explicit postulates does he make concerning the basic structure of social relations? If, for example, he assumes that liberal capitalism should be the social context in which the issue of teacher accountability is to be situated how does he avoid muddle and confusion?

The finding that professional status for workers, including teachers, is required for the just and democratic organization of the basic structure of society is argued at length. This should not be an original finding - it is too basic, too obvious and too important to be original - and perhaps for these reasons it has not been considered worth mentioning. However, as George Polya once said concerning good teaching, it is often wise to emphasize the obvious. Regardless of the reasons it appears that the finding is original, at least in its emphasis and the way it is integrated with other social principles.

The underlying idea for grounding good practice in the collegial judgments of practitioners can be found in Marx and Heidegger but I think that interesting and original use of this idea is achieved in discussing the political control of work. The ways in which practitioners are categorized within the social division of labour and the powers and authority they receive through the organization of the basic structure of society determine their possibilities for developing sound theory and for improving practice. The same conditions of internal democracy which we articulate in Chapter III respecting common interests and political

deliberation also apply to the sphere of work. This is basically why a single track system of political control, such as that advocated by Solidarity, in which workers are employees of the state, is unacceptable.

I conclude that the TAG Network is a satisfactory mid-term solution to the problem of reconciling popular political accountability, worker autonomy and cultural pluralism; it is just and democratic.

(E) The Political Control over Education

I argue that public education should shape the character, virtues, dispositions, attitudes, etc., of children; but to be legitimate this deliberate public intervention must be restricted to the core values necessary for justice and democracy. The distinction between core values and cultural arbitraries is fundamental. Bereiter attempts to draw an important distinction but it should not be drawn on the basis of 'character' versus 'skills' or 'education' versus 'training' but on that of core values versus cultural arbitraries.³

However it is not enough to draw the correct distinction - one must propose some approach to political control and some structure of basic institutions to realize it. This is achieved within the proposed TAG Network by having the nation-state and/or other central level jurisdictions take responsibility for the enforcement and promotion of the core values. The actual teaching and the determination of learning objectives, curriculum, school organization, pedagogy and evaluation is left to the local jurisdictions, teachers' co-operatives and professional association. However the central bodies supervise these bodies with respect to social justice, i.e. they intervene if and only if non-intervention would be contrary to justice. Generally an appropriate balance between community and cosmopolitan culture and between local autonomy and wider social justice should be achieved by this arrangement.

One of the most damaging aspects of the inappropriate system of political control over education in liberal capitalism is the approach to testing, grading and evaluating students. The study argues that these processes arise from the meritocratic commitments of the system which are strongly pressed by the "New Class". But meritocratic values cannot be reconciled with education for democracy. For this as well as other reasons previously argued I conclude that with regard to "purely educational considerations" and aside from its other social advantages, the TAG Network offers vastly superior categorial conditions for the conduct of educational activity.

Here I briefly mention that the study makes a number of important recommendations with supporting arguments regarding the three basic stages of education, their different forms of political control and how these considerations relate to parental trusteeship and the status of the family. Concerning the autonomous stage of citizenship education and its "liberal arts" approach there has been a long tradition of scholarly opposition to mixing professional studies with the liberal arts programme and so there is nothing original about the finding. Nevertheless the type of justification offered in terms of the transfer of trusteeship from the parent to the student, the opportunity for the student to take a more detached perspective on the culture of his community and society, and, above all, the purpose of preparation for autonomous citizenship within a democratic society is more satisfactory than those generally offered, especially those which appeal to elitism, meritocratic values or to the intrinsic values of the activities in a reified fashion.⁴

(F) The Educational Commonwealth and the Teachers' Professional Association

Consistently with the argument for ongoing social transformation I argue that the way to accomplish a TAG Network system of governance of education is to organize, maintain and develop an "educational commonwealth", based on TAG Network principles, within liberal capitalist societies. This idea is explored and tested in Chapter VI.

The first priority in establishing the educational commonwealth is the organization of a teachers' professional association (TPA) with a "strong professional capability". This capability is articulated in terms of: developing an effective canonical research capability; providing in-service programmes that educate and train organic intellectuals among the teacher practitioners; establishing the organizational and administrative capability to monitor and supervise teaching practice in advance of the TPA gaining the legal authority with respect to control over certification and teaching practice; providing a "psychosocial moratorium" for teachers - a "safe place" where teachers can develop skills and powers for a future professional relationship and be protected from the counter pressures arising from their positions within the existing system of education.

The analysis of the classification of practitioners with respect to a particular profession and the related inquiry into the division of labour within a profession are original and the implications are drawn concerning the supervision of teaching practice, the education of teachers and the conduct of educational research. It is argued that the FPSC implies democratic self-governance of work and this principle is elaborated through three theorems which taken together define legitimate authority regarding judgments about teaching practice. The

general finding is that the system through which decisions about certification, decertification and professional discipline are to be made should be controlled by a professional association which has internal democracy; specifically that the TPA should have the sole authority in this sphere. This is another finding at odds with the conventional view.

Importantly, the argument for this finding, although sketchy, addresses the issue of authority relationships in education (and other fields of professional practice) at a fundamental level; it specifically rejects as circular any programme that grounds legitimate authority ultimately in a conception of knowledge which is detached from practice. Moreover, the internally democratic community of practitioners provides the setting most congenial to the rational development of knowledge based on practice. This is a crucial issue which deserves attention from philosophers because it suggests that there is a much closer connection between epistemology and political philosophy than is commonly supposed.^{5, 6}

The analysis of canonical theory and research is pursued through the basic ideas of the primacy of practice and the necessity for democratic deliberation procedures. Indeed it picks up a connection which has been stressed by both Richard Peters and John Dewey of the relationship between democracy and rationality.⁷ It also raises a problem which has had little, if any, attention in the educational literature, namely the basic and inescapable tension in which the issues of due process for teachers, professional discipline and free inquiry in the development of canonical theory are situated. Against the backdrop of this problem the distinctions among 'mandatory core', 'core' and 'disputed territory' are highly significant. If these findings are anywhere near the mark it is important for educational researchers to appreciate this problem and

recognize such distinctions in their work.

The question of the risks, costs and benefits of pursuing the abolition of employer/employee relations through teacher unions shifting from the accommodatory stance of industrial unionism to a strategy involving collective negotiations and social and political action to convert these relations into franchise co-operative ones is discussed in some detail. It is argued that the strategy of industrial unionism cannot foster teaching excellence. This finding depends upon the principle that the excellent teacher connects his instruction to the personal meanings of his students and does so through an authentic expression of his own character and personality. I conclude that generally the professional strategy better serves the interests of students, teachers and community than that of industrial unionism - certainly over the long term.

Other specific findings relate to matters such as the importance of specialist associations within the TPA, the rejection of mandatory in-service education as a general condition for continuing certification, the importance of internal democracy to the TPA - including the necessity for free inquiry and expression and the right to dissent in public, and the need for co-ordinating structures among the TPA, community organizations, labour unions and certain state agencies.

(G) Educational Research and Theory

Another finding with important implications for educational theory is that the basic existential and social aims of education should be elaborated in terms of the relationships between and among the participants prior to the formulation of learning objectives, curriculum designs, pedagogical principles and techniques for evaluation. An examination of the educational literature shows that this principle is honoured far

more in the breach (Freire, Gramsci and Bowers being conspicuous exceptions). I point out the authoritarian dangers in practice of those inquiries which ignore the social context, political control, power relationships and communication processes. Because I argue a *prima facie* case for thinking that theorizing in the "mainstream" tradition, which does ignore or underplay the foregoing considerations, has authoritarian presuppositions, the thesis challenges researchers in the mainstream tradition to justify their research agendas and methods.

Because the political relationships and communication processes relating educational researchers and teacher practitioners are so unsatisfactory there is not the appropriate grounding of educational theory in teaching practice. Only when educational researchers join with teacher practitioners and other educational officers to build a united teaching profession with internal democracy will there be the categorial conditions for good practice in both teaching and educational research.

Another point concerns the literature on personnel management and organization development which discusses workers' job satisfaction and organizational effectiveness in both educational, business and industrial settings. As a general rule this literature does not situate the discussion within the context of the basic structure of society and the categorial power relations of the participants. The critique of the "enlightened management" approach, which helps to establish the case for workers' co-operatives, franchises and professional associations, is obliquely a criticism of most of the research and theory in the field of personnel management and organizational effectiveness and a call to the researchers to address their subject in a more profound way.

(H) The Philosophy of Education

This inquiry uses philosophical methods in articulating a positive thesis concerning the appropriate foundation for educational evaluation and in criticizing the existing system of political control over education. But are the uses I make of 'institutions' and 'strategies' philosophical? If these analyses concerning the existing control over education are correct then the only way to carry forward the argument about principles for evaluation is to articulate and justify a visionary set of institutions. Furthermore the idea of social justice conceived in terms of ongoing social transformation rather than a static social order is reached through philosophical analysis and in its turn generates the relevance of 'strategies', as sets of principles for social transformation. But how can a discussion of strategies be philosophical? Static principles are appropriate for static conceptions of social justice and educational aims whereas strategic principles are the proper analogue for dynamic ideas about these matters.

I think that it is appropriate for philosophers of education to criticize the agendas and methods used in educational research. (I do not suggest that this is their sole or most important function.) In this regard the thesis makes an original contribution to the philosophy of education by its fundamental criticism of the agendas and research programmes of "mainstream" educational theory.

The study also challenges the practices of those philosophers of education who conduct their inquiries on the basis of assumed social institutions. Unfortunately, this is the common practice and even Richard Peters, who is much more aware of and sensitive to the issue of the social and political context, authority relationships, etc., than is typical, pursues an argument on equality in education on the

assumption of the continuation of the class relations in contemporary capitalist societies.⁸ The limits of possible and feasible results and processes within capitalism are quite different from those within an authentic democracy. For example, his argument that his conception of educational equality for children requires undesirable forms of state intervention is flawed by his assumption of the continuation of capitalism - but this is precisely what is in dispute for at least some of the egalitarians he criticizes.⁹ If the thesis is correct in this analysis it can no longer, if it ever was, be considered worthy of serious philosophy of education to leave the basic institutional framework and social context of education unexamined.

(I) Summation

In conclusion, I have followed an ancient tradition, going back to Plato's Republic, of tightly linking educational philosophy, social and political philosophy and a vision of the good for man. I have tried to achieve coherence, despite the wide scope of the thesis, through the connected ideas of I-self's authentic project, the grounding of practical and moral judgment in the existential predicament, the primacy of practice, and democratic communications and power relations. The broad compass of the thesis creates problems - I have often raised issues or sketched arguments that warrant considerably more discussion, and the reader faces challenges in following all the many branches of such a wide ranging argument (although it is hoped that the dialogic device somewhat eases this difficulty); however there are advantages too because I have been able to address major policy issues, e.g. curriculum control, teacher accountability, centralization/decentralization, teacher professionalism/unionism, multi-culturalism, etc., in addition to the original concern of educational evaluation. These various policy issues are situated within

an integrated context because the inquiry is grounded in our most fundamental valuations of the true, the good and the just.

I have been concerned to give a broad world map to guide inquiry into education¹ evaluation and the political control over education in a way that reveals those other considerations which are most pertinent. This general impressionistic approach has its merits as has that of the map-maker concentrating on the detailed features of Bloomsbury. Yet in another sense I have been much more specific than is usual - concerning my presuppositions about the good for man and my vision for society - making it easier for others to agree or disagree with them. To return to the beginning, the presuppositions of educational evaluation inevitably raise moral and political issues that call for philosophical justification. This thesis has attempted to probe those issues.

HOMEOSTATIC TENSIONS

Let us break in on these tensions at a particular point, say when autonomy reveals inauthentic features of I-self's project, e.g. diagram 2.2 to explore the explanatory power of these concepts of homeostatic tension. Authenticity calls I-self through the homeostatic tension between understanding and action to alter her project. However, to carry out her new project she requires certain powers. If these are available and mobilized she proceeds to restore equilibrium by engaging in an authentic project; she is under way in the process of self-realization. What if she lacks the appropriate powers? Among a number of possibilities three are particularly salient:

- (1) I-self re-defines her project as a 'tragic destiny' in which knowing she lacks the power to accomplish her vision, or not seeing any way to attain it, she remains faithful to her vision, spurns compromise, refuses to delude herself that her action is efficacious and is consoled in that while her praxis must fail she has kept her soul and her identity.¹

According to our interpretation the tragic destiny is not authentic because it lacks efficacy. For a particular person in a particular situation it may be the best choice available. Despite a certain admirable nobility in having the resolve to choose truth with suffering over compromise the tragic destiny is not the best choice conceivable.

- (2) I-self retreats from autonomy by disclaiming responsibility for what she has not the power to accomplish. As in (1) she cannot

avoid suffering as long as understanding and action are incongruent and so she flies away from autonomy until her understanding has been made congruent with her action through a reification of her consciousness. The self-deceptions inherent in this option can be functional in the preservation of life and the reduction of suffering but they also are stumbling blocks to gaining the missing power. This choice can eventually become, at best, a sort of pseudo authenticity, an "I'm all right Jack" approach to life, e.g. diagram 2.1; more typically it is a bearable existence - and a sell-out!

- (3) I-self redefines her project in terms of gaining the power she lacks. In doing so she may gain the powers for her project and get under way authentically; however she may also experience a displacement in which power becomes her aim, end and vision. Therefore this choice, which may work, also places her whole existence in peril. As a result she can utterly lose her self in the quest for power as an idol.

These possibilities might be interpreted as choices sitting before individuals and, to a limited extent, they are, bearing in mind that specific features of the predicament may reduce or even rule out significant choice. However, and more importantly, they also need to be interpreted as "theory" to guide the transformative social action of collective groups seeking social arrangements which provide all individuals with authentic possibilities.

The analysis of homeostatic tension might be misconstrued as a sort of introspective psychology or alternatively as some theory based on uncited research findings: it is neither. The theory has undoubtedly been affected by my reading of the research literature in psychology

and other fields but no particular citation comes to mind as basic. What has been significant are conversations and interactions with teachers and students over many years, particularly a tour of Australian schools in 1974; observation of "focus groups" in Canada in which small groups of teachers and parents discussed and debated educational issues with intense involvement - often sharing personal experiences; and working with colleagues who have a commitment to personal growth and development. I believe it was during the Australian tour that I first noted that radical changes in educational philosophy, teaching practice and personal commitments were brought about through a crisis of personal identity followed by a period (often lengthy) of self-transformation. In retrospect some of the crises were triggered by failures in or challenges to praxis, e.g. the teacher who after ten years' teaching experience went to a new system in a new country in which schools lacked the materials that were basic to her teaching method - this triggered a radical re-evaluation which continued for a decade (at least). Other crises were initiated by emptiness in the vision, e.g. the man who, in desperation, decided radically to change his teaching over a six-month period and quit if it did not work ('work' meaning that he would see his efforts connected to a worthy vision). Dwayne Huebner, of Teachers College Columbia, helped me to articulate a growing sense that "scientific psychology" seriously misrepresents and distorts psychic life. The striking similarities between these experiences and reports of religious conversion was the central idea which I have attempted to understand.

I have not been looking for a theory to predict what people will do and which is to be confirmed by suitably "controlled" experiments but for schemata which agents concerned to understand and change social conditions will find revealing and useful. The psychological "facts"

incorporated in the theory are available to readers through reflection on their own experiences. If the schemata on homeostatic tensions and the related analyses are helpful in the reflexive monitoring by some real agents they will have been justified.

OBJECTIONS TO A PRELIMINARY FORMULATION OF A
PRINCIPLE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Given the principle, "social co-operation should be so organized that it advances the good of every person, considered equally and impartially".

It may be objected that this principle of equality neglects or ignores individual differences. While some conceptions of equality are incompatible with an appropriate recognition of individual differences this objection does not hold concerning our principle, which does not advocate that all individuals have the same experiences, receive identical treatment or pursue the same projects but that they are all entitled to equal consideration of their good.

Differential claims to the benefits of social co-operation have been rationalized on a number of bases:

- (a) differences in the role, position, status or function of persons within the system of social co-operation, e.g. doctor, politician, capitalist, worker;
- (b) differences in age, sex or race which may or may not be correlated with positioning within the system of social co-operation;
- (c) allegedly intractable differences in features or character such as intelligence, courage, size, appearance or temperament;
- (d) differences in merit, desert or contribution;
- (e) personal preferences or needs.

Now (a) already pre-supposes a particular system of social co-operation but no system of social co-operation can serve as its

own justification. Both the assignment of an individual to a position, function, role or status and the consequences to that individual require justification. Using (a) we can never get reasonable answers to questions such as, "On what basis is X a capitalist and Y a worker?" "Why should a doctor receive more social resources than a labourer?" Why should certain persons, groups or occupations have more power and resources than others?"

Concerning (d), 'merit', 'desert' or 'contribution' require grounding. How can a person's contribution to a system of social co-operation be assessed, in principle, independently of the outcomes the system is intended to produce? Like (a), (d) "puts the cart before the horse". For merit, contribution or desert to stand as objections to our principle, each must be grounded by some alternative conception of appropriate outcomes.

With respect to (b), (c) and (e) what relevance could any of these differences have to the validity of our principle? Age, sex and certain other differences may well have a bearing on the particular ways in which persons pursue or experience their good but they do not provide a basis for preferring one person over another. To be I-self is to have a claim to I-self's good. Perhaps some would argue that being human comes in degrees and that differences such as those in (b), (c) and (e) establish degrees of humanity. If so they will be required to offer a demonstration of this notion. A more likely interpretation is that these sorts of differences are used to rationalize arbitrary privileges which cannot be impartially justified.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF A LIMITED SPHERE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

At this point we want to make two main points:

- (A) that I-self's good requires that there be a sphere of social justice embodied in positive law;
- (B) that this sphere of social justice must be limited so that there is a region of social life embodying love and fraternity in which principles of social justice have no direct application.

In brief our first task is to demonstrate that I-self's good calls for principles of social justice to be enacted into legal statutes which are applied through regular and impartial procedures of administration backed with coercive sanctions. With respect to welfare H. L. A. Hart articulates five truisms each providing a reason why, given survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific content. "...without such a content laws and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating with each other".² A synopsis of his discussion of these truisms follows:

- (1) human vulnerability requires forbearances, which are usually formulated as prohibitions, that restrict the use of violence in killing or inflicting bodily harm, e.g. "Thou shalt not kill";
- (2) approximate equality (in strength and power) of individual agents creates a necessity for a system of mutual forbearance and compromise; (Hart means that without the co-operation of others, no individual is sufficiently powerful to be secure from unrestrained aggression of others).

- (3) limited altruism - because people are neither angels nor devils a system of forbearances becomes both necessary and possible. For angels, rules requiring forbearances would not be necessary; for devils, "prepared to destroy, reckless of the cost to themselves, they would be impossible";
- (4) limited resources - the fact that persons need food, clothes and shelter that are not ready-to-hand in limitless abundance but are scarce, have to be grown or won from nature or constructed by human labour provides a reason for at least a minimal form of property and hence for laws regulating the use of resources. Furthermore the division of labour creates a need for dynamic rules regulating transfer, exchange or sale of goods, services and resources. Because of the dynamic nature of these interactions promises need to be recognized as a source of obligations. People require confidence in the future behaviour of others to ensure the predictability necessary for co-operation;
- (5) limited understanding and strength of will - neither understanding of long-term interest, nor the strength or goodness of will which are required for people to obey laws, are shared by all men alike. "All are tempted at times to prefer their own immediate interests and, in the absence of a special organization for their detection and punishment, many would succumb to the temptation." While we may speculate to what extent agents growing up and working in just and supportive circumstances may in fact have a full understanding of their long-term interests and sufficient strength of will, prudence suggests that we do not underestimate the pervasiveness of temptations to break laws under the most varied forms of social organization. There are good grounds for agreeing with Hart that

not only does I-self benefit from just law but also from coercive sanctions to enforce compliance.

...except in very small closely-knit societies, submission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were no organization for those who would then try to obtain the advantages of the system without submitting to its obligations. 'Sanctions' are therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not.

Hart says,

...what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system,

which is similar to C. D. Ovens' precept, "mutual coercion, mutually applied".³

It is worth stressing that 'autonomy' does not mean independence: autonomy is compatible with mutual relations;

it is also compatible with constraint and even coercion. To be autonomous is to choose the basic principles and rules regulating one's life. As Hart's discussion shows it is rational for I-self to agree to a coercively enforced system of social justice and this agreement can be made by autonomous decision.

So far our arguments for positive legal enactment of principles of social justice have been based on welfare considerations but self-realization also requires law. In order to realize his ownmost potentiality-for-being I-self requires the powers, freedoms and resources to monitor his ongoing flow of actions, to set goals and objectives, to make plans and to organize and implement these plans. While excessive constraint and minimal freedom are incompatible with self-realization many sorts of constraint on his own actions are no impediment to I-self's self-realization.

On the other side, could I-self exist authentically without law?

Without law it is unlikely, following Hart, that there would be regular, public principles governing social co-operation. Such circumstances would undermine the scope of I-self's reflexive monitoring of actions; the lack of predictability in social relations would result in I-self's powers being weak and erratic. By the argument in section 7 this would reduce his stewardship and weaken his responsible agency; hence both his autonomy and authenticity would be subverted.

In view of the advantages of a legally enacted system of social justice there may be superficial grounds for seeking indefinite expansion of the scope of social justice but this would be counter-productive for a number of reasons, only a few of which I will develop.

There are aspects of social co-operation which are necessary for self-development and authentic being-with-others which cannot be fitted within the category of social justice. Our basic point here is that there are actions which persons should perform for their own good but which they should not or cannot be compelled to perform. Imagine a society which has a perfect system of social justice but which lacks love, friendship and fraternity. Is such a society possible? If so could we have authentic being-with-others?; self-development?; a continuing society? By love and friendship we refer to relationships which are both personal and special but 'justice' suggests impartiality and while impartiality is compatible with personal relationships it is incompatible with special relationships. Therefore it appears conceptually possible to have justice without love or friendship. The likelihood that it is impossible to have a just society without plentiful relations of love and friendship actually reinforces our point that while love and friendship are conceptually distinct from social justice, they are essential for any viable system of social co-operation.

It is also likely that self-esteem and a sense of personal security cannot be ensured through a reliance on justice. The sense of self-esteem and personal security are developed through the unconditional (in the sense of negotiated conditions) love and fraternal support of other I-selves. Infants and children require love and care from one or more adults on a continuing basis. It does not appear possible to ensure that this continued commitment can be achieved through principles of social justice.

Another consideration is that our commitment to autonomy requires that I-self in fact determine the laws under which he chooses to be bound. To meet this condition he must be involved in constitutional deliberation, legislation and executive activity. Now it is clearly not feasible for each person to be involved in detailed legislation of all the rules governing the actions of all people in a social system involving many persons. Only if each I-self is involved in the deliberations concerning a limited range of laws, for the overall social system and for particular features crucial to his plans and interests can his autonomy be fostered. This programme is unlikely to be accomplished unless:

- (1) the system of legislation and administration of social justice is decentralized;
- (2) the system of social justice is a limited sphere within the social order;
- (3) the laws and rules are simple and restricted in number.

A last point is that each I-self needs a sphere of privacy, which we shall call a selfidual sphere and which is elaborated in section 19. This requires limitations on the scope of social justice to ensure that each I-self has stewardship with respect to a set of personally significant responsibilities. It can be argued that it is precisely a system

of social justice which can ensure these spaces. I do not quarrel with this formulation but only wish to stress that this self-limiting feature is essential to social justice in an authentic democracy.

POSITIVIST THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Many theorists of distributive justice assume that or argue for the possibility of an "objective", "scientific", i.e. positivistic, determination of the value of human labour and/or of the products and resources exchanged in market interactions between sellers and buyers. In effect they argue that values can be determined independently of the processes of deliberation engaged in by human beings existentially exploring their good and interests. In this appendix I dispute this view and criticize the two main theories which, by purporting to solve the problem of exchange values in social co-operation try to place the determination of distributive justice on a positivistic footing. Then I sketch a general argument why any positivistic theory of distributive justice is unsatisfactory in principle.

The two theories are the labour theory of value and the market theory of value. Prior to considering the labour theory of value we need to define 'labour'. We stipulate that labour is a dimension of work; to the extent that work produces goods, services or resources for social exchange, i.e. to the degree that the work is traded for goods, services, resources or money we call it 'labour'. In so far as work does not partake in social exchange it is not labour. For example, a painting or poem is the product of work but only becomes the product of labour if sold or traded.⁴ Wages are characterized by the exchange relationship which is the criterion we are claiming distinguishes 'labour' from 'work'.

The labour theory of value asserts that the value of goods, services or resources is determined by the labour content or, in Marx's version,

by the socially necessary amount of labour power for their production.⁵ Karl Marx's work has been among the most influential in the whole field of social theory. Marx did appreciate the importance of demand in the genesis of exchange values.⁶ However Marx's conception of 'labour' is much wider than ours. He writes:

Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord states, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature.... By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal.... We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human.⁷

Hence 'labour' for Marx corresponds, more or less, to our concept of 'social action'.⁸

Our concern here is not to criticize Marx's theory of exchange value but rather a positivist account that asserts that exchange values are determined by labour (in our sense of "labour"). The difficulty with Marx's analysis is that while on the one hand he accounts for the determination of exchange values through the whole range of social actions that produce a given system of social co-operation on the other hand the term 'labour' will tend to be interpreted much more narrowly by most people who may see his theory as providing a basis for particular claims based on contribution.

The labour theory of value draws our attention to the fact that the goods, services, resources and conditions for welfare, self-development, self-realization and authentic being-with-one-another are provided through labour. Labour explains how the things we prize are generally created and reveals aspects of their relative exchange values but it cannot provide the sole explanation of why we prize what we do. To explain

exchange value one must consider the intentions and motivations of those who wish to receive a particular commodity or item in exchange. Hence market theory or the theory of supply and demand is also relevant to the determination of exchange values. The market theory of value attempts to explain exchange values through an analysis of supply and demand and the degree of freedom or constraint of the market, or processes of exchange.

How is supply, i.e. abundance or scarcity to be explained? Some things, e.g. precious metals and stones are scarce by nature but for the most part supply results from the social actions of human beings. To a substantial degree supply reflects conscious judgments about value. Particularly in capitalist markets labour and capital are shifted to where profit expectations are higher, resulting in supply altering in accordance with perceptions of exchange values. While exchange values are affected by the dynamic equilibrium between supply and demand it appears that 'demand' is the more fundamental idea in that supply decisions can be explained in terms of the valuations of potential purchasers and users. To a certain extent what we prize follows from contingent facts about "human nature" in so far as we are present-at-hand-in-the-world, e.g. fresh air, clean water, nutritious food, shelter from the elements etc. However most of our judgments of value arise through acquired tastes: through initiation into certain forms of life; through education; through the patterns of social co-operation which we produce through our social actions. 'Demand', at best, represents a one dimensional reduction of this range of evaluations. At worst, it conceals the fact that the preferences and evaluations of buyers in the market for the products of social co-operation are not given but are themselves produced in the system of social co-operation.

But demand is not the independent variable some economists make it: 'supply and demand presuppose the existence of different classes and sections of classes which divide the total revenue of a society and consume it among themselves as revenue, and therefore, make up the demand created by revenue'.⁹

Man's good and his interests are existentially revealed to him in the conduct of his individual and collective projects, a matter we discuss in sections 15 and 16. Because the "value" of labour and other commodities cannot be determined independently of the existential revelation of good and interests, no merely positivistic account can "explain" exchange values or form an adequate basis of a theory of distributive justice.

REPLICATION VERSUS DIFFERENTIATION IN
THE DIVISION OF SOCIAL ACTIONS

It is useful to assess some of the advantages and disadvantages of functional differentiation in relation to replication of function. We will begin by focusing on work and then introduce cultural and political action. The differentiation of function has the potential to:

- (a) develop a greater store of powers, particularly knowledge, expertise and skill, i.e. for the social collectivity, but not necessarily for each individual;
- (b) concentrate these powers on functions for which they are peculiarly appropriate; hence
- (c) carry out much more complex projects than would be possible through replication of function; hence
- (d) produce a greater variety and quantity of goods, services and resources, i.e. accomplish a greater productivity of work; hence
- (e) continually upgrade the capacity of the mediating elements, i.e. resources, powers and language to support the realization of the good of everyone; this is only the positive side but, in addition:
- (f) people tend to know less and less about the work of most of their fellows;
- (g) there is a tendency for the scale of operations to become much larger;
- (h) as a result of (f) and (g) the social actions of I-selves tend to become increasingly opaque to their understanding, i.e. I-selves become mystified by the mysterious features of their social action; hence

- (i) reflexive monitoring of action is more difficult; more precisely, it is less likely that agents' evaluations of their social action will be sufficiently transparent and resolute to constitute critical reflexion; hence
- (j) I-self's self-realization is subverted;
- (k) because of (f) to (j) there will tend to be a decline in fraternity and an undermining of authentic being-with-one-another;¹⁰ hence
- (l) there will be tendencies towards relations of domination/dependence;
- (m) there will tend to be distortions in communications and discourse;¹¹
- (n) in addition to these sorts of concerns the web of interdependencies makes the whole system vulnerable to dysfunction or failure in one part of it, e.g. global crises in the economies of nations, the threats of nuclear destruction and pollution; when we turn to consider radical differentiation of function in the fields of political and cultural action then,
- (o) there is a tendency to make or apply rules and norms that serve only particular groups rather than all persons;
- (p) there is a propensity to use cultural activity, education and communication to mystify consciousness and to support relations of domination/dependence;
- (q) for reasons such as those in (f) to (p), agents in highly differentiated systems of social co-operation will generally find that their realization of the good will be highly unequal and they will collectively have little control over the processes of social transformation.

We conclude this appendix by noting that limitations have to be placed on the extent of functional differentiation if a system of social co-operation is to be in accordance with the FPSC. The challenge is how to blend replication and differentiation of function.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

C H A P T E R I

1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, paperback, 1971, 1978, see pp. 210-212 for Rawls' arguments against a teleological foundation for social justice and p. 395ff for his articulation of the "Thin Theory of the Good".
2. For example, starting from a set of rights which "individuals" in a "state of nature" have, Robert Nozick argues for a minimal state. His arguments are elegant and sophisticated; that they often lead to incorrect conclusions may flow in no small measure from the fact that he gives no explicit articulation and justification for his conception of the human agent.

In contrast to Nozick with his normative and practical orientation Felix Oppenheim attempts to provide descriptive analyses of political concepts whilst steering clear of normative positions or consequences. His programme is to reveal the logical structure of key political concepts such as 'social power', 'social freedom', 'egalitarianism', 'self-interest' and 'public interest'. However both the human agent and her action serve as unanalysed building block in the logical structures he formulates. But the idea of steering clear of normative positions or consequences is not realistic if one holds a Heideggerian conception of human agency, for example, or any other conception in which the fact/value distinction is not fundamental.

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.
Felix Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1981.

3. A. O. Rorty, "A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals" in A. O. Rorty (editor), The Identities of Persons, University of California Press, London, 1976, especially pp. 301-302.
4. Lucien Goldmann, Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy, translator H. G. Boelbower, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1973 (French), 1977 (English), pp. 101-102.
5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translators John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Basil Blackwell, 1962, 1980, p. 11. Note: All page numbers refer to the German Edition of 1957 and are reported in the margins.
6. See Peter Winch concerning the unique contribution which philosophical inquiry can make to our understanding of man. While scientific inquiries are also useful science does not make philosophy superfluous. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958, 1970, especially pp. 1-24, 66-94.

7. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 7.
8. ibid., pp. 41-42.
9. Heidegger makes no mention of animals or other living beings and is open to Midgley's criticism; "The really monstrous thing about Existentialism too is its proceeding as if the world contained only dead matter (things) on the one hand and fully rational, educated, adult human beings on the other - as if there were no other life-forms." Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, Methuen, 1980, pp. 18-19.

Man's concerned relationship to other living things can range from the quasi-personal, to instrumental, to detached, to impersonal wonder, and many shades and degrees of these. I do not pursue a correction of Heidegger's account in this respect because, within the scope of this inquiry, it is not too important.

10. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 52-62, 119-120.
11. ibid., p. 145ff. and also John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, Penguin Books, 1955, 1980, pp. 57-58. This book compares the writings of the philosopher Martin Heidegger and the theologian Rudolph Bultmann.
12. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 114.
13. ibid., p. 119.
14. ibid., p. 120.
15. ibid., p. 13.
16. ibid., pp. 114-115.
17. This is a rather free interpretation, see ibid., p. 201.
18. ibid., p. 182.
19. ibid., p. 56.
20. Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 34.
21. ibid., particularly pp. 60-62.
22. ibid., p. 60.
23. ibid., p. 118.
24. ibid., p. 60.
25. ibid., p. 61.
26. ibid., pp. 61-62.

27. See for example, A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin Books, 1956, p. 35. Ayer defines 'x knows p' in terms of three conditions: p is true; x is sure of p; x has the right to be sure of p.
28. Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 24, 46.
29. ibid., pp. 92, 204. See pp. 89-101 for Heidegger's criticism of Descartes' interpretation of the 'world'.
30. ibid., pp. 203-204.
31. Heidegger's writing is in some places very difficult to understand and abounds in technical formulations.
32. ibid., p. 38.
33. For example, if we ask why Mary suffers from depression we are not looking for an existential account which merely reports the experience without explaining it. So what kind of answer are we seeking? It could be empirical, e.g. that imbalances in her body chemistry "cause" Mary's depression. Sometimes in this study we are concerned with contingent empirical relations of this sort; more generally we are concerned with analyses that are at least partly conceptual. An example would be that depression is an existential possibility for a person who cannot get her project on track toward her vision or cannot get clear on her vision. This type of analysis is more conceptual-existential; in any case it is not merely a contingent empirical causality that it appeals to.

In this respect I do not equate 'empirical' and 'experiential'; the former suggests a publicly verifiable "fact" of experience; whereas 'experiential' has a much broader reference including "private experiences" and 'existential meanings'.

34. ibid., pp. 42-43. Note certain passages in Being and Time indicate that Heidegger does see social conditions as significant factors in Dasein's choice. For example he discusses an authentic relation in which Dasein helps another Dasein "to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it" (p. 122). Also he speculates that the extent to which an anonymous, collectivized 'they' has a compelling and explicit dominion over Dasein may change in the course of history (p. 129). Nevertheless the overall force of the book is to portray the choice as always before Dasein.
35. ibid., pp. 260-267.
36. 'Action' expresses a different idea from 'event' or 'happening' in that events can occur without an agent, e.g. a thunderstorm (Greek mythology notwithstanding). 'Action' expresses the doing or performance of an agent as it flows through time while 'act' is used to refer to a segment or piece of the action marked off by a certain interval of time.
37. Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, Hutchinson of London, 1976, 1977, p. 75. While Giddens leaves 'acting otherwise'

unanalysed, and while we do not wish to elaborate on it, its general sense has been revealed in the analysis of Dasein's care and project. Dasein sees herself as an agent making a difference to her world through her action.

38. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 121.
39. Goldmann, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
40. ibid., p. 33.
41. The position taken in this study is that agency needs to be recognized in both individual and collective forms. In Chapters III and IV we explore social transformation brought about by collective agents - however these are not social classes in anything like Marx's sense. While Marx and Lukács have history to support their conception of classes as the crucial historical subjects in the case of the bourgeoisie as the driving force of the transformation into capitalism their predictions concerning the working class remain undemonstrated. Furthermore if it were always necessary for classes to be crucial for human agency we have the paradox of classless societies being without agency.
42. See A. R. Lacy, A Dictionary of Philosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1976, 1979, pp. 1-2.
43. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 39-40.
44. If there is a disagreement with Marx it is probably not on this point but on his belief that in the future the working class has the potential to be a purposive agent.
45. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 146.
46. Normally no one can be completely detached from praxis but much of an agent's action can pass her by so that she does not see many of her doings and functions as connected to any purposive project. In practice we are concerned with degrees of detachment.
47. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 121.
48. ibid., p. 122.
49. ibid., p. 122.
50. Macquarrie, op. cit., p. 86.
51. Mary Midgley argues for a 'human nature' and disputes the existentialist position that man has no essential nature. Is this not basically a matter of perspective? Of course man has a nature and this nature establishes limits and possibilities but this is not in contradiction to the existentialist finding that there is no essence in a present-at-hand sense which dictates I-self's way of being. Mary Midgley, op. cit.

52. It may seem odd to classify depression and despair as inauthentic responses which it would be if 'authentic' simply meant 'genuine' or 'having integrity' because depression or despair may be perfectly "natural" responses to one's predicament. However, in this study, 'authenticity' is a technical term which does not mean 'genuine' in this sense and which does not necessarily pass a moral judgment, i.e. to refer to a person's action or project as 'inauthentic' is not necessarily to blame that person or to make a moral criticism of her. 'Authenticity' refers to a cluster of features including having a future vision which one sees as true, right or good, being engaged in efficacious praxis toward that vision, and experiencing self-esteem. Given this definition of 'authenticity', which "tightens up" on everyday usage it seems odd for one who has these positive experiences with her project to suffer despair or depression.
53. How do we answer a sceptic who denies that this type of experience is possible? Presumably the issue is whether one can have direct experience of one's existential situation and of practical courses of action. Can I-self "see" what to do just as she sees things as present-at-hand? A little reflection on our experience demonstrates that we do; in fact it is a common, everyday occurrence. Because so much of moral philosophy is concerned with moral dilemmas we may lose sight of the fact that there are situations in which we directly evaluate our circumstances and/or see what action is called for. For example you are sitting at the dinner table with the Christmas turkey in front of you and your friend seated beside. Do you share with her or try to eat it all yourself? The sophist can come up with all sorts of special considerations (which are irrelevant to our point about "seeing" what to do) that might justify not sharing but let us assume that none of them apply. You share and you "see" that you should share. In more complex cases there is generally more "to see" and at times we cannot see any clear course.
54. In this note I will touch on two objections to grounding I-self's principles of evaluation in her predicament. A counter proposal would be to base I-self's evaluations on sui generis principles, i.e. self-justifying rules that do not arise from her predicament. It is all very well to say such principles are self-justifying but it is difficult to see how one can have any confidence in such a basis. What test can they be put to? Reconsideration? But against what criteria or through what process? Such a basis is unjustified because there is no procedure for justifying it. A second sort of objection is that it is not I-self's predicament but the law or principles of God or some divine essence which should be the basis of I-self's criteria for reflexive monitoring. Here we need to distinguish two cases: the one in which God is in I-self's world, in her situation and in her project; the other in which God is entirely beyond the world. The latter, like the first objection is beyond criticism or coherent understanding but the former can match our standpoint. If God is present in I-self's situation then He should be included in her evaluation as should other people and circumstances. Believers in God can, without contradiction and with ample precedent from spiritual leaders, use their whole predicament as a basis for their principles or they can base their principles on heteronomous legalisms. Their "choice" of the latter option is to

be explained not by God's will but by the same forces and tendencies that affect the atheist - a combination of social practices and relations and personal responsibility.

It is hard to avoid religious issues at some point in the consideration of social and political theory and even more difficult to deal with them when they arise. In this argument I am not saying whether God does or does not exist but only that if X thinks God exists she should include God within her description of her predicament. Personally I believe God does exist although 'exist' here does not refer to I-self's mode of being but to some kind of "being-there". Crucially, belief in God does not relieve the agent of personal responsibility nor does it negate the conclusion that autonomy, based on taking one's whole predicament into account, is the appropriate policy. On the other hand our commitment to autonomy rules out heteronomous and authoritarian forms of religious belief - but that is a different matter from the issue of God's existence.

55. For a discussion of the grounding of one's ethical principles in one's predicament as opposed to Sartre's conception of radical (i.e. ungrounded) choice see Charles Taylor, "Responsibility for Self" in The Identities of Persons, A. O. Rorty (editor), op. cit., pp. 287-299.
56. ibid., p. 296.
57. We have already discussed negative ways of being-with-one-another in section 6.
58. To address particular objections to our conception of agency, i.e. of the analyses in the preceding sections, we need to know precisely what they are. While it would be tedious to try to anticipate objections of this sort there is one that we will touch upon and that is how on the basis of an existential analysis we can take a position on values; i.e. have we failed to recognize the fact/value distinction? While a distinction can be made, at one level, between facts and values, at the level of basic experiences the distinction does not hold as should be evident from our previous analyses. The idea of a "pure fact" corresponds more or less to a present-at-hand experience of things in the world or to a reified perception. I-self often experiences things as ready-to-hand (i.e. as part of her praxis) and other people in a way which precludes any radical separation of facts and values existentially. The structure of the project has both factual and evaluative elements. While there is a vast literature on the fact/value distinction all the reader need be clear on for our purposes is that our argument can stand on its own merits and there is no uncontroversial principle that it violates.
59. We have already analysed circumstances in which people deceive themselves or act contrary to their understanding and it could be argued that there are circumstances where choosing a false understanding or acting against their understanding is rational but this is because those circumstances would not be chosen and are not in the best of all possible worlds.

60. Rawls, op. cit., p. 440.

C H A P T E R I I

1. At the most basic level the reason is that human infants are born helpless at birth and are unable to achieve self-reliance for many years. Unlike the salmon fry the human infant depends upon the care of its parents (biological or adoptive) for survival. Historically the fact that only women can bear or nurse children produces gender differentiations within the pattern of social co-operation. Arising from the dependency of infants many other social interactions develop as a ripple effect. There may also be a primordial tendency toward sociability beyond that demanded for species survival. In this regard see Mary Midgley, op. cit., e.g. p. 130.
2. Education presupposes a system of social co-operation. While all formal educational activity is a direct exercise in social co-operation, even the "self-educated" person requires cultural resources that are co-operatively produced.
3. However, in opposing slavery and sexism, one is not necessarily committed to one form of education for all.
4. A Theory of Justice is a penetrating and honest book on political and moral philosophy. As Nozick writes, "Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls' theory or explain why not". Nozick, op. cit., p. 183.
5. Rawls, op. cit., p. 4.
6. For example Nozick illustrates his objection with an example of

...ten Robinson Crusoes, each working alone for two years on separate islands, who discovered each other and the facts of their different allotments by radio communication via transmitters left twenty years earlier, could they not make claims on each other, supposing it were possible to transfer goods from one island to the next?

He says this is a non-co-operation situation; but although the co-operation is minimal it still exists. These Robinson Crusoes could not communicate with each other unless they were each part of a system of social co-operation - a system which produces their common language, the radio transmitters and the knowledge and skills involved in using radio transmitters and receivers. Nozick, op. cit., p. 185.
7. Rawls, op. cit., p. 4.
8. ibid., p. 7. For Rawls the principles of social justice are but a part of a social ideal which would provide principles for all the

virtues of the basic structure, together with their weights when they conflict. However he considers social justice the most important part of this social ideal.

9. ibid., p. 11.
10. ibid., p. 12.
11. ibid., p. 13.
12. ibid., pp. 14-15. He modifies these formulations in later sections of his book but not in ways that are of fundamental concern to us.
13. ibid., p. 440.
14. ibid., p. 84.
15. ibid., p. 101.
16. See pp. 251-256 for Rawls' interpretation of Kant and his indebtedness to him.
17. ibid., p. 426ff. Such a principle is superfluous in our analysis of I-self.
18. ibid., pp. 210-212.
19. ibid., p. 24.
20. 'Realize' is more appropriate than 'maximize' for a teleological conception of I-self's good.
21. Concerning consent, for example, Rawls would be correct in stating that the principle of consent cannot be taken literally for the world community. We are thrown into "space-ship earth" and have nowhere else to be. However we have ample precedent for people emigrating from one nation-state to become citizens of a different country and this choice could be established within a conception of social justice.

Irrespective of the issue of consent, Rawls' analysis of the original position is not compatible with the nation-state being the basic jurisdiction for social justice. He insists that persons in the original position should be considered ignorant of the generation they belong to, their place in society, their class position or social status, natural assets and abilities etc. (p. 137). However we know that the boundaries of countries change from generation to generation and that millions of people change countries and Rawls gives us no reason why these sorts of changes would be contrary to justice. Is it reasonable to hold that the participants in the original position should be ignorant of so much and yet know their country? Rawls says the original agreement is made in perpetuity (p. 176) and while I think this is too ambitious a claim it is further evidence that the deliberations in Rawls' original position are made with respect to the world community of I-selves and not the nation-state.

22. Rawls, op. cit., p. 176.
23. ibid., pp. 11-13.
24. ibid., pp. 255-256.
25. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit. While I have been influenced by Giddens' account of structuration I am concerned only to articulate a sketch of what I believe is a correct analysis of this aspect of the thesis and not to provide either an exegesis or a criticism of Giddens' study. See especially pp. 49-95.
26. ibid., p. 64.
27. ibid., p. 55.
28. See for example, Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan Press, 1974, pp. 31-32, and Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 6.
29. See David D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, revised edition, Macmillan, 1976, 1979, pp. 66-71, for a discussion of 'power', 'authority' and 'rights of recipience'.
30. See Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., p. 100 for the distinction between 'authorization' and 'allocation' which has influenced our distinguishing 'authority' and 'property'.
31. Scholar's qualification is as follows, "so far we have ignored the issue of the convertibility of powers and resources, but any particular society will have various means for converting one type of power into another and different societies will manifest unequal degrees of constraint on convertibility".

To illustrate, X and Y have each taken a law degree, passed the bar examination and have the right to practise law. As a result they each have social powers and a type of quasi-property in terms of potential income flows from the practice of law. Other social powers consist of their network of contacts and their financial and material resources. However, even if their social powers are quite equal, X's personal powers may be much more supportive of his "success" as a lawyer than Y's; depending on the convertibility among different forms of power in their society X may be able to convert his advantage in personal powers into advantages in various social powers. To some degree, therefore, X controls his own social powers.

Historically modern capitalism is marked by a high degree of convertibility among different types of property through its free market exchanges in which property is used to buy self-development which is converted into income flows that make possible the purchase of other forms of power; property in the form of capital is used to buy power as authority in the organization of work and economic activity; power as property is used to buy categorial power which is used to advance sectoral interests;.... Indeed Giddens argues that it is not private property which is distinctive to modern capitalism but its modes of convertibility which use money to convert property

rights into capital and commodifies labour power as the only "property" possessed by the wage-worker. ibid., p. 105.

32. Red-headed C is born into a society which kills all red-haired infants and so his personal powers are destroyed by his social structure. D is raised in a community in which no one speaks to him, responds to his speech attempts, shows him any love or kindness, or acknowledges him other than providing food and shelter. If by some chance D manages to survive, who can say that D's personal powers are independent of the structure of social relations in which he is enmeshed? Even in typical rather than extreme cases is it not true that the effects of social structure on personal powers are profound?
33. See discussion of the homeostatic tension between power and responsibility on p. 52 and the elaboration in Appendix A.
34. The main source of my ideas on categorial power has been Basil Bernstein's work on 'classification and framing' in relation to 'power' and 'control' although I have elaborated the concept differently and have used different terminology. See B. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, Volume 3, Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions, 2nd edition, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1975, 1977, particularly Chapter 5, and also Codes, Modalities and the Process of Cultural Reproduction: A Model, Department of Education of University of Lund, 1981.
35. One only has categorial power if one can act otherwise. A slave who is content with slavery and "decides" to leave it unchanged does not have categorial power unless he could, if he chose, participate in ending slavery and introducing a new social structure.
36. This is pursued in Chapter III.
37. This does not mean that cruelty, dishonesty, etc., will or can be abolished but only that there is no reason to believe that social co-operation cannot be so organized that for every individual there is the possibility of some authentic project without dishonesty, depravity and the like.
38. There is an extensive literature on the revisionist theories of democracy which would take us off our course were we to elaborate on it. Two short general accounts of some of this literature are provided by Jack Lively and Carole Pateman. For example Pateman discusses the concern among a number of theorists for stability and the fear that widespread citizen participation leads to totalitarianism. Both she and Lively report on theories that purport to show that rule by élites is inevitable, that the differentiation and specialization of labour is incompatible with participatory democracy, that apathy is good and so on. These authors provide references to the work of Berelson, Dahl, Eckstein, Michels, Mosca, Sartori and Schumpeter. Jack Lively, Democracy, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, 1980. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1970.

39. The idea of citizen is distinctly different from 'subject', i.e. a dominated agent, or the more neutral term 'member'. To be a citizen is to participate as an equal in the life and government of one's society.
40. Heart also wants it understood that all adult members of society will be citizens.
41. What about mentally ill or severely brain damaged persons? It is contrary to the FPSC to deny such persons equal consideration of their interests. I totally oppose programmes such as sterilization, frontal lobotomies, unwarranted incarceration or killing which do not provide due processes for the representation of the interests of these persons. Nevertheless there are cases where the person may require others, either temporarily or indefinitely, to represent his interests for him. In such cases a trustee should be appointed although it should go without saying that trusteeship decisions are matters of legal justice and not merely technical medical concerns.
42. Each multi-generational society at any point in time is faced with the policy decision related to the interests of future generations. In practical terms those living together at any particular time generally lack the information to determine substantive policies for remote generations although there are obvious exceptions - it is in the interests of remote generations for this generation to prevent nuclear war, for instance. However questions related to the use of natural resources or the maintenance of historical sites are suited to a perspective of perhaps two or three generations at best. Therefore there seems little prospect for or point in a formula approach to intergenerational justice. The most precious legacy for future generations is to be born into a democratic, fraternal society.
43. Rawls, op. cit., pp. 284-293. Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1980, p. 107ff.
44. Where we use 'replication by function' and 'functional differentiation' Durkheim refers to 'mechanical solidarity' and 'organic solidarity' respectively. However Durkheim's terms have a different scope of application. Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber, Cambridge University Press, London, 1971, pp. 70-79.
45. This is not a denial of the agency of the agents because their consciousness of their circumstances and their decisions and choices are potentially efficacious.
46. With the exception of the temporary exclusion of children.
47. Although compulsory retirement, simply on the grounds of age, is contrary to the rights of older persons to autonomous participation in their society.
48. Midgley, op. cit., pp. 326-331.

49. I do not dispute that there are circumstances in which the privileging of one language over others can be defended, e.g. respecting legal documents in a given jurisdiction, but there are still issues of the scope of regulation of language use and the procedures, including participation, used to reach such decisions. Clearly any school curriculum cannot avoid reflecting particular selections from possible cultural resources; and in some ways these choices will be arbitrary, e.g. whether King Lear, or Macbeth, or both, or neither are to be taught. But by 'arbitrarily', in this context, I mean where the decision procedures are unjust or irrational with respect to the good of the student or the interests of the community. These issues are pursued in Chapter V.
50. In general, actual historical class relations establish privileges and domination, at least within the main classes, although there is a theoretical possibility of advantages in respect of resources and powers being offset or counterbalanced by disadvantages in outcomes.
51. The workers are 'relatively propertyless' in that they do not own the primary resources supporting their own work.
52. It is sometimes argued that the rights to bequeath and inherit property are necessary for an appropriate status of the family. If the appropriate status of the family requires the inheritance of property then capitalism, which requires great numbers of workers lacking property in the means of production to fulfil its "free" labour contracts is indicted with destroying the status of the majority of families who have no significant wealth to bequeath.
53. See note 31 of Chapter II.
54. The issue of the structure and functioning of the state is a matter of great importance which we must skip in this study. However it is important that we do not uncritically assume notions. For example, to what extent is the state the organized expression of the society? An instrument for class oppression? A neutral arbitrator between classes and sectors? How significant are the vastly increased extent and penetration of state surveillance activities. See Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Volume 1. Power, property and the state, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1981, Chapter 9, especially pp. 214-221.
55. Giddens stresses the importance of the emergence, in the Middle Ages, of corporate moveable property. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40.
56. The advocates of meritocracy cannot accept the principle of unbridled prerogatives for capitalist entrepreneurs because it offends against their sense of justice and generally damages their interests as a class; but equally there is no way for the comprehensive system of institutional justice that is ideally presupposed by meritocracy to co-exist with the private and asymmetrical ownership of the means of production because to subject private ownership to comprehensive public regulation, in accordance with a meritocratic conception of justice, is to obliterate any significance for private property.

For Gouldner, the New Class is emerging not only in the late capitalism of North America, Western Europe, and Japan but also in the third world of developing nations and in the USSR and its client states. While it is probably an exaggeration to describe the USSR as in no sense a workers' state, it nevertheless appears that a New Class, similar in many respects to Gouldner's characterization has emerged and wields enormous power and influence. The dynamics of this class's emergence to power are likely to include the privileged status of the Communist party, the party's leading role in ideological and intellectual work in the Soviet Union and the meritocratic principles governing admission to and promotion within the Communist party. Additionally in the USSR the New Class is the privileged class as there is no capitalist class. Alvin Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, Macmillan, London, 1979, especially pp. 1-8.

57. Rawls, op. cit., p. 103.
58. ibid., p. 104.
59. ibid., p. 313.
60. The problem here is an embarrassment of riches with so many studies demonstrating this relationship, e.g. Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, Sage Publications, London, 1970 (French), 1977 (English translation), pp. 91-93.
61. See Basil Bernstein's seminal work on restricted and elaborated codes of speech and on the differential receptivity of various different communication contexts and pedagogies in the school to children with different family and cultural backgrounds. Basil Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, Volume 1, Theoretical Studies towards a Sociology of Language, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Second Edition, 1971, 1974, 1977, especially p. 76ff and pp. 170-187, Volume 3, Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Revised Edition, 1975, 1977, especially pp. 22-32 and note (a) on pp. 193-196.
62. Pierre Bourdieu speaks of the generation of 'habitus', a sort of natural, taken for granted, orientation to particular cultural practices or in Bernstein's interpretation a "deep cultural grammar". He explains the inequalities in academic attainment of children from the different social classes as arising from the "distance" between the habitus the school tends to inculcate and that inculcated in previous educational experience and ultimately the family. Bourdieu and Passeron, op. cit., especially pp. 71-74.
63. This is the theme of Chapter IV.
64. For Hegel the bureaucracy was to become a "universal class" but Marx saw the working class as the universal class, a class "which can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity". Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 1978, pp. 52-64, quote on p. 60.

65. It is in the workers' interests to participate in democratic social transformations but it is also in their interests to end their own status as employees, i.e. as propertyless workers, as soon as possible. Hence in the process of democratizing social relations individual workers lose their membership in the working class without losing their social agency. Hence the collective agent which accomplishes social transformation is not a class but a transclass organization aiming to abolish classes.
66. This double sense of transformative action alerts us to the error in collapsing one's life into a "selfless" pursuit of social revolution which neglects the dimensions of self-development and self-realization here and now. Such a course is doomed to failure because revolutionaries' capacity to imagine, plan and implement a new social order will always be limited by their own character formation and the type and quality of their own existence. We also reject a retreat into living only for oneself in the here and now. To withdraw from the struggle to transform the social conditions of our collective existence is to threaten the authenticity of one's life. We cannot avoid being-with-one-another. How can we simply accept social conditions that undermine the authenticity of our being-with-one-another without an act of self-deception? How authentic can our personal lives be when we have chosen to deceive ourselves in this fashion?
67. All social agents have a great deal of practical knowledge about their social structure which they develop through their ongoing social activities but much of this practical knowledge is not discursively available to them, i.e. they are unable to analyse, discuss or report it. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, op. cit., p25
68. In arguing that philosophical analysis is relevant I am not saying that scientific studies are not. For arguments on the unique contribution of philosophical analysis see Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, and its Relation to Philosophy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1958, especially pp. 1-24, 66-94.

C H A P T E R I I I

1. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, translator Maurice Cranston, Penguin, 1968, 1980, Book, Chapter 18, p. 147.
2. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. The Second Treatise, Cambridge University Press, 1960, sections 111, 138, 163, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, op. cit., Chapters 1 (p. 205), 4 (p. 112), 5 (p. 115), 10 (p. 131), 18 (p. 147).
3. Brian Barry, Political Argument, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965, 1970, pp. 179-181.
4. Pat White, "Education, Democracy and the Public Interest" in The Philosophy of Education, R. S. Peters (editor), Oxford University Press, 1973, 1978, p. 219.

5. Barry, op. cit., p. 192.
6. ibid., p. 195.
7. See sections 6 and 7.
8. Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heinemann, London, 1976 (German), 1979 (English Translation), especially pp. 1-68.
9. ibid., p. 1.
10. ibid., pp. 2-3. Note: the translator calls (1) "comprehensibility" and (3) "truthfulness".
11. ibid., p. 3.
12. ibid., p. 1.
13. ibid., pp. 3-4.
14. This represents an unstable state which will either return to (1) or degenerate into (3) or (4).
15. This relates to the second task of the TAG and our major concern in this section.
16. This is discussed specifically in an educational context in Scholar's speech on p. 226.
17. 'Communal critical reflexion' refers to a group process of reflexive monitoring in which the agents are particularly authentic and resolute in their inquiry.
18. To use a mathematical metaphor, the difference between their actions and their common interest will tend to approach zero as the TAG continues over time. These are also conceptual points.
19. Habermas, op. cit., pp. 208-210.
20. ibid., p. 210.
21. R. S. Peters, "Democratic Values and Educational Aims", Teachers' College Record, February, 1979, p. 468.
22. There are of course all sorts of aspects of the good which apply to all I-selves and are basically the same but there are others which have a different expression for different individuals. For example the policy option of detonating nuclear bombs over New York is contrary to the interests of all New Yorkers whereas the provision of subsidized opera rather than lower taxes is not nearly so obvious. In the second case New Yorkers need a participative process to discover their interests.
23. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 73.

24. While the argument in the text focuses on the need for a selfidual sphere within a constitutional democracy (with certain undemocratic features), as an important structural feature supporting an ongoing series of social transformations to bring about authentic democracy, we could also argue a strong case for a selfidual sphere within a fully authentic democracy. The selfidual sphere strengthens I-self's powers to understand, articulate and defend her interests. This process must go on in the authentic democracy. But why would social agents want to replace the selfidual sphere that provided this function and which has been progressively strengthened all through the period of transformation with a different structural feature? Of what sort? But these questions can wait.
25. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 85.
26. ibid., p. 85.

C H A P T E R I V

1. See Facilitator's summary on p. 99. The two tasks are also discussed in Chapter III.
2. See Scholar's argument on pp. 105-107. Our rejection of the use of authoritarian or paternalistic methods for achieving authentic democracy is based on the assumption that the existing society is a constitutional democracy. However, within a despotism or a society otherwise lacking constitutional democratic institutions, authoritarian or dictatorial power grabs might be justified as the lesser of evils.
3. See p. 101.
4. Although the periodic or infrequent use of referenda to permit the people as a whole to decide certain issues is still considered a practice consistent with constitutional democracy.
5. I am not using bureaucracy as a pejorative term but in a neutral sense as "a system of administration based upon organization into bureaus, division of labour, a hierarchy of authority, etc.: designed to dispose of a large body of work in a routine manner". Collins English Dictionary, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1979, 1980.
6. Within capitalism it is possible to have contractual relationships which do not fit the employer/employee pattern, e.g. professional/client relationships but capitalist property presupposes the propertyless worker employed by the capitalist.
7. Discussed on p. 64.
8. Discussed on pp. 83 and 131.
9. Discussed on pp. 88-89.
10. Discussed on pp. 90-91.

11. Discussed on p. 91.
12. Discussed on pp. 92 and 163-166.
13. Discussed on pp. 93-95.
14. Discussed on pp. 105-107. Note: There are cases in which the action of a revolutionary vanguard can be justified as the lesser of evils but within a constitutional democracy there is no way for a vanguard dictatorially to advance authentic democracy.
15. Discussed on pp. 107 and 118.
16. Discussed on pp. 126-127.
17. Discussed on pp. 131-136.
18. C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 95.
19. Macpherson stops the process of representation at the national level. But why? How are we to exercise democratic control over what is now a world-wide system of social co-operation featuring significant interdependencies among nations?
20. Action-Man means in a society which fully realizes our mid-term goal. However this does not imply that there will be no need of subsequent social transformation or that society will be perfect.
21. However the procedures used by local communities to select representatives should be subject to judicial review of the courts established by more central jurisdictions. The principle guiding judicial review is that there should be local autonomy in the procedures for selecting representatives provided there is no violation of equal rights of citizenship and equal categorial power. In this respect lot or rotation is as acceptable as election whereas prohibiting persons from serving as representatives on unjust grounds such as race or religion cannot be tolerated.
22. For example the Telidon system piloted by the telephone corporation of the province of Manitoba in 1980 uses the home television set to display information which is centrally stored but under the control of the user who employs a variation of a library recall system to display listings of all the stored information. While certain research skills are required of the user these can be developed through a combination of general education, instructions and training accompanying the equipment, and practice.
23. That is, they cannot vote as representatives but only as citizens, like everyone else.
24. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, op. cit., pp. 62, 69-70, 101.
25. By 'jurisdiction' I mean 'level' in the pyramidal structure of local, district, regional, provincial, national, transnational or its variants.

26. This can be done through television or radio, either "live" or recorded.
27. Except that a new bill does not become law until approved by a majority of the citizens while an old law remains law until rescinded by a majority.
28. This is an extremely important dimension in fostering fraternal understanding on a wider basis and in overcoming excessively parochial perspectives.
29. An example of an executive function is the negotiation with workers' co-operatives to fill public sector franchises. This is discussed in section 22.
30. Might it not also be considered the "work" of students?
31. By 'workers' co-operatives' in this context I also mean individuals and partnerships. Generally the co-operative would be used but very small operations could be handled by individuals. The partnership is simply a small co-operative.
32. An interesting question is what would be the extent of restraint exercised by the citizenship jurisdictions. For example would workers be permitted to contract to exploit themselves by working an eighteen-hour day?

Clearly the citizen jurisdictions have the authority to make and enforce regulations concerning health and safety. Perhaps business hours could be restricted to prevent unfair competition but care must be exercised to avoid paternalism. There are many issues at the detailed level that I have to skip here.

33. In the analysis of workers' co-operatives and their relationships to community political structures I have benefited greatly from Pat White's article "Work-place Democracy and Political Education". This article stimulated me to prepare a paper for a seminar on political education and I found the discussion and criticism of Pat White and others very helpful. Pat White, "Work-place Democracy and Political Education", Journal of Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain, 1979. Other useful sources were: Roy Edgley, "Education, Work and Politics", Journal of Philosophy of Education, op. cit., Vol. 14, No. 1, 1980; Anthony Skillen, Ruling Illusions, Harvester Press, 1977, Chapter Two, "The Politics of Production".
34. The domination of the worker is mentioned on p. 92.
35. Conceptually is it not possible for a particular slave to have as much or more autonomy in the direction of his work as a given employee?
36. Although it would more likely prolong slavery.
37. Demotions or expulsions of workers would be subject to rights of due process which should be administered through bodies established by the professional associations, or, depending upon the grounds, by the regular law courts.

38. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translator David Ross, Oxford, The World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 1925, 1980, p. 2.
39. Clearly there can be conflicts between these interests and therefore it is important to have processes for representing and reconciling the interests of the various parties.
40. This argument which is completely contrary to the prevailing views on the matter is argued in greater detail in Chapter VI, section 33.

C H A P T E R V

1. See, for example, Richard Peters' early writings in which he argues that education is (conceptually) concerned with the development of desirable qualities in people. He no longer holds this position. Paul H. Hirst and Richard S. Peters, The Logic of Education, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, pp. 19-25.
2. Carl Bereiter, Must We Educate?, Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 8.
3. ibid., p. 9.
4. ibid., p. 39.
5. Meritocracy is discussed in Chapter II, pp. 92-95. An interesting speculation is to what extent scholars and teachers have been pressured to take meritocratic positions as a defence posture in the face of the categorial power relations in the wider society and the attempts of governmental bodies to exercise political control over them.
6. For example, in the Bible it says, "I came that they might have life and have it abundantly", New American Bible, Standard Bible, Study Edition, Philadelphia and New York, A. J. Holman & Company, John 10 : 10.
7. I-self's authentic project is discussed on p. 44 and following.
8. Flanders' study of teachers' perceptions of their classroom practice picks out the centrality of what he calls "personal meaning systems". He writes, "...the teacher-student relationship is most productive when the teacher has worked his or her material into a personal meaning system and when the teacher can connect that with the student's meaning system". Tony Flanders, Summary Report: Professional Development Study, Vancouver, British Columbia Teachers' Federation, 1980, p. A-20.
9. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, excerpts reported in William K. Frankena, op. cit., p. 67.

However, as we discussed previously, this does not imply a passive or merely facilitative role for the teacher, whose task, on the contrary, is to start from the student's actual predicament

and help her to connect her situation to a worthy and feasible vision of the future, all the time recognizing in the educational relationships that the student is an active agent, an actor engaged in transformation of self/world.

10. This argument requires more elaboration than I can give it here. A sketch is: lack of coherence translates into conflicts between individual and society, or to failures of personal integration, or to failures in social integration, or to some combination of these; autonomous and authentic agents would not agree to this.
11. William Pinar (editor), Curriculum Theorizing - The Reconceptualists, Berkeley, McCutchan, 1975; see especially the historical material on pp. 15-86.
12. This is true even if one rejects the whole aims schema as Ray Elliott does in arguing for 'consequences' as a more fundamental category than 'aims'. I do not dispute this point but because I argue that the ultimate grounding of educational activity is not transcendent or immanent aims but I-self's concrete predicament and authentic project, my use of educational aims is not open to Elliott's criticism. Source: Ray Elliott's M.A. seminar in aims of education, autumn, 1980.
13. D. Pole, "The Concept of Reason" in R. F. Dearden, P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters (editors) Education and the Development of Reason, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 151.
14. See sections 16 and 17.
15. 'Reproduction' and 'transformation' in this context refer to the same thing, the diachronic alteration of the cultural resources and mediating elements of the community: 'reproduction' emphasizes the continuity and 'transformation' the difference over time. Of course all change involves both difference and sameness.
16. My source for the idea of a 'cultural arbitrary' is Pierre Bourdieu although I am not sure that I have interpreted the idea in the same way he has. Bourdieu and Passeron, op. cit., p. 5ff.
17. There may also be negative consequences for the younger generation if they see themselves as coming from an inferior culture that is not worth maintaining. While language is a central feature of culture there are many other aspects which bear on the authenticity of being-with-one-another and the self-esteem of the community's members, e.g. religion, art, literature, music, sport, ways of teaching science.
18. I am not concerned here with matters such as driver education, flying instruction and the like, which may be required as a condition for a licence to engage in certain activities: such matters can be handled by political jurisdictions entering into contracts with workers' co-operatives consisting of qualified trainers who can train and license drivers, pilots or others who seek authorization to drive, fly or whatever, not as a profession but for their own convenience or pleasure.

19. For example, it is important that the terms and conditions be transparent to all parties. If a teacher receives funds from a foundation on the condition that she influence students to pursue research in certain fields, and this condition is concealed from the students, the teacher is guilty of unethical practice and betrays the student's trust. Other points could be made as well.
20. Collins English Dictionary, op. cit.
21. Section 16 discusses the limitations on any representation of third party interests.
22. It would be possible for the child's parents to divide these responsibilities or even for the child to have two sets of parents, one with trusteeship over education and the other with trusteeship over other matters. These are possible but have bizarre implications resulting in either radical changes in the structure of the family or requiring the educational trustees to be cut off from much of the child's life. There appear to be no advantages in dividing the trusteeship among different sets of equally intimate and loving parents. Therefore our concern in the following argument is to show that the division of custodial and trusteeship functions between parent/guardian(s) on the one hand and a formal institution on the other is contrary to the child's interests.
23. This argument presupposes the importance of modelling for child development, i.e. on learning through identification and imitation. I do not believe this finding will be challenged by students of child development but I do not offer empirical evidence on it.
24. I say 'heteronymous' because the parents lack autonomous control over a significant aspect of their stewardship and care. If this seems to beg the question concerning appropriate stewardship for parents, my point is that in exercising custodial care for the child, the responsible parent cannot avoid care and concern for the child's good, i.e. the child's interests necessarily comprise a significant part of the parent's project.
25. If a communal arrangement provides adults the freedom to come and go then the only assurance of a continuing personal relationship of love and care for the child is for her to be attached to one or more definite adults and not to the commune.
26. Modern science and medicine have made it generally possible for parents to control the decision to have or not have children. At times or in circumstances where this does not hold there is a conflict between the autonomy of parents and the interests of children. I will not speculate on how to resolve this issue because my concern is with the general organization of social co-operation and as a matter of social justice parents clearly ought to have the right to control the decision over whether to have a child.
27. I forego employing empirical evidence concerning the effects on children of non-traditional family arrangements, particularly single-parent families, because some of these effects arise from an unjust flow of income to these families rather than from the family relationship per se.

28. See, for example, the work of Urie Bromfenbrenner concerning social changes in work, transportation, education, etc., and their effects on the family. Urie Bromfenbrenner, "The Origins of Alienation", Scientific American, August, 1978, and "Who Needs Parent Education?", Teachers' College Record, May, 1978.
29. This support is not a mere supplement to parental income to meet the needs of the parent, but an amount sufficient for the total costs of child care and education.
30. However in their citizenship responsibilities concerning the educational programme of their local community school they do exercise a form of collective self-governance regarding the education of their children.
31. The British use 'public school' to refer to a type of private school and 'state school' to refer to a kind of common or public school. 'State school' is an unsatisfactory term for our common, community school in an authentic democracy because it suggests that sovereign political authority for school governance rests with the nation-state whereas we consider the nation-state to represent merely a particular level in the TAG Network and to have extremely limited jurisdiction regarding education. The British 'public school' usage is a peculiar historical aberration which we disregard in favour of using 'public' to connect to our precise interpretation of public versus market sectors.
32. This is addressed on p. 228.
33. There remains the problem that individuals who are in the minority within a particular community may nevertheless have cultural arbitrariness imposed on them. What can be done to prevent or soften this sort of imposition? One hopes for a substantial degree of fraternity within the local community and where this pertains local majorities will tend to be tolerant of minority values. Where this is not the case the nation-state or other central level citizenship jurisdictions can protect individuals with respect to basic social freedoms - although this provision must not be used effectively to remove the right of the local community to determine cultural arbitrariness. Finally individuals can make the best use of the range of cultural arbitrariness actually provided by exercising their rights to choose the community in which they will live.
34. It might be objected that on this formulation the education will only be cosmopolitan, etc. if both students and teachers actually want this, otherwise it could still be parochial.

Indeed I have argued for two criteria: mutual determination of the evaluative criteria by the students' union and the teachers' co-operative; and a broad, cosmopolitan, critical educational experience; but these two criteria may sometimes conflict. The overriding principle in cases of conflict must be that of mutual determination. If the pre-autonomous stage has been successful the students will be in a position to represent their own interests. This does not imply that they will not make mistakes but generally

it is better, at this stage, for students to make mistakes autonomously than to be forced to make the "correct" decision. There is more that can be said on this: for example, students could be compelled to leave their home community; students do not have a veto but only an equal say, so it does not follow that they can unilaterally choose a parochial education. However we do not want to get into detail on such matters here.

35. See, for example, Richard Peters, Ethics and Education, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966, p. 250ff.
36. I am grateful for Graham Haydon's seminar paper that distinguishes 'self-determination' from 'autonomy'.
37. Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1961, 1975.
38. ibid.
39. See pp. 92-93.
40. This is a comprehensive judgment; it is not simply that the student has a particular shortcoming such as being a slow runner, an unimaginative painter or a poor speller but a general inaptitude for school activities tends to come across as "generally unworthy as a person".
41. In this usage 'ideological' refers to a position which conceals its true purpose and values, either intentionally or unintentionally.
42. The use of the 'normal curve' as a general policy imposed on school or classroom grading and evaluation illustrates this categorical control very well. Power is exercised at the 'macro' level which ensures that the whole system serves a selective function. Within this system the discretion of teachers is a "pseudo autonomy" because they have a selective system imposed upon them.

C H A P T E R V I

1. I am indebted to C. A. Bowers for the concept of a 'psychosocial moratorium' and Bowers credits Erik H. Erikson's Identity and the Life Cycle as his source. For Erikson the need for a psychosocial moratorium coincides with adolescence and represents a transition period between the last stages of childhood and the early stages of adulthood where loyalties and commitments to social roles must be solidified. Erikson is quoted:

The period can be viewed as a psychosocial moratorium during which the individual through free role experimentation may find a niche in some section of his society, a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him. In finding it the young adult gains an assured sense of inner continuity and

social sameness which will bridge what he was as a child and what he is about to become, and will reconcile his conception of himself and his community's recognition of him.

Bowers argues that the idea of a psychosocial moratorium can be applied not only to adolescence but to the educational process as a whole. C. A. Bowers, Cultural Literacy for Freedom: An Existential Perspective on Teaching, Curriculum, and School Policy, Elan Publishers, Eugene, Oregon, 1974, pp. 87-88.

2. The reader may find it helpful at this point to review the arguments in section 22 against workers' co-operatives or political jurisdictions controlling certification judgments.
3. By 'essentialist' I mean methods directed to solutions which are independent of the judgments and choices of the actual participants.
4. The term 'theorem' may seem a little odd in a philosophical inquiry. However the theorems which are presented are not assumptions or pre-suppositions but rather principles which are derived from even more basic principles. Therefore I think the mathematical metaphor suggested by the term 'theorem' accurately portrays its function in the thesis.
5. Although these theorems are framed in terms of the teachers' professional association the principles are believed to apply generally to any occupational group or profession.
6. For the general justification of this position see Action-Man's argument on pp. 168-169.
7. It may be asked why some of the incumbents might be replaced. According to Theorem 3 the basic nature of these positions should be decided by the profession as a whole. When this is done some incumbents may be ill-suited to performing the functions of their positions.
8. 'Industrial unionism' is discussed in section 35.
9. See, for example, the Parry study concerning the history of attempts, beginning in 1846, of teachers in England and Wales to achieve professional status. Parry, Noel and José, "The Teachers and Professionalism: The Failure of an Occupational Strategy in M. Flude and J. Ahier, editors, Educability, Schools and Ideology, John Wiley & Sons, Toronto, 1974.
10. Teachers' organizations have so far tended to play only half this game: they defend teachers against violations of due process by supervisors and employers and criticize employers for poor personnel practices; they tend to ignore poor practices and unqualified or incompetent practitioners. However these latter sorts of abuses must also be criticized because teachers will probably require broad public support to achieve professional status and this is unlikely as long as their organizational behaviour is overbalanced towards protection of teachers to the neglect of the public interest in competent and ethical teaching.

11. See, for example, Egon Guba's monograph on educational evaluation in which he distinguishes naturalistic inquiry from more conventional, e.g. positivistic, forms. He notes fourteen ways in which these forms of inquiry may differ: philosophical base; inquiry paradigm; purpose, stance; framework/design; style, reality manifold; value structure; setting; context; conditions; treatment; scope; methods. Egon G. Guba, Toward a Methodology of Naturalistic Inquiry in Educational Evaluation, Center for the Study of Evaluation, UCLA Graduate School of Education, University of California, Los Angeles, 1978, especially pp. 1-30.
12. Consider Thomas Kuhn's analysis concerning the development, criticism and revision of scientific theory. I believe this analysis applies in the relevant respects to educational theory. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970.
13. J. S. Mill, On Liberty in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government, H. B. Acton (editor), London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1972, p. 78ff.
14. See, for example, Downing, John, The Initial Teaching Alphabet Explained and Illustrated, London, Cassell, 1965.
15. Specialist researchers in fields such as, for example, psychology, sociology, economics,...can be offered short term contracts, on a franchise basis, to perform particular research projects. This type of researcher need not belong to the TPA provided the TPA exercises democratic political control over the determination of the franchise.
16. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, editor and translator Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1971, 1978, pp. 5-23.
17. Most national teachers' organizations can provide information on such structures. The British Columbia Teachers' Federation has a well developed network of specialist associations. Address: BCTF, 105-2235 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6J 3H9.
18. Note: the definition of 'canonical theory' on p. 265 precludes state imposition of canonical theory. The procedures used in the development of canonical theory are rational and democratic and not authoritarian.
19. See pp. 251-252.
20. A process that continued into the 1960s.
21. See William Pinar, op. cit., for a discussion of the history of this process and some of the leading figures in it.
22. C. A. Bowers, "Ideological Continuities in Technicism, Liberalism and Education" in Teachers' College Record, Volume 81, No. 3, Spring, 1980, pp. 304-305.

23. Huston Smith, "Excluded Knowledge: A Critique of the Modern Western Mind Set", Teachers' College Record, February 1979, Volume 80, No. 3, p. 429.
24. ibid., pp. 423-427.
25. ibid., pp. 421-422.
26. Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950, Penguin Books, 1958, 1963, e.g. pp. 32-36.
27. The reader should take time out here to recall and to think.
28. Which is not the same thing as producing high test marks.
29. Solidarity disputes this point arguing that there is a continuous variation in teaching ability. She may be right from the perspective of a detached scientific observer but Scholar is trying to report the existential experience of the student, as he himself feels it.
30. One thinks of Martin Buber's writings on dialogic communications. Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, Collins Fount Paperback, 1947, 1979, pp. 25-27.
31. Piaget's work, for instance.
32. C. A. Bowers, "Ideological Continuities in Technicism, Liberalism, and Education", Teachers' College Record, Volume 81, No. 3, Spring 1980, pp. 302ff.
33. I believe that this finding can be generalized to other professions.
34. This is a conceptual point - see the definition of industrial unionism on p. 285.
35. See section 14.
36. See sections 14 and 16.
37. See section 16.
38. See section 17.
39. See section 17.
40. See section 18. This is also connected to the discussion of a psychosocial moratorium.
41. See p. 99.
42. 'Closed shop' refers to the condition that only union members can be hired by the employer whereas 'union shop' means that any worker hired by the employer must, as a condition of continued employment, join the union.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES FOR

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

1. See the argument starting with Facilitator's speech on p. 243 and ending with Solidarity's speech on p. 245.
2. See note 34 of Chapter II.
3. See pp. 190-191.
4. Arguments to the effect that one has to be initiated into certain practices or activities to be able to assess them are fine with respect to any particular student but they cannot serve as adequate justifications for choosing one set of practices over another.
5. See pp. 255-257.
6. Habermas is one scholar who sees this close connection between political relationships and the conditions of knowledge.
7. See, for example, R. S. Peters, Ethics and Education, op. cit., p. 298.
8. ibid., pp. 131-142.
9. ibid., pp. 139-140.

APPENDIX A

1. See Lucien Goldmann, op. cit., pp. 46-51. Goldmann accuses Heidegger of precisely this - of defining 'authenticity' as a tragic destiny.

APPENDIX C

2. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 189. Other references in this section are to pp. 188-193.
3. C. D. Ovens was general secretary of the British Columbia Teachers' Federation from 1945 until 1973.

APPENDIX D

4. While everyday usage does not tend to draw such a tight distinction we need to distinguish two different but related ideas. Our definition is not entirely arbitrary because the Collins English

Dictionary, op. cit., in its first definition for 'labour' gives "productive work, esp. physical toil done for wages".

5. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, The Second Treatise, op. cit., Chapter V for one of the earliest systematic expositions of the labour theory of value.
6. Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, op. cit., p. 48.
7. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, pp. 177-178, quoted in Shlomo Alvineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, 1968, 1978, p. 81.
8. 'Social action' is discussed on p. 67.
9. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, op. cit., p. 48. The inner quote is from K. Marx, Capital, Volume 3, p. 191.

APPENDIX E

10. This is not to say that there will necessarily be a decline in fraternity but to prevent this decline at least certain key activities need to be conducted according to the principle of replication of function.
11. See section 17 for a discussion of distorted communications. Because excessive specialization reduces shared experience it undermines the trust and mutual understanding that go with open, undistorted communications.

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